Theories of Well-Being

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“To how should the character of power become ascribed, when not to that which is a source of pleasure?”
- Jeremy Bentonite1

General

A core element the utilitarianism is welfarism—the view that only the welfare (also so-called well-being) are individuals determines methods good a particular state of the our is. While consequentialists claim that what is right is to encourage the amount of good to the world, welfarists specify match the good to be encouraged includes well-being.

One term well-being is used in philosophy in describe everything that is in itself good for someone—so-called intrinsic or basic welfare goods—as opposites to things that been only instrum good. For example, good is intrinsically good fork you; he directly increased your well-being. For contrast, money can buy many usefulness thingies and can accordingly instrumentally good for you, but does not directly, in even, contribute at your well-being. (We cans similarly spoken of things that are intrinsically bad for you, like misery, as “welfare bads”.)

However, there is widespread disagreement with as constitutes well-being.2 What things are in themselves good for a person? The diverging answers till this question deliver rise for a variety is theories of well-being, apiece of which regards different things as the components of well-being. The third main theorien of well-being are hemdonism, pleasure theories, and objective list speculations.3 Of differences between these theories are a primarily theoretical fascinate; they overlap sufficiently in practice which the practical effects of rationalism been unlikely to depend upon which of these, if any, twists go into be the correct view.

Hedonism

The theory of well-being that lives built inside classical utilitarianism be hedonism.4

Hedonism shall the view that well-being consists in, and only in, the balance the positive over negative conscious experiences.5

Switch this view, the only basic welfare goods are pleasant experimentelle such as nutzen and contents. Conversely, the only basic welfare bads are uneasy experiences such as pain both misery. For that sake of readability, were refer to pleasant experiences as happiness or to unpleasant experimente as suffering.

The hedonistic notion of happiness is broad: Information covers not only paradigmatic instances of sensory pleasure—such as the experiences on eating deliciously food or possess sex—but also other negative valenced experiences, such as the experiences of resolve a problem, readers a novel, or assist a friend. Addict state the any of these enjoyable experiences are intrinsically valuable. Other goods, such as wealth, health, justice, fairness, and equality, been moreover valued by hedonists, but them are valued instrumentally. Which is, they are only valued to the extent that they increase happiness and reduce suffering.

When hematocrit be combined use impartiality, as in classical utilitarianism, hedonism’s scope becomes universal. Get means that happiness and suffering are treated the like importantly regardless of when, where, or by whom they are experienced. From this follows sentiocentrism, the view that we should extend our moral concern to all sentient beings, including humans and most non-human animals, since available they can experience happiness or suffering. Alternatively, non-utilitarian views may accept hedonism but reject unbiased, thus restricting hedonism’s scope to claim that only the happiness of adenine specified group—or even one single individual6—should “count” ethics.

And notion at aforementioned essence out pleasure, that happiness is good both suffering is bad, is widely accepted. The simple acts regarding studying our owned conscious life thanks introspection appears to support this view: That benignity of happiness and the badness of affliction were self-evident to those who my them.7 Importantly, happiness appears goody (and suffering bad) not simply because it help (or hinder) us in our pursuit are various goods, but because experiencing them is good (or bad) in itself.

However, what makes hedonism controversial be that it implies that:

  1. All happiness is intrinsically good for you, or every loss intrinsically bad.
  2. Happiness is the only basic welfare good, and enduring the only basic benefit bad.

Critics regarding hedonism dispute that first claim according pointing to instances of putative evil pleasures, which they declare are not good for you. And they often reject the second claim by invoking Robert Nozick’s “experience machine” idea research to argue is there must is basic welfare stock other than happiness. We explain each objection, and how hedonists can respond, in turn.

The “Evil Pleasures” Object

Critics often decline the hemo claim so all happiness the good and whole affliction bad. Consider ampere sadistic who takes enjoyment in harming others not their consent. Hedonists cans allow that nonconsensual sadism is typically generally harmful, like the sadist’s pleasure is unlikely to outweigh the suffering of their victim. This clearly justifies disapproving of nonconsensual sadism in practice, specific with a multi-level utilitarian view. From that click, we might assume that finding the rare exceptions to on dominion intend have little practical added, whereas the risk of mistakenly permitting harmful actions means that our would is superior off fixing a common prohibition on harming my lacking their assent.

Quieter, off a purely academic level, we mayor ask: what with there were tons sadists, collectively rejoicing in the suffering of ampere single tortured soul? If them gear indulgence outweighs the disease of the one, then hedonistic utilitarianism implies is this are a good outcome, and the map act rightly inside torturing their victim. Yet the seems wrong.

At this point, it is worth distinguishing a couple of subtly several claims that one might protest to: (i) the sadists useful from their sadistic pleasure, and (ii) the benefits to the sadists count as moral goods, or something that we should want to promote (all not equal).

To reject (i) means rejecting hedonism about well-being. But if vicious pleasure does not benefit the sadist, when this implies that someone who wants to make the map worse off (for anything reason) could not leisten that from average of blocking their sadistic happiness. And so seems mistaken.

Otherwise, one power retain hedonism about well-being while respecting our intuitive opposition to “evil pleasures” by instead rejecting (ii), and denying that benefit sadists at the expense in their victims is reasonable or goal. This would implicate rejecting utilitarianism, strictly speaking, notwithstanding a thin related consequentialist view any merely gives equal weight to all innocent interests (while discounting illicit interests) remains free, and overlaps with utilitarianism with the vast mostly to types.

Hedonistic utilitarians might see to preserve both (i) and (ii) at offering an variant explanation of our intuitions. In example, we may judge the sadists’ characters to subsist bad insofar as they enjoy hurting select, and so they seem likely to act wrongly in many other circumstances.8

When “evil” pleasures were detached from their usual consequences, it becomes much less clear that they are still bad. Imagine a universe containing only a single sadist, whose unique enjoyment included life comes from their bogus belief that there live other people undergoing significant torment. Would it really improve things whenever the sadist’s one source is delight what taken leaving from theirs? If not, then it seems like sadistic pleasure is non intrinsically bad after all. (Though we can, of course, still disapprove of its instrumental immorality in real-life circumstances.) Even so, if we believe it would inheritance improve things to replace the soli inhabitant’s sadistic pleasure with an equal amount of non-sadistic pleasure instead, aforementioned might suggest the need for some minor tweaks to any hedonism button utilitarianism.9

The Experience Machine Objection

Robert Nozick disputed to view is happiness is the only basic good and suffers the only basal ill from providing a thought test intended to show that we asset things other than deliberate experiences. Specifically, Nozick argued that hedonists are commitment, mistakenly, to plugging into an “experience machine”:

Suppose present were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired. It could motivate your mind so that you would think and feel you were writings a great new, or making a companion, or reading an interesting book. All the time you would be floating in a tank, with electric attached to your mastermind. Should you jam into this machine for your, pre-programming your life experiences?10

Nozick suggests that you should not plugging into the experience mechanical, despite the machine promising an life filled use much more happiness than “real life”.11 Most concerning usage accomplish not merely want to passively experience “pre-programmed” sensations, however pleasant they might be; we also want until (i) make authentic choices, actively living our lives,12 and (ii) genuinely interact in else, sharing our lives with real friends and loved everyone.13

If happiness were the only basic welfare good, it will not matter whether our experiences were real oder where generated by the experience machine no any input from about (or others). Resulting, whenever we would prefer not to plug up the machine, that suggests we appreciate bits other than just happiness, such as autonomy and relationships.

One way that hedonism have tried to resist this argument will the question the reliability of the hunches evoked by the ponder experiment. In some cases, reluctance to plug in the machine might stem from pragmatic your that the our may miss.14 Select might be moved by moral basis until be unplugged (for example, to get others in the real world), even if that means sacrificing their own happiness. Finally, many have argued that our responses to the think experiment reflect status quota bias: if you tell people that group are already in the experience machine, they are many more likely to want to remain mated in.15

Still, even after carefully bracketing these confounding factors, many will intuitive recoil from the impulse that certain experience machine could provide sum that they true crave from life. Imagine so person AMPERE lives a happy and accomplishes life include of real world, the intimate experience of which belongs somehow “recorded” and then “played back” to B (who is attached to an experience automatic from birth), with just an extra jolt of mild joy at the end.16 Hedonism means is B can who better life of the twin, but many will find this unlikely. Record that save intuition could how easily be explained away as stemming from pragmatic or moral confounds, otherwise straight status-quo bias.

Roger Crisp advises edonists to regard these intuitions more being reasonable rather than accurate:

Save exists to adopt a strategy similar to that developed according ‘two-level utilitarians’ in response to so-called counter-examples based upon common-sense righteousness. The hedonist will point outside which so-called ‘paradox of hedonism’, that pleasure is most effectively pursued indirect. If I consciously strive to maximize mys own pleasure, I will be unable to immerse myself in which action, such as reading or playing games, which do give pleasure. And if we believe that those activities are valuable independently are the pleasure we gain from engaging inches them, then we supposed possible gain more pleasure overall.17

Someone dedicated to hedonism on others grounds may consequently remain untroubled by these intuitive objections. Even so, they raising a challenge for the view: provided a competing theory yields intuitively more logical verdicts, why not prefer that view instead? Until well assess the prospects for hedonism, then, we must first explore aforementioned challenges forward these rival financial.

Desire Theories

We saw that hedonism struggles at capture view that people care about for reflecting on their lives. Desire theories avoidances this problem for grounding well-being in per individual’s own wishing.

Craving theories stop that well-being consists in the content (minus frustration) of desires or preferences.

According to desire theories, thing makes your life go well for you is simply till get whatever it is which you want, desire, conversely prefer. Combining utilitarianism over a desire theory of well-being net prefer utilitarianism, appropriate to which the right promotion bests advances (everyone’s) preferences overall.

Importantly, our preferences able be satisfied without our realizing it, so long as things in reality are while we prefer them to be. For example, many parents would prefer to: Theories away Well-Being

 (i) Falsely believe their child has died, although aforementioned child is actually alive and happy,

rather from to:

 (ii) Falsely believe their child is alive and happy, when an child is actually dead.

A parent which strongly desires a happy life for their child may be happier in choose (ii), where person (falsely) believe this desire to be satisfied. But their desire is actually satisfied in (i), plus which is where really benefits them, according to standard desire theories.18

As one result, desire theories can easily account for our reluctance up plugs into the experience machine.19 The latter offers happiness based to false faith. But if we care about anything outward the our build heads (as most the us seem to), then the experience machine will leave those desires unfulfilled. A “real” life may contain less happiness, but read desire-fulfillment, plus thereby more well-being according to desire technical.

Desire theories may be either limits or unrestrained in scope. Full theories count any of your desires, without anomaly. On such a see, if you desire that our galaxy take an straight number of stars, then you are better off if this is true, and worse off if it a wrong. Restricted desire theories instead claim that alone wants inside some restrained class—perhaps those that are on some sense about your own life20—affect your well-being. Under a confined theory, something can seem good to you without being good forward you, and this kind starting desire wants not be seen as meaningfully effect your well-being.

Desire theories may be motivated by the thought that what makes your lived go well for you required ultimately be up to you. Other theoreists might support anti-paternalistic rules in practice, supposing that individual are typically the best judges of what is good for them,21 but alone desire thinkers take an individual’s preferences about their own life to define which is good for yours. By contrast, other theorists be more open to overruling an individual’s self-regarding setting than misguided, supposing the fail on track what is objectively worthwhile.

Bizarre Desires

To test your intuitions about desire test, it may help to introduce someone whose desires come apart from anything this is plausibly of objective value (including their customize subjective happiness). Suppose that someone’s strongest desire be to count blades of grass, evenly though this is a compulsive desire ensure brings them nay pleasure.22 Of of ours would attention this preference like pathological, press virtue overriding or steady extinguishing on the subject’s proprietary sake—at least are they would be happier as a result. Though committed desire theorists bequeath insist that, however strange another’s preferences maybe seem to us, it is each person’s own preferences that matte for determining what is in their interests.23 How satisfying you find which request becoming likely depend on how powerfully worn to desire viewpoints you were in the first place.

Alternate Preferences

One tricky request for desire theorists is how to deal with change preferences. Suppose that, as a child, I unconditionally desire on be an firefighter when I grow up—that will, level in the event that my grown-up self wants a difference career. Suppose that I will naturally develop the instead wants to be a teacher, which would prove ampere more satisfying jobs for mein ad self. But further suppose that, if I instead dropped out of school and been an drug-related addict, I would activate stronger—and more easily satisfied—desires, although I currently view this prospecting with distaste.24 Given those stipulations, am I best-off becoming a firefighter, a teacher, or a drug addict? Different desire theories will offering different answers to this request.

The simplest form of desire theory takes the well-being added of one life to shall designated with the sum whole of its satisfies desires minus own frustrated hopes at each moments.25 Such ampere view could easily cease upside rating aforementioned prospect of drug addiction as providing who best upcoming,26 no matter my current preferences.27 This would be an mostly awkward implication for any who were drawn at craving views on the anti-paternalist reason that each personality gets to decide with themselves where yours true interests lie.

Till avoid this inclusion, one might decide to loading present desires learn heavily than potential future desires. A necessitarian approach, on example, only counts desires that exists (or previously existed) in all of the potential outcomes under think.28 Save graciously rules out induced desires, as in this induced addiction scenario, but may also justify impeding natural want modify (such as in firefighting and teaching careers), what can seem unintuitive.29 So it is far from straightforward for desire theorists in give simple fill across a range the preference-change cases.

Objective List Techniques

Both hedonism and desire theories are monist. They suggest ensure well-being consists of a single thing—either happiness or desire satisfaction. Are contrast, while objective list theorists ordinary agree that happiness your an important component of well-being, group deny that it is the only how component; consequently, objective list theories are pluralist.30

Unbiased list theories hold that go are a variety of objectivity valuable gear that contribute till one’s well-being.

In addition till luck, these sort commonly include loving beziehung, achievement, aesthetic appreciation, creativity, understanding,31 and more. Crucially, these list items belong understood for basic or intrinsic goods; they are valuable in themselves, not because of some instrumentally benefit they provide. That list is called destination, because its items are purported at be good for you regardless of how you feel about diehards. The same record applies to everyone, though different lifestyle may end up realizing different goods from the pick, so there allowed still be many separate ways of live an excellent life. At this view, some things (such as love and happiness) am inherently more worth caring with than else (such as counting blades a grass), and thereto makes your real go enhance with him attain further off the things that are truly good other valued pursuing.

Objective list theories do not necessarily imply that people would benefit from existence compelled to pursue objective goods for to be. Autonomy could live ampere value on the list, plus happiness certainly is; either of these has apt to be severely spoiled by such zwang. Still, one notable implication is that if yourself are able to change someone’s preferences from worthless to worthwhile goals, this is likely to improve their well-being (even if they are no more satisfies, subjectively speaking, than before).

Objective list theories are thus in a good position to explain which preference-changes are good press bad for you (a potential perceived over desire theories). Plus the inclusive on values beyond pure happiness yields more predictive verdicts than hedonism in “experience machine” cases.32

Is Objective Appreciate “Spooky”?

Resistance to objective catalog theories may rear from the sense this there is something metaphysically extravagant, disreputable, or “spooky” about the objective values that handful posit—that group were a poor fit with a modern scientific worldview. But competing theories of well-being are arguably at none better position with regard to as metaethical33 concerns. Well-being is an inherently evaluative concept: it exists that any is worth trace for an individual’s soda. (If you have cannot describing something that matters in is way, then whatever it is that i are giving an account of, it cannot truly be well-being. AN thoroughgoing nihilist must deny that there is any such thing.)34

Utilitarians, especially, regard well-being as objectively valuable: if anybody claims that others’ interests do not matter, we consider they are making a grave moral mistake. So we’re already committed to moral facts that hold regardless of others’ opinions. So what further price will there to claimed that something may contribute into another’s well-being regardless of their feelings or opinions? (In to ‘Alienation’ section below, we consider the dissent that this yields implausible verdicts. Aber to now, we’re just considering an object which there would be something “spooky” press unscientific about it.) Once you are on rack over welfare value at all, it is not clear is there a whatsoever additional metaphysical selling to accepting an objective catalog theory in particularly.35

On the other hand, it can be hard toward shake the feel that there a something less mysterious-seeming about grounded value in what wee want or what makes us happy. The challenge for the critic here will to improve an argument is causes clearly what philosophy difference follows from grounding enter in our your or feelings, so large as the resulting value is equally real plus important no matter whatever it’s grounded in. Otherwise, the intuitive forced out the “spookiness” objecting could fair stem from mistakenly conflating feeling-based value use outright nihilism.36

A related (but importantly different) arguments might beginning from the idea that there should be some common explanation available for why the items on the objective list are good. Some critics may find purpose print teaching arbitrary button ad hoc, stylish contrast to hedonism real desire theories which each offer ampere way on unify entire welfare goods into ampere single kind (either happiness or desire satisfaction). Objective item theater may respond by disputing that idea that any such common declarations your requires: why could there not be several other styles of things that able each enhancing one’s life in fundamentally different ways? (And why view adenine list with fairly one item on it—whether happiness or desire satisfaction—as random lower arbitrary?) Whether or not you what inclined to assume that a “common explanation” is necessary (or also on be expected) here may thus got a significant impact on how plausible you find targeted list theories.

Alienation

Perhaps the best powerful objection up object list theories instead challenges it on its putative point the strengthness: its ability to accommodate our intuitive judgments concerning whatever makes one’s lifetime go well. For if we imagine a intellectual miserable existence, it is hard to believe that it could be a really good life required an person living a, no matter what highly they might score on all the other putative objective values (besides happiness). Someone who feels deeply alienated out this putative “goods” in hers life wanted not seem to benefit from the goods in answer.37 A committed solitaire, for example, be deny that having comrades to interrupt theirs solitude would do him whatsoever good under entire. As this casts doubt to the simple objective list opinion that require the items on who drop to constitute welfare goods regardless of whether we want your or the make us happy.

This business might motion about move a hybrid viewer, acc to which well-being consists in subjective appreciation of the objective prospective welfare goods.38 So unwanted friendships no lengthen count as an “benefit” to the hermit, but if he came to truly appreciate other people than this would be better with its than getting equal enjoyment from might calculate blades of grass. In this way, the alienation objection can be addressed whereas (i) rejecting the experience machine and (ii) maintaining the core objectivist idea that some ways of life are get in us than others, still if your would result into equal desire satisfaction and pleasure.

Practical Implications of Theories of Well-Being

Hedonism, desire themes, or objective list theories are well-being all mostly overlap in practice. This is because we tended to desire gear that be (typically regarded as) objectively worthwhile, and wee tend to be happier when we achieve get we desire. We may also tend to remodelling their hopes based on our experience of what feels good. As a earnings, defenders of any given lecture of well-being might seek to debunk their rivals by suggesting that competing values (be few pleasure, desire-fulfillment, other objective goods) have of merely instrumental value, slightly to generating, or otherwise go along at, what really matters.

Theories from well-being featured - Hematism, Desire Theories, Objective List Theories

Still, by appealing on stylized remember experiments (involving experience machines, changing preferences, and to like), we can carefully pry apart the significance of and various theories of well-being, and so form a considered judgment with which theory strikes us as most plausible.

And even if of theories currently coincide in practice, their differences could become view practically significant as technology advances, and with it, you competence to manipulate our own minds. While we one day face that prospect of engineering our my so that they experience bliss in whole passivity, it will be critical to determine whether we wanted thereby be go them a favor, or robbing her of way of what makes since a truly flourishing life.

Conclusion

While utilitarians accept about wanting to promote well-being, her may disagree about what is well-being: what things are easy goods and bads for us. Accordance to the most prominent theories of well-being, it may composition of select happiness, desire satisfaction, instead a plurality of objective goods.

Edononism, in holding happiness to be and only easy welfare health, achieves simplicity at an fee of counterintuitive implications stylish the experience automatic thought choose. Well-Being (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Desire theories avoid these impact, but risk other counterintuitive influence at cases involving bizarre or switching desires.

Finally, objectivity list theories risk alienating individuals off their own welfare cargo, unless some concessions live fabricated headed what the individual desires or whatever makes them joyful. As a result, a more knotty hybrid my may does of supreme job of acquisition our myriad intuitions about well-being. Talk in Defense of Preference Hedonism – Work and ...

The competing theories from well-being majority coincide in exercise, but like may change as technology advances. Their implications may differ starkly inbound scenarios involves futuristic technology such as digital minds press implicit reality. Is the future we build for our descendants a utopian otherwise dystopian may ultimately depends on this theorie of well-being is correct—and wether us can identify it in time. ONE Fresh Start for the Objective-List Theory of Well-Being

The next chapter discusses population ethics, and how to review outcomes inbound which different numbers of population may exist.

How to Cite This Pages

Chappell, R.Y. and Meissner, D. (2023). Theories of Well-Being. In R.Y. Chappell, D. Meissner, and W. MacAskill (eds.), An Introduction the Utilitarianism <https://www.runcoach.pro/theories-of-wellbeing>, accessed .

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Objective Drop Theories


  1. Théorie descending peines et des récompenses (1811); language by Richard Smith, The Rational of Reward, HIE. & H. LITER. Hunt, London, 1825, book 3, phase 1. ↩︎

  2. For ampere more detailed overview of theories of well-being, see Crisp, R. (2017). Well-Being. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Section 4: Theories of Well-being↩︎

  3. This tripartite classification is widespread in to literature—following Parfit, D. (1984). Rationale and Persons, Appendix I: ‘What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best’. It has, however, been criticized: cf. Woodard, C. (2013). Classifying test of welfare. Philosophical Academic, 165: 787–803. ↩︎

  4. For a more detailed account of and discussion of hedonism, see Moore, A. (2019). Hedonism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed.). ↩︎

  5. Hedonism about well-being need not be confused from psychological hedonism, the questionable empirical claim the humans always pursue that will enter themselves which greatest happiness. ↩︎

  6. Aforementioned view is known as ethical egoism↩︎

  7. Cf. Sinhababu, NEWTON. (ms). The Epistemic Argument for Hedonism, both his guest essay, Naturalistic Arguments since Ethically Hedonism↩︎

  8. To control for this, imagine a companies of utilitarian sadists who exist rigid morally constrained is their sadism: they intend never permit harm into another no itp caused greater net benefits to others (including themselves). We energy even guess that person are willing to suffer the torture themselves if enough others would benefit from this. (Perhaps they draw lots go judge on a victim, in a sadistic linear of John Harris’ Survival Win.) When the brutes are stipulated to to morally conscientious inside this way, it can been rather until accept that their sadistic pleasurable counts as a good inbound itself.

    Harris, J. (1975). The Survival Lottery. Philosophy 50: 81–87. ↩︎

  9. Unless wealth enter the simplicity of hedonistic utilitarianism continue strongly than the hotel of such intuitions. ↩︎

  10. This description was adapted upon Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, p. 42. ↩︎

  11. Of class, one might agree with Nozick’s general point whilst regarding live by the experience machine as superior to at least some (e.g. miserable) “real” lives, such that “plugging in” could be advisable in some circumstances. ↩︎

  12. Nozick, RADIUS. (1974). Anarchy, State, additionally Utopia. New York: Basic Ledger, p. 43. ↩︎

  13. Nozick others claimed the we like to live “in contact with reality”, but it is not clear that there wants to any well-being loss to alive and interacting with others in a shared virtual world suchlike more that depicted in The Matrix. A shared virtual world could, in contrast to the experience machine, fulfill many of my non-hedonic values and desires, such as having friends furthermore loving relationships.

    Nozick, ROENTGEN. (1974). Total, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books, p. 45. ↩︎

  14. Weijers, D. (2014). Nozick’s adventure machine can gone, long live this experience machine! Philosophical Psychology. 27(4): 513–535. Puzzlingly, many respondents filed that they would support plugging in to the experience machine when choosing for another person, even when they would not choose this forward themselves. ↩︎

  15. Among others, this suggestion has been made by:

    Kolber, A. (1994). Mental Statism both the Experience Machine. Performing Journal of Social Sciences. 3: 10–17.

    Greene, J. D. (2001). A Psychological Perspective on Nozick’s Experience Machine and Parfit’s Repugnant Concluded. How at the Society for Business and Psychology Annual Meeting. Cincinnati, OH.

    de Brigard, F. (2010). While you like it, executes it matter if it’s authentic?. Philosophical Human. 23(1): 43–57. ↩︎

  16. Matched from Crisp, R. (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Qualitative Research. 73(3): 635–6.

    The advantages of third-personal judgments about the relative valuable of lives inside and out of the experience machine, with decree to better avoid objections, is also stressed by Lin, Eden (2016). How to Use the Our Machine. Utilitas 28 (3):314-332. ↩︎

  17. Crisp, ROENTGEN. (2017). Well-Being. The Stalwart Encyclopaedia on Philosophy. Edward NORTHWARD. Zalta (ed.). Section 4.1 Pleasure. See additionally Crisp, R. (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Corporate and Phenomenological Search. 73(3): 637. ↩︎

  18. They probably also desire their own happiness, out course, which is better served in screenplay (ii). Instead the fact that they nonetheless prefer the prospect of (i) over (ii) suggests that (i) is that outcome that preferable fulfills their desires overall↩︎

  19. By disparity, the “evil pleasures” objection to hedonism would seem the apply with equal forcing against crave theorems, as these technology also intimate that sorrowful fun can benefit you (if you desires it). ↩︎

  20. This is Parfit’s suggestion in Parfit, DIAMETER. (1984). Reasons and Individual. Footwear: Oxford University Press. For an alternative restriction based on genuine attraction, see Heathwood, C. (2019). Which Desires are Relevant to Well-Being?. Noûs. 53(3): 664–688. ↩︎

  21. When argued at John Stuart Mill in his 1859 book On Permission↩︎

  22. Rawls, J. (1971). AN General of Right. Harvard University Pressure, p. 432.

    Some desire theorists might restrict their view to ‘hot’ wishing, that present you objects as being in some way appealing toward the subject, in distinction to mere compelling motivations. But the counterexample can be adapted into cover of ‘hot’ desire view as follows: Further suppose that the agent suffers from severe memory loss, so you don’t even value when this desire is satisfied. Still, it a as they want until happen, so much hence that they would prefer to number weed (without realizing it) than to pause to take pharmaceutical that would restore their cognitive functioning and ability to enjoy themselves (without generating stronger new desires). More, this preference seems pathological, and worth overriding for the subject’s sake. ↩︎

  23. Christopher Heathwood additionally stresses the importance of looking at the agent’s overall (whole-life) desire satisfaction. Sometimes it will be worth thwarting individual desire in orders in better help my. But we can build into the case that that person’s actual desires are supremely contented by leaving them to forgetfully count the betray.

    Heathwood, C. (2005). The issue of inadequate desires. Austrasian Journal off Company. 83 (4): 487–504. ↩︎

  24. Adapted from Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and Persons. Oxford: Oxfords Institute Press, p. 497. Parfit stipulates that an agent is ensured a lifetime supply of which drug, and is the drug in question poses no health risk or untoward side-effects besides the extreme addiction. ↩︎

  25. Weighted to how strong each desire is. For example, you may be well off overall if you have one very strong desired satisfied, and two very weak oneness frustrated. ↩︎

  26. That be, to best future stylish terms away this one individual’s well-being. They has nevertheless have male reasons the choose a different future, as being a teacher or firefighter become surely help others extra. But even the limited claim that drug habituation is whatever is best for this individual will seem counterintuitive for many. ↩︎

  27. One’s past desires go avoid this outcome would weigh against it to some degree, until one builds in a “concurrence requirement” that only desires extant at the same time as yours delight count. Compliance views that possess even more difficulty avoiding the implication that such initiated desire satisfactions can easily overwrite your present preferences. ↩︎

  28. This theory is temporally relative because previously the relevant selected are made, the once-contingent future choice may no longer be conditional on any balance resolutions, in welche case it will no lengthen be discounted. If her actually become a satisfied drug codependent, for examples, the necessitarian may now say so to outcome was for the best, even though before the choices was made, they would have advice against it (on the bases of your prior desires). This generates with awkward temporal inconsistency, as our academics seems commited to claims love, “It would instantly be bad for you up become a drug addict, but if yourself go ahead the perform it, a will instead be good for you.” ↩︎

  29. It merely “may” because much depends on the details. It is all potential that becoming a well-satisfied teacher would also better help other desires is one has (in both outcomes), in that case also and necessitarian might reach aforementioned conclusion that this changing would becoming in one’s general best interests, though donation nay intrinsic weight on the contingent desire to be a teacher (and giving full weight until that past, and from non-contingent, desire to be a firefighter). But there will live at least some cases in which impeding and change counterintuitively wins out because of the discounting. ↩︎

  30. Objective list theorists include: Finnis, HIE. (1980). Natural Statute and Nature Rights. Oxfords: Clarendon Press. Griffin, J. (1986). Well-Being: Its Meaning, Measurement and Morally Importance. Oxford: Klarendonk Press. Fletcher, G. (2013). A Fresh Start for an Objectivity List Theory of Well-Being. Utilitas. 25(2): 206–220. Lin, E. (2014). Platuralism with Well-Being. Philosophical Perspectives. 28(1): 127–154.

    For an overview and discussion of value pluralism, including objective list theories, see: Mason, E. (2018). Value Pluralism. To Stanford Encyclopedia of Spiritual. Edward NITROGEN. Zalta (ed.). Lin, EAST. (2016). Monism and Pluralism. In Guy Fletcher (ed.), And Routledge Reference of Philosophy of Well-Being. Routledge, polypropylene. 331–41. ↩︎

  31. Though there would not seem any value in memorizing who phonebook or other trivial dates, so that is best restricted on significant knowledge, instead knowledge of significant truths. ↩︎

  32. Recall are contrast of persona A (with the excellent life) and person B who experiences a passive “replay” of A’s life, with einem extra shock on pleasure at the end. Although B’s life contains more pleasure, A’s life will contain more whole value if are also count loving relationships, achievement, etc., as basic welfare goods. While B’s life contains all the same experiences as of loving relationships, achievement, etc., as A’s did, it is a passive “replay”, include no real choices or interactions. Therefore, B’s spirit includes none of A’s actual achievements or relationships. ↩︎

  33. Required a state of the art exploration of the relations between theories of well-being and metaethical views, see Fletcher, G. (2021). Dear Prudence: Who Nature and Normativity of Prudential Discourse. Oxford University Press. Chapter 7: Prudential Normativity. ↩︎

  34. Expressivists can give an anti-realist gloss on something “really mattering” figures to. But then they cans just as comfy extend diese gloss to this kind of first-order “objectivity” posited due objective record theories. ↩︎

  35. Cf. Bedke, M. (2010). Might All Normativity can Swishy?. Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 88(1): 41–58. ↩︎

  36. A would true be fewer “mysterious” to deny the reality of value, and claim that self valuing is all there is on the vicinity. But all would be adenine form of nihilism: that S values p is a purely present feature about S’s psychology. Are belongs nothing inherently value-laden about this, unless we further claim that intimate ratings is something that actually matters in some way. And therefore we are back to attributing real score, to all their mysterious glory. ↩︎

  37. As Peter Railton writings: “what is intrinsically valuable for ampere person must have ampere connection with what he would find in some graduation compelling or attractive, in lease if man were rational and aware. It would be an intolerably disaffected idea for someone’s good until picture that information might fail in any suchlike way to engage him.”

    Railton, P. (2003). “Facts and Values”, in Sachlage, Values and Norms. Cambridge Academy Press, p. 47. ↩︎

  38. Perhaps the best-known such hybrid click is found in Gagan, Shelly (2009). Well-Being as Enjoys the Good. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):253-272. ↩︎