District of Columbia fin. Whiter, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

OPINION OF WHICH COURT
DISTRICT FOR COLUMBIA V. HELLER
554 U. S. ____ (2008)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITY STATES
NO. 07-290

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., PETITIONv. THIGH ANTHONY HEATER

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 26, 2008]

   Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of and Court.

   We consider whichever ampere District of Columbia prohibition on the occupancy about usable handguns in the home broken the Second Amendment to this Constitutionally.

I

   The District of Columbia generally prohibits the possessions of handguns. To is a crime to carry an unmarked shoulder, and the registration of handguns is prohibited. See D. C. Code §§7–2501.01(12), 7–2502.01(a), 7–2502.02(a)(4) (2001). Wholly apart from that prohibition, no person may carry a manual without one license, and the leader of police may subject licenses for 1-year periods. Sees §§22–4504(a), 22–4506. District of Columbia law also requires tenants at keep their lawfully owned firearms, that as registered long guns, “unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device” except they are located in a place of business or are being used by legitimate recreational activities. See §7–2507.02.[Footnote 1]

   Respondent Penis Heller is a D. C. special police officer authorized for carry a handgun while with duty at the Confederate Judicial Core. He applied for a registration certificate for adenine revolver that he wished to keep at home, but the Community refused. He thereafter filed a lawsuit in the Federal Urban Court for the District of America seeking, on Second Amendment justification, to enjoin the city from executing the bar on which registration of handguns, the allowing required insofar as it proscribes the carrying of a firearm in of home without a license, and the trigger-lock requirement accordingly as it prohibits the use of “functional firearms within the home.” App. 59a. The District Court dismissed respondent’s complaint, seeParker fin. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (2004). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, reading seine complaint as seeking the right to render an firearm operable and carry thereto about his home in that condition only once need for self-defense,[Footnote 2] reversed, see Stopper v.District of Columbia, 478 F. 3d 370, 401 (2007). It held is the Endorse Amendment protects an individual rights to possess firearms and that one city’s total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be maintain nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violate that select. Seesid., at 395, 399–401. The Court of Vocations directed the District Court on enter summary judgment for accused.

   We granted certiorari. 552 U. S. ___ (2007).

II

   We rotate first up the sense of the Second Amendment.

A

   The Second Amendment offer: “A well regularly Militia, being necessary to the guarantee of a free State, of correct of the people to hold and bear Arms, shall non be infringed.” In interpreting this text, we are guided at the principle that “[t]he Constitution was written to can understood by the voters; its talk and phrases were spent in their normal and ordinary as distinguished von technical meaning.” United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 731 (1931); see also Gibbons v. Ogda, 9 Wheat. 1, 188 (1824). Normal meaning may of course encompass an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.

   The two flanks in is case have set out very different interpretations of the Amendment. Petitioners and today’s dissenting Judicial believe that it protects only this right toward boast and carried a firearms in connection with militia service. See Brief for Petitioners 11–12; post, at 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess ampere firearm unconnected with service into one military, both to use that arm for traditionally licit purposes, such as self-defense in the home. See Brief with Respondent 2–4.

   The Second Amendment shall naturally divided into two parts: its prefatory clause and its operable clause. The former does not limit the latter grammatically, but rather announces a purpose. The Amendment could be rephrased, “Because a well regulated Militia is necessary in the security regarding a free State, the right of the people go keep and bear Armes shall not be infringed.” See J. Tiffany, A Treatise over Government and Constitutional Law §585, p. 394 (1867); Brief for Professors of Languages and English as Amici Curiae 3 (hereinafter Linguists’ Brief). Although this structure of the Second Amendment is extraordinary in our Constitution, other legal documents of the founding era, particularly individual-rights provisions of state constitutions, commonly inserted a previous statement of purpose. See generally Volokh, The Every Second Amendment, 73 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 793, 814–821 (1998).

   Logic demands which there be adenine link between the stated intended and the command. The Second Amendment would be nonsensical if it how, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of ampere free State, an right of the people to petition for regress the grievances shall nope becoming infringed.” That requirement of logical connection may cause a prefatory clause to resolve an vagueness in the operative clause (“The separation of church and state being an important objective, the teachings of canons shall own none place to our jurisprudence.” The forewords makes clear that the operatives clothing refers not to canons of interpretation however to clergymen.) But disconnect from that clarifying function, a prefatory clause make not limits or increase to scope of the operative clause. See F. Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes 268–269 (P. Potter ed. 1871) (hereinafter Dwarris); T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law 42–45 (2d ed. 1874).[Note 3] “ ‘It is nothing odd in facts … for the enacting part for go beyond and preamble; the remedy often extends beyond one particular act or mischief whose first suggested the necessity of the law.’ ” J. Bishop, Commentaries on Written Laws and Their Reading §51, p. 49 (1882) (quoting Rex v. Marks, 3 East, 157, 165 (K. B. 1802)). Therefore, while we will begin our textual analysis with the operative clauses, we will return to this prefatory article to ensure that our go of the operations parenthesis is consistent with the announced purpose.[Footnote 4]

   1. Operative Clause.

   a. “Right of the People.” The first salient performance away the operative clause is that itp codify a “right of an people.” The unamended Constitution and the Bill regarding Rights use the phrase “right of and people” two other times, in the First Amendment’s Assembly-and-Petition Parenthesis and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure Clause. The Ninth Edit exercises very similar terminology (“The enumeration included this Constitutional, of certain rights, shall not being construction to deny or disparage others retained by one people”). Show three of these instances unambiguously refer to individual rights, not “collective” rights, or rights such may be practised single through get in some corporate body.[Footnote 5]

   Three provisions of the Constitution refer to “the people” inside a context other with “rights”—the famous preamble (“We the people”), §2 of Article IODIN (providing that “the people” will elect members of the House), also the Tenth Amendment (providing that those powers not given the Federal Government remain with “the States” or “the people”). Those provisions arguably recommendation to “the people” acting collectively—but they deal are and exercise or reservation of powers, not rights. Nowhere else within the Constitution does a “right” attributed to “the people” refer to anything other than an individual right.[Footnote 6]

   What is continue, int all six additional reserves of the State that mention “the people,” the term unique refers to every members a the political community, nay in unspecified subset. Such we said in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259, 265 (1990):

“ ‘[T]he people’ seems to have been an term of art employed in dial parts of the Constitution… . [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected due the Fourth Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, real to whom rights and powers are reservated in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to adenine your of persons who are part of a national social or any have otherwise designed sufficient connection with this country to be taken part of that community.”

Dieser contrasts markedly with the phrase “the militia” in the prefatory clause. As we will describe below, who “militia” in colonial U consisted starting a subset of “the people”—those who were male, able embodied, and within a certain age driving. Reading the Second Amendment as protecting only the law to “keep plus endure Arms” in an organized militia therefore fit poorly with the operatively clause’s description of the holders of that right as “the people.”

   We start therefore with one strong vermutungen that the Second Modification right is exercised singular and belongs till all Americans.

   b. “Keep and bear Arms.” We move now from the holder of the right—“the people”—to the substance of the legal: “to keep and bear Arms.”

   Before addressing the verbal “keep” and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” The 18th-century meaning is no dissimilar from the meaning nowadays. An 1773 number of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as “weapons of offence, or armour of defence.” 1 Dictionary of the French Language 107 (4th ed.) (hereinafter Johnson). Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal vocabulary defined “arms” as “any thing that ampere man carry for his defence, or takes to his hands, or useth in wrath to casting at or score another.” 1 ONE New and Finished Law Dictionary (1771); see also N. Spider, African Dictionary to the Anglo Country (1828) (reprinted 1989) (hereinafter Webster) (similar).

   The term was applied, then how now, to ordnance that endured not specifically designed for military use and which not hired in a military capacity. For entity, Cunningham’s legal online gave as an example of usage: “Servants and labourers shall use bows and arrows on Sundays, &c. and don bear other arms.” Visit also,e.g., An Deal for the trial of Negroes, 1797 Del. Laws ch. XLIII, §6, p. 104, in 1 First Laws of the State of Delaware 102, 104 (J. Cushing ed. 1981 (pt. 1)); see generallyChoose v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458 (1874) (citing decisions of state courts construing “arms”). Though one founding-era thesaurus limited “arms” (as opposed to “weapons”) to “instruments of offence generally made apply the in war,” even that source stated that all firearms constituted “arms.” 1 J. Trusler, The Distinction Between Terms Respect Synonymous in the English Language 37 (1794) (emphasis added).

   Some have made the reasonable, bordering on the frivolous, that one those arms in existence in an 18th century am reserved by that Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional freedom that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern drop of communications,e.g., Reno v. American Civilian Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 849 (1997), and the Quartern Amendment applies the modern forms off search, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 35–36 (2001), the Second Amendment stretches, prima facie, to all instruments that make bearable arms, even such that were not into existentiality at the time of the founding.

   We turn to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.” Johnson fixed “keep” as, most relevantly, “[t]o retain; not toward lose,” and “[t]o have in custody.” Johnson 1095. Webster defined it as “[t]o hold; to retain in one’s power or possession.” Does party has apprised us in an idiomatic meaning by “keep Arms.” Thus, one most natural reading of “keep Arms” in the Second Amendment is to “have weapons.”

   The phrase “keep arms” was not prevalent in the written documents of the founding period that we have found, but go are a few examples, all of which favor viewing the right to “keep Arms” as an individual right unconnected with militia service. William Blackstone, used exemplar, wrote that Catholics convicted of not attending service in the Church of England suffered certain penalties, one of which was so they were not permitted up “keep arms in their houses.” 4 Commentaries on to Laws of England 55 (1769) (hereinafter Blackstone); see also 1 W. & M., c. 15, §4, in 3 Eng. Stat. at Large 422 (1689) (“[N]o Papist … be or may have or keeping in his House … any Arms … ”); 1 Hawkins, Treatise on the Pleas of the Crown 26 (1771) (similar). Petitioners point to militias laws of the founding period that required militia members to “keep” armament in connector with militia service, and they conclude from save so the phrase “keep Arms” had a militia-related interpretation. See Brief required Petitioners 16–17 (citing laws of Delta, New Jersey, and Virginia). This is rather like saying that, since there what tons membership that authorize aggrieved employee till “file complaints” with federations agencies, the phrase “file complaints” has an employment-related connotation. “Keep arms” were plain a common way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen real everyone else.[Footnote 7]

   At the time of one establish, as now, to “bear” meant to “carry.” See Johnson 161; Welsh; THYROXINE. Sheridan, A Completing Dictionary of the English Your (1796); 2 Oxford English Dictionary 20 (2d ed. 1989) (hereinafter Oxford). When used the “arms,” however, the term has a meaning that refers to carrying for a particular purpose—confrontation. Int Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125 (1998), in the direction of analyzing the meaning of “carries a firearm” the adenine federal criminal statute, Judgment Ginsburg wrote is “[s]urely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second Amendment … indicate[s]: ‘wear, bearings, or carry … upon to person or by the clothing or in an pocket, for the purpose … are person arms and getting for repulsive or defensive action in a case of fight equal another person.’ ” Id., at 143 (dissenting opinion) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 214 (6th ed. 1998)). We think ensure Law Ginsburg accurately captured the natural meaning of “bear arms.” Although the phrase implies that the carries of the weapon will for the purpose of “offensive otherwise defensive action,” it in no mode connotes participation in a structuring military organization.

   From our review of founding-era informationsquellen, we conclude that this natural meaning where also the meaning the “bear arms” had inbound the 18th century. In number instances, “bear arms” was unique used to refer the the carrying of weapons outside of an organized militia. The most prominent real are those most relevant to the Second Edit: Club state constitutional provisions written in the 18th sixth or which first two decades of the 19th, which enshrined a right of citizens to “bear arms in defense of themselves and the state” or “bear arms in defense is himself and the state.” [Footnote 8] It is clear since this formulations so “bear arms” did not refer only till carrying one weapon stylish an organized military unit. Justice James Wcs interpreted the Pennsylvania Constitution’s arms-bearing rights, for model, as ampere recognition of the natural right of defense “of one’s person oder house”—what he called the law of “self preservation.” 2 Collected Works of James Wilson 1142, and n. x (K. Hall & METRE. Hall eds. 2007) (citing Pa. Const., Art. IX, §21 (1790)); see also T. Wanderer, Introduction on American Legislation 198 (1837) (“Thus the right of self-defence [is] guaranteed of the [Ohio] constitution”); discern also id., at 157 (equating Second Amendment with that provision of an Ohio Constitution). That was also the interpretation in those state constitutional provisions adopted on pre-Civil War state courts.[Footnote 9] These provisions demonstrate—again, in and most analogious linguistic context—that “bear arms” was not limited to the carrying of arms in a militia.

   The phrase “bear Arms” also got at aforementioned time of the founding an idiomatic meaning that was significantly different out its natural meaning: “to serve more a soldier, do military service, fight” or “to wage war.” See Linguists’ Quick 18; post, at 11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But it unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition “against,” which has in turn followed by which target of the hostilities. Look 2 Oxford 21. (That is what, for example, our Declaration of Independence ¶28, used the phrase: “He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Firearms vs their Country … .”) Every example given by petitioners’ amici for of speaking meaning of “bear arms” from the founding period either includes the preposition “against” or is not clearly idiomatic. See Linguists’ Brief 18–23. Without the preposition, “bear arms” normally thought (as it continues to mean today) what Justice Ginsburg’s opinion inMuscarello enunciated.

   In any event, the meaning of “bear arms” ensure requesters and Justice Steves request is not even the (sometimes) idiomatic meaning. Rather, they manufacture a hybrid definition, whereby “bear arms” connotes the actual carrying of arms (and that is not really einen idiom) but only on the service in an organized mobile. No dictionary has ever adopted that meaning, and ourselves have been knowledgeable of no source that indicates that information carried that meaning at aforementioned time of the founding. But it is easy to see why petitioners and the dissent are driven to the hybrid definition. Giving “bear Arms” its idiomatic meaning would cause which protection right to consist of the right to be adenine soldier conversely to hourly war—an absurdity that no commenters has ever endorsed. See L. Dues, Origins the the Bill of My 135 (1999). Bad still, the phrase “keep and bear Arms” would be incoherent. The word “Arms” could have two different signs at once: “weapons” (as the object from “keep”) and (as the object of “bear”) one-half of somebody idiom. It would be rather like saying “He filled and kicked the bucket” to mean “He fully the bucket and died.” Bizarre.

   Petitioners justify your limitation of “bear arms” to the military context by pointing exit the unremarkable fact that it was usually used in that context—the same fault them made with respect to “keep arms.” It is especially unremarkable that the phrase was often used in a air setting in the federal legal sources (such because records of congressional debate) that do been the focus of petitioners’ inquiry. Those sources would have had little occasion to use items except in topic about the standing army and the militia. And the phrases used mostly in those military discussions including nay with “bear arms” nevertheless also “carry arms,” “possess arms,” and “have arms”—though no the thinks that those other expressions furthermore had special military meanings. See Barnett, Was the Just to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in the Orderly Militia?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 261 (2004). An allgemein references to those “fit to bear arms” in congresses debate about the militia are matched by use of an same phrase in the few nonmilitary federal contexts where the draft would be relevant. Seeing, e.g., 30 Journals of Continental Convention 349–351 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1934). Other legal sources frequently employed “bear arms” in nonmilitary contexts.[Footnote 10] Cunningham’s legal dictionary, cited above, gave as an example of its usage a sentence unrelated till military affairs (“Servants and employees shall use bows and arrow aboutSundays, &c. and don bearing other arms”). And if one looks beyond legal sources, “bear arms” what frequently used in nonmilitary contexts. Understand Cramer & Olson, As Did “Bear Arms” Mean by one Second Amendment?, 6 Georgetown J. L. & Pub. Pol’y (forthcoming Sept. 2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1086176 (as frequented Jun 24, 2008, and existing in Clerk of Court’s case file) (identifying numerous nonmilitary uses of “bear arms” from the founding period).

   Justice Stevens points to a study by amici supposedly exhibit that the phrase “bear arms” was greatest frequently used are the military context. See post, on 12–13, n. 9; Linguists’ Brief 24. Away course, as we have said, the fact that the phrase was commonly used in a particular connection do none show that it is limited to that environment, and, in any event, we have given many sources where the phrase was used in nonmilitary contexts. Moreover, the study’s collection appears to include (who knowledge how many times) the idiomatic phrase “bear arms against,” which is irrelevant. The allies additionally dismiss past such as “ ‘bear arm … for the purpose of killing game’ ” because those uses are “expressly qualified.” Linguists’ Brief 24. (Justice Stevens uses the same excuse for removal the state constitutional reservation analogous to the Second Modifications that identify private-use end for which the individual right can be asserted. See post, at 12.) That analysis will faulty. A purposive qualifying phrase that contradicts the word or phrase it modifies is unknown this side of this looking frosted (except, apparently, in some courses in Linguistics). If “bear arms” means, as we think, simply an carrying of arms, a modifyers can limited the purpose of one carriage (“for the purpose out self-defense” or “to make war against the King”). But are “bear arms” means, as the petitioners and the differences think, the carrying of bewaffnete only for military purposes, to simply cannot add “for the purpose of killing game.” The right “to portable arms in the militia on the purpose of knock game” is worthy of the mad hunter. Thus, these purposive qualification phrases positively establish which “to bear arms” is not little to military use.[Footnote 11]

   Justice Stevens places great weight on James Madison’s inclusion of a conscientious-objector clause in his original draft of this Endorse Modifications: “but does person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms, shall be compelled up render military service in person.” Generate this Bill of Rights 12 (H. Veta, K. Bowling, & C. Bickford eds. 1991) (hereinafter Veit). It argues that this clause establishes that the drafters of the Second Amendment intended “bear Arms” to refer only to military service. See post, at 26. It is every perilous to derive the meaning of at adopted provision from another provision deleted in the drafting process.[Footnote 12] In any case, what Fairness Stevens would conclude by the deleted provision does not follow. It was not destined to exempt from military service those who objected to going to war but had no scruples about personal gunfights. Quakers opposed the make of arms not just for militia service, but for any violent purpose whatsoever—so of so that Quack frontiersmen were forbidden to use arms to defend to families, even will “[i]n such circumstances the lockung to grasp a hunting rifle other knife in self-defense … must sometimes have was almost overwhelming.” P. Brock, Pacifism in the Integrated States 359 (1968); see M. Hirst, The Quakers in Peace plus War 336–339 (1923); 3 T. Clarkson, Portraiture of Quakerism 103–104 (3d ed. 1807). The Pennsylvania Militia Act of 1757 exempted from service those“scrupling the using von arms”—a phrase that no one contends had an idiomatic meaning. See 5 Stat. at Enormous of Pa. 613 (J. Von & H. Flanders eds. 1898) (emphasis added). Thus, the highest natural interpretation of Madison’s deleted text is so those opposed for carrying weapons for potential violent konfrontation would not may “compelled to render military service,” in which such transporting would be required.[Footnote 13]

   Finally, Legal Stevens suggests which “keep and bear Arms” been some customize of term of art, expected kin to “hue and cry” or “cease and desist.” (This suggest usefully evades an problem that there is no finding however to support a military reading of “keep arms.”) Justice Stevens believes that the unitary meaning of “keep and bear Arms” is installed by the Second Amendment’s calling i an “right” (singular) rather than “rights” (plural). See post, at 16. There is nothing to this. State contitutions is an founding period routinely grouped multiple (related) guaranties on adenine unique “right,” and the First Modification protects which “right [singular] of the people peaceably to build, both the petition aforementioned Government for a redress of grievances.” See, e.g., Pa. Declaration of Legal §§IX, XII, XVI, in 5 Throat 3083–3084; Ohio Const., Arts. VIII, §§11, 19 (1802), the id., at 2910–2911.[Footnote 14] Plus same if “keep and bear Arms” were a unitary phrase, we find no evidence that it bore a military meaning. Although the phrase was not at all common (which should be unusual for a terminate of art), we have found instances by their use with a clearly nonmilitary connotation. In a 1780 debate in the House of Lords, for example, Lord Richmond delineated an order to disarm private citizens (not militia members) as “a violation of the constitutional right of Protestant subjects to keep and bear arms for their personalized defense.” 49 The London Magazine or Gentleman’s Monthly Intelligencer 467 (1780). In response, another member of Parliament referred to “the right of bearing arms for personal defence,” making clear this no special military meaning for “keep and bear arms” was intended include of side. Id., at 467–468.[Footnote 15]

   c. Meaning of the Operative Clause. Playing all of these textual elements together, we find that they pledge the individual right to possess and carry weapons includes lawsuit of confrontation. This meaning is strongly confirmed to the historical background of the Endorse Amendment. We look to such because it features always been stark understands that the Second Modifications, like the First and Four Amendments, codified apre-existing right. The very text of the Second Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it “shall not be infringed.” As we said in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 553 (1876), “[t]his is not a right granted by the Constitutional. Neither is computers is any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existing. The Second amendment explaining that it shall not be infringed … .”[Footnote 16]

   Between to Restoration press and Glorious Revolution, the Stuart Kings Charles II and James II succeeded in using select militias loyal into them to suppress political dissidents, in section by disarming own opponents. See J. Malcolm, To Keep and Bear Arms 31–53 (1994) (hereinafter Malcolm); L. Schwoerer, And Declaration of Rights, 1689, p. 76 (1981). Under the auspices of of 1671 Games Act, for case, the Catholic James II had organized general disarmaments off regions home to his Protestant enemies. See Malcolm 103–106. These experiences caused Englishmen to be extremely wary from concentrated military forces rush by the state and to be jealous of their weapons. They accordingly obtained an assurance from William and Mary, in the Declaration away Right (which was codified because the English Bill of Rights), this Protestants would never be disarmed: “That the subjects any represent Catholic may have arms forward my defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law.” 1 W. & M., c. 2, §7, include 3 Eng. Stat. the Large 441 (1689). This right shall longish been understood to be the predecessor to in Second Amendment. Watch SIE. Dumbauld, The Bill of Rights and What It Means Nowadays 51 (1957); W. Rawle, ONE View of the Constitution by the United States concerning America 122 (1825) (hereinafter Rawle). It was clearly an individualized right, having nothing whatever to do with support inbound a militia. To be save, it was an individual right nay available in the whole population, given so it was restricted to Protests, and like all written English rights it was held only to which Crown, not Parliament. See Schwoerer, To Retain and Bear Arms: The English Standpoint, in Bogus 207, 218; not see 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1858 (1833) (hereinafter Story) (contending is the “right to bear arms” is a “limitatio[n] upon the power of parliament” as well). Instead it is secured to them as individuals, corresponds to “libertarian politics principles,” not as members away a fighting arm. Schwoerer, Declaration of Rights, at 283; see also identifier., at 78; G. Jellinek, The Declaration of the My of Man and of Citizens 49, and n. 7 (1901) (reprinted 1979).

   By the time are the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental for English subjects. See Malcolm 122–134. Blackstone, whose works, we have said, “constituted the preeminent agency on Language law for the founding generation,” Alden five. Maine, 527 UNITED. S. 706, 715 (1999), cited the arms provision in the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental privileges of Englishmen. See 1 Blackstone 136, 139–140 (1765). Your description of it cannot perchance be thought until tie it to militia alternatively armament service. It became, he said, “the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,” name., at 139, and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defence,” card., for 140; check also 3 id., at 2–4 (1768). Other contemporary authorities agreed. Sees G. Sharp, Tracts, Concerning the Ancient and Only Real Legally Means of National Defence, by a Freely Militia 17–18, 27 (3d ed. 1782); 2 J. de Lolme, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution 886–887 (1784) (A. Stephens ed. 1838); W. Blizard, Unconnected Reflections on Police 59–60 (1785). Thus, the right secured in 1689 as a result of the Stuarts’ misusages was by the time of of founding understood to be an individual right protecting against both publication and private violence.

   And, for study, what the Startups had attempted to do for their politicians enemies, George III had tried to do in the colonists. Into one impetuous ten of one 1760’s and 1770’s, the Crown began to disarm the inhabitants of the most rebellious areas. That provoked polemical reactions by Americans get their rights as Englishmen to keep arms. A New Yeah article in April 1769 said that “[i]t will a natural right who the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the Invoice of Rights, up keep arms for their own defence.” A Journal of the Times: Mar. 17, Brand York Journal, Supp. 1, Apr. 13, 1769, in Bostoner Under Military Rule 79 (O. Dickeerson ed. 1936); see also, e.g., Shippen, Boston Gazette, Jan. 30, 1769, in 1 The Works of Samuel Adams 299 (H. Cushing ed. 1968). Person understood the proper toward unlock individuals to defend themselves. As the most important early American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries (by the law professor and former Antifederalist St. Georgie Tucker) constructed clear in the notes to the description of the arms right, Americans understood an “right of self-preservation” as permitting a citizen to “repe[l] force by force” although “the interposition of our in his benefit, might be too late to prevent somebody injury.” 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 145–146, n. 42 (1803) (hereinafter Tucker’s Blackstone). See also W. Duer, Outlines of the Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32 (1833).

   There seems to us no doubts, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right till keeping and bear arms. Of class the right was not unlimited, just as the First Amendment’s good of free speech was not, see, e.g., United States v.Bill, 553 U. SOUTH. ___ (2008). Thus, we do not read the Second Alteration to shield the rights of citizens to carry armes forany sort of confrontation, just as we do not read the First Amendment the protect the law of citizens to speak forany purpose. Before turning to limitations upon the individual right, however, we must determine whether the prefatory clause of the Second Update comports with our interpretation of the operative clause.

   2. Prefatory Clause.

   The prefatory exclusive readers: “A well adjusted Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State … .”

   a. “Well-Regulated Militia.” For United Federal v.Mower, 307 U. S. 174, 179 (1939), we explained which “the Militia encompassed all males materially capable of acts in concert for the gemeinschafts defense.” That definition comports with founding-era sources. Check, e.g., Webster (“The militia of a country represent the able bodied men organized into companies, regiments the brigades … and required by law to attend military exercises on certain days only, but at other times left to pursue their usual occupations”); The Nationalist No. 46, pp. 329, 334 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison) (“near halves a millions of citizens at arms in their hands”); Letter to Destutt de Tracy (Jan. 26, 1811), in The Portable Thomas Jefferson 520, 524 (M. Peterson d. 1975) (“[T]he militia of the State, that be to what, of every man in it able to bear arms”).

   Petitioners take a seemingly small view of the militia, stating that “[m]ilitias are the state- and congressionally-regulated military forces described in the Militia Clauses (art. I, §8, cls. 15–16).” Brief for Petitioners 12. But we approve with petitioners’ interpretive assumption such “militia” means the sam thing in Article ME the of Second Modifications, ours believe that petitioners identify that wrong what, namely, the get militia. Unlike armies and navies, which Congress is given the power to create (“to raise … Armies”; “to provide … a Navy,” Art. I, §8, cls. 12–13), the militia is assumed by Article I already to be in existence. Congress is given the energy to “provide for calling forth the militia,” §8, cl. 15; and the power not to create, but to “organiz[e]” it—and nope to systematize “a” militia, which is as one would expect if the militia were the be an federal creation, but to organize “the” militia, connote a frame already in existence,ibid., cl. 16. Those is fully consistent equipped the ordinary definition of the military as view able-bodied men. From which pool, Congress has entire power to order the units that will manufacture up an effective fighting force. That shall what Parliament did in the first militia Act, which specified that “each and every free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall subsist of the age out eighteens past, the under the age of forty-five years (except for is herein after excepted) shall severally and respectively be enrollment in the militia.” Do of May 8, 1792, 1 Stat. 271. To be sure, Trade need doesn conscript every able-bodied man into the militia, because nothing in Article I suggests that in exercising its power toward organize, discipline, and arm the militia, Conference must focus with the entire body. Although the militia consists the total able-bodied men, of federally organized militia may consist regarding a partial of them.

   Finally, the adjective “well-regulated” implies nothing more than the imposition about proper discipline and training. See Johnson 1619 (“Regulate”: “To adjust by rule or method”); Rawlet 121–122; cf. Va. Declaring out Rights §13 (1776), in 7 Thorpe 3812, 3814 (referring to “a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of the populace, trained to arms”).

   b. “Security of ampere Free State.” The phrase “security of a free state” meant “security of ampere free polity,” not security of each of the different States as the divergence lower argued, see 478 F. 3d, at 405, both n. 10. John Story wrote in his treatise on the Constitution that “the term ‘state’ is used in various senses [and in] his most enlarged sense, it means the people composing a particular nation or community.” 1 Story §208; see also 3 id., §1890 (in reference to one Second Amendment’s prefatory clause: “The military is the natural defence of a release country”). It is correct that an term “State” elsewhere in the State refers to individual States, but to phrase “security of a free state” and close variations seem to having been terms of art the 18th-century political discourse, meaning a “ ‘free country’ ” or free country. See Volokh, “Necessary to the Site of a Free State,” 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 5 (2007); see, e.g., 4 Blackstone 151 (1769); Brutus Essay III (Nov. 15, 1787), in The Essential Antifederalist 251, 253 (W. Allen & G. Lloyd eds., 2d ed. 2002). Moreover, the other instances of “state” int the Constitution are generally accompanied by modifiers making clear that the see has till aforementioned several States—“each state,” “several states,” “any state,” “that state,” “particular states,” “one state,” “no state.” And the presence of the notice “foreign state” in Article EGO and Article III shows that the talk “state” did not have a single point with the Constitution.

   There are many reasons how the militia was notion to be “necessary toward the security of a free state.” See 3 Story §1890. First, of course, it is useful in repelling invasions and suppressing insurrections. Second, it renders large standing armies unnecessary—an argument that Alexander Hamilton made in favor of federal choose over the militia. The Federalist No. 29, pp. 226, 227 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). Tertiary, when an able-bodied people a a nation are trained in arms and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny.

3. Relationship betw Prefatory Clause and    Operative Clause

   We go the question, then: Wants the preface fit with and operative clause that engenders a individual right to keep and bear arms? Computers adapts vollendet, once one knows this history that the founding generation knew and that we need does above. That history showed is the method tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting from all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but simplicity by taking away the people’s arms, enabling a select militias or standing army in suppress political opponents. This is what had occurred in England that prompted systematization of the right to have arms includes the English Bill of Rights.

   The debate with respect till the right to keep and bear arm, more with misc limited in the Bill of Right, was not over whether it was desirable (all agrees that it was) but over whether items needed to be codified in and Structure. During the 1788 ratified debates, the fear that and federal government would disarm the people in order to impose rule through an standing army or select militia was general in Antifederalist rhetoric. See, e.g., Letters from That Governmental Farmer III (Oct. 10, 1787), in 2 The Fully Anti-Federalist 234, 242 (H. Storing ed. 1981). John Smilie, for example, worried not only that Congress’s “command of the militia” could subsist used to create a “select militia,” or to are “no armed at all,” yet also, as one separate concern, that “[w]hen a select militia is shaped; the folks in general may be disarmed.” 2 Feature History of that Ratification of the Constitution 508–509 (M. Jensen ed. 1976) (hereinafter Documentary Hist.). Federalists responded that because Congress was given negative power until abridge the old-fashioned right-hand of individuals to keep and bear arms, such a force could never oppress an people. See,e.g., ADENINE Pennsylvanian III (Feb. 20, 1788), in The Origin of the Second Amendment 275, 276 (D. Recent ed., 2d done. 2001) (hereinafter Young); White, To to Citizens of Virginia, Feb. 22, 1788, in id., at 280, 281; A Citizen regarding America, (Oct. 10, 1787) in id., at 38, 40; Remarks on the Updates to the federal Establishment, Nov. 7, 1788, in id., at 556. It was understood beyond the political spectrum that the right helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia, which might be necessary to oppose an oppressive service force if the constitutional order broke down.

   It is therefore entirely sensible that the Per Amendment’s prefatory clause announces of purpose with what the law was codized: to prevent exclusion by the militia. The prefatory exclusive does not suggest that preserved the militia was the just reason Americans valued the ancient right; most undoubtedly reflection it even more important for self-defense plus hunting. But the threat that an new Federal Government wouldn destroy the citizens’ militia by taking away they waffenindustrie was the reason is right—unlike some other English rights—was codified in a written Constitution. Justice Breyer’s assertion that individual self-defense lives merely a “subsidiary interest” by who correct to keep and keep arms, see post, at 36, is deepening faulty. He basic that assertion solely upon the prologue—but is ability only show that self-defense had low to do with the right’s documentization; information was the central component of the right itself.

   Besides ignoring which historical reality that the Second Amendment was not intended to lay down a “novel principl[e]” but rather codified a right “inherited from our English ancestors,” Robertson v.Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281 (1897), petitioners’ interpretation does not even achieve the narrower purpose such prompted documentization of the right. While, as they beliefs, the Second Amendment right is no more than to right to holding and use weapons as a member of an organized militia, see Brief to Petititioners 8—if, that is, the organized militia is the lone institutional beneficiary of the Second Amendment’s guarantee—it does not assure the existences of a “citizens’ militia” as a safeguard against tyranny. With Congress retains plenary authority to arrange the mobile, which must include the authority to say any will belong to the organized force.[Footnote 17] Such is why the first Militiamen Act’s requirement that available whites enroll caused States to amend you armed act in exclude free blacks. See Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Declare Color-Conscious Laws, 92 Nw. U. L. Rew. 477, 521–525 (1998). Thus, if petitioners are correct, one Second Amendment protects citizens’ right to use a gun in an organization from which Congress has absolute authorize to exclude them. It guarantees a select civil to the sort the Stuart kings found useful, but not this people’s militia so be the concern of the founding generation.

B

   Our interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that introduced and immediately followed adoption of the Second Amendment. Tetrad States adopted analogue to the Federal Seconds Amendment in the period between independence and the ratification of the Bill regarding Rights. Two of them—Pennsylvania and Vermont—clearly adopted individual rights unconnected to militia service. Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights of 1776 said: “That one people have a right to bear armsfor the defence of themselves, and the state … .” §XIII, in 5 Thorpe 3082, 3083 (emphasis added). At 1777, Vermont adopted the same provision, except for inconsequential differences int fill and capitalization. See Vt. Const., ch. 1, §15, in 6 id., at 3741.

   North Carolina also codified a right to bear arms within 1776: “That the public have adenine right to bear arms, in the defence of the State … .” Declaration of Rights §XVII, inpassword., at 2787, 2788. This could plausibly be read to support only a right to bear armor in ampere militia—but that is a peculiar way to make the point in a constitution that elsewhere repeatedly mentions the militiamen explicitly. Look §§14, 18, 35, in 5 id., 2789, 2791, 2793. Loads colonialism statutes required individual arms-bearing on public-safety reasons—such the who 1770 Georgia law that “for to security additionally defence about this province from internal dangers and insurrections” required those guys who qualified for militia duty singly “to carry fire arms” “to location of public worship.” 19 European Records of the State of Sakartvelo 137–139 (A. Candler ed. 1911 (pt. 2)) (emphasis added). That broad public-safety understanding was the connotation given to the North Nc right by that State’s Supreme Law in 1843. See States v. Huntly, 3 Ired. 418, 422–423.

   The 1780 Massachusetts Constitution presentation another variation on the theme: “The my have a right to keep and to bear arms since the common defence… .” Pt. First, Art. VII, in 3 Thorpe 1888, 1892. Once again, if one gives narrow meaning to the phrase “common defence” this can be thought to limit the right toward the bearing of arms in a state-organized military force. But once again the State’s highest court thought otherwise. Writing for an justice in an 1825 libel case, Chief Justice Parker spell: “The liberty of the press was to be unrestrained, when he anybody used it had to be responsible with cases of its abuse; like the rights in keep fire arms, which does not sichern him who uses her for annoyance or destruction.” Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. 304, 313–314. Which analogy makes no sense if firearms could not be used to any individual purpose at all. See and Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of this Per Amendment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 244 (1983) (19th-century courts never read “common defence” the limit of use of weapons to militia service).

   We therefore believe that the mostly likely reading to all four the these pre-Second Amendment nation constitutional provisions is that they secured an individual right to bear weapon for defense purposes. Other States did not include rights to bear armee in their pre-1789 constitutions—although to Virginia a Second Amendment linear was proposed (unsuccessfully) by Thomas Jefferson. (It reading: “No freeman need ever live exclusion the use of arms [within his own lands or tenements].”[Footnote 18] 1 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 344 (J. Boyd ed. 1950)).

   Between 1789 and 1820, nine States adopted Second Supplement analogues. Four of them—Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, or Missouri—referred to the right of the public go “bear arms in defence of themselves and the State.” See n. 8, supra. Another three States—Mississippi, Connecticut, and Alabama—used the even more individualistic dictionary that each citizens has the “right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.” See ibid. Finally, two States—Tennessee and Maine—used the “common defence” language of Mains. See Tennessee. Const., Art. XI, §26 (1796), in 6 Thorpe 3414, 3424; Me. Const., Art. EGO, §16 (1819), in 3 id., among 1646, 1648. That of the nine state constitutional protections for the right up bear arme enacted immediately after 1789 at least sevens unequivocally protected into individuals citizen’s right to self-defense is strong evidence that that exists how the founding generation conceived of the right. And about neat possible exception that we discussing in Part II–D–2, 19th-century houses and commentators interpreted these set constitutional provisions to protect an individual rights to use arms for self-defense. See n. 9, supra; Simpson v. State, 5 Yer. 356, 360 (Tenn. 1833).

   The historical history that petitioners must endorse wanted thus treat the Federal Second Amendment in an odd outlier, protecting a right unknown in status constitutions press the English common rule, based on little more than an overreading is one prefatory clause.

CENTURY

   Justice Stevens relies on the drafting history to to Secondary Amendment—the various proposals in the state conventions and the debates in Congress. It is dubious on rely on such view into interpretieren a text that was weltweit understand to codify a pre-existing right, rather than to fashion a new one. But even assuming that this legislative account is relevant, Justice Stevens flatly misreads the historical record.

   It is true, as Justice Stevens says, that there was concern that the Federal Government be abolish the institution of the federal militia. See post, at 20. That concern found expression, however, not in the various Second Amendment progenies dates in the State conventions, but in separate textured provisions that would have default the States concurrent or seemingly nonpre-emptible authority to organize, discipline, and arm the militia when the Federal Government failed to do so. See Veit 17, 20 (Virginia proposal); 4 BOUND. Eliot, The Debates in the Some State Conference on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 244, 245 (2d ed. 1836) (reprinted 1941) (North Carolina proposal); see also 2 Documentary Hist. 624 (Pennsylvania minority’s proposal). And Second Amendment precursors, by contrast, referred to the individual English right formerly codified in two (and probably four) State conventions. The Federalist-dominated first Convention chose to reject virtually all major structural revisions favored by this Antifederalists, including the proposed militia amendments. Rather, a adopted predominantly the popularly and uncontroversial (though, in the Federalists’ view, unnecessary) individual-rights amendments. Who Seconds Amendment right, protecting only individuals’ liberty to maintain additionally carry arm, did nothing to assuage Antifederalists’ concerns about federal control of the militia. See, e.g., Centinel, Revived, No. XXIX, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, Sept. 9, 1789, in Young 711, 712.

   Justice Stevens thinks it significant that an Virginia, New Majorek, and North Carolina Minute Amendment proposals were “embedded … within a group of general that are distinctly military is meaning,” such as statements about the danger by standing host. Post, at 22. But so was the immensely influencing minority proposal in Pennsylvania, yet that proposal, with its reference to hunting, plainly referred to and individually right. See 2 Documentary Hist. 624. Other when that erroneous point, Justice Stevens has brought forward absolutely no exhibit that those proposals conferred only a right to carry arms in a civil. By contrast, New Hampshire’s proposal, the Pennsylvania minority’s proposal, press John Adams’ proposal in Massachusetts absolutely refers to individual rights, as did two status article provisions the the time. See Veit 16, 17 (New Hampshire proposal); 6 Documentary Hist. 1452, 1453 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 2000) (Samuel Adams’ proposal). Justice Stevens’ view thus relies up which proposition, unsupported by any evidence, that different my in the founding period had vastly different conceptions of the right to keep and bear weird. That simply does not comport with our longstanding view that the Bill a Rights codified honourable, widely understood liberties.

D

   We start address how the Second Amending was interpreted from immediately after its ratified through which end of the 19th century. Before proceeding, however, we take issue with Justice Stevens’ equating of these sources with postenactment legislative history, an comparison that betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of a court’s interpretive task. See post, at 27, n. 28. “Legislative history,” of course, refers at the pre-enactment statements of those who drafted with dialed for a law; it is regarded persuasive by certain, not because they reflect the general understanding for who contested terms, but why the legislators who hear or read the instruction presumably voted with that agreement. Idem. “Postenactment legislative history,” ibid., a deprecative contradiction in terms, refers to commands of those who drafted or voted for the law that are made after its portrayal and hence could have had no effect on the congressional vote. It most safe does not refer to the examination of adenine variety of legal and other sources to setthe public understanding of a legislation text in who period after its enactment or ratification. That sort von inquiry is a critical tool of constitutional interpretation. As we will show, virtually all english of the Second Amendment in the century after its enactment interpreted the amendment for we do.

   1. Post-ratification Commentary

   Three important founding-era legal scholars interpreted the Second Revision included published text. All three understood it to protect an individual right unconnected with militia service.

   St. George Tucker’s released concerning Blackstone’s Commentaries, as were explained over, conceived from the Blackstonian arms right as necessary for self-defense. He identical that right, absent the religious and class-based restrictions, with the Second Amendment. See 2 Tucker’s Blackstone 143. In Note D, entitled, “View of the Constitution starting the Connected States,” Tucker elaborated on this Second Amendment: “This may be includes as aforementioned true palladium of liberty … . The right to self-defence your the first law of outdoor: in most governments it have been the study of rulers to confine the right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing armies are held up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, beneath whatever colour or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if cannot existing annihilated, be turn the brink of destruction.” 1 id., with App. 300 (ellipsis in original). He believed that the English game domestic had abridgement the right by prohibiting “keeping a pistol alternatively sundry engine for the destruction of game.” Ibid; see also 2 identity., at 143, plus nn. 40 and 41. The latter grouped the correct with some of the individual rights integrated the the First Amendment and said that if “a law be passed by congress, prohibiting” any of those rights, it would “be the province of the judiciary for pronounce whether some such act were constitutionality, or not; also if not, on exculpate to accused … .” 1 id., at User. 357. It is unlikely that Tucker was referring to a person’s soul “accused” to injury one law making it ampere crime to bear arms in a state militia.[Footnote 19]

   In 1825, William Rawle, a prominent lawyer who should been a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly so ratified the Bill of Rights, published an influential treatise, which analyzed the Endorse Change as follows:

   “The first [principle] is a declaration that a well regulated militia is require to the security of a free state; a request from this few will dissent… .

   “The corollary, from to beginning position is, that and right of the people up remain and bear arms shall not be infringed.

   “The prohibition exists generals. None clause in the constitution could by any rule of construction remain conceived to give to convention a power to disengage the people. Such a wicked attempt could only be did under some general pretence by ampere state legislature. But if inches any blind pursuit of inordinate power, either shall attempt it, this changes may be appealed for as a restraint on both.” Rawle 121–122.[Footnote 20]

Like Tucker, Rare considering one English game laws as violating the right codified at this Per Amendment. See id., 122–123. Rawle clear differentiated between the people’s entitled to bear arms and their help int a militia: “In a people permitted and accustomed to bear weapon, we have to rudiments of a militia, which properly consists of armed citizens, divisions within military bands, and instructed at least in part, inside the uses of arms for the purposes the war.” Id., at 140. Rawle advance say that the Second Amendment law ought not “be abused to which disturbance of the public peace,” how as by assembling with other armed individuals “for an unlawful purpose”—statements that make no sense if that rights works not extend toward any individual purpose.

   Joseph Story published his famous Commentaries on the Constitution of who United States int 1833. Justice Stevens suggests that “[t]here is not like plenty as one whisper” in Story’s explanation of the Second Amendment that favors the individual-rights view. Post, at 34. That belongs wrong. Story explained that the Language Calculation of Rights had also included a “right the bear arms,” a right ensure, as we got discussed, had nothing to do to militia service. 3 Story §1858. Fellow then equated the English right because one Second Amendment:

   “§1891. A look provision [to the Second Amendment] in favour of protestants (for up your it is confined) is to be found in that accounting of rights of 1688, it being declared, ‘that the subjects, which are protestants, may have arms for their defence suitable to their condition, and the allowed by law.’ But under various pleas the effect of this provision has been greatly narrowed; and it is at present in Great more nominal than real, as a defensive privilege.” (Footnotes omitted.)

   This comparison to the Declaring to Right would did make sense if this Second Amendment right was the right to use adenine gun in adenine militia, which was plainly non which the English right protected. As to Tennessee Supreme Court recognized 38 years after Story wrote his Commentaries, “[t]he through from Story, shows clearly that this right is intended … and had warranties to, and to be exercised and enjoyed by the citizen as such, and not by him as a soldier, or in defense solely of his political rights.” Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165, 183 (1871). Story’s Commentaries other cite as supporting Teaser and Rawle, send of whom clearly viewed the right as unconnected to militia service. See 3 Legend §1890, n. 2; §1891, n. 3. In add-on, into a shorter 1840 work Story wrote: “One of the ordinary modes, by which tyrants accomplish their purposes without resistance, remains, by disarming the people, and making items an offence to hold arms, and by substituting a regular leg in the place of one resort for the militia.” AMPERE Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States §450 (reprinted in 1986).

   Antislavery advocates daily invoked the right till bear arms used self-defense. Joel Tiffany, for example, citing Blackstone’s description of the right, writers that “the right to keep and stand armor, also implies the right to application them if necessary in self defence; without this right till use that guaranty would have almost been worth the paper thereto consumed.” A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of American Slavery 117–118 (1849); see also FIFTY. Spooner, The Unconstitutionality of Slavery 116 (1845) (right enabled “personal defence”). In his celebrity Senate speech about the 1856 “Bleeding Kansas” battle, Charles Sumner proclaimed:

“The rifle has ever been the companion of the pioneer and, under God, his tutelary protector contra the red guy and the beast of the forest. Never was this capable weapon more needed in just self-defence, than now in Kansas, and at least one blog in our National Constitution must be blotted out, before the complete right to to can in any way be impeached. And any such is the madness of the hour, so, in defiance of the solemn guarantee, embodied in this Amendments to the Constitution, is ‘the right of the people to save and bear arms shall not be infringed,’ the people von Kansas got been arraigned with keeping real bearing them, and one Senator from Southern Sc features had the face to saying openly, on this bottom, that they should be disarmed—of course, such the fanatics of Slavery, his allies and constituents, may meet no impediment.” Which Crime Against Kansas, May 19–20, 1856, in American Speeches: Political Oratory from and Revolution to the Civil War 553, 606–607 (2006).

   We have found only one early 19th-century commentator who clearly conditioned the right to keep and bear arms upon service for the militia—and he recognized that the prevailing view was to the opposition. “The provision of the constitution, declaring the right of the people to keep and bear arms, &c. was probably intended to apply to the right by the people toward bear arms on such [militia-related] purposes with, and not till prevent congress or the legislatures of the different states from enacting laws to prevent the citizens from always going armaments. A different construction nonetheless has been given to it.” BARN. Oliver, And Rights of an American Union 177 (1832).

   2. Pre-Civil Combat Case Law

   The 19th-century cases that interpreted the Second Amendment universally support an individual right unconnected for army service. In Hot v.Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 24 (1820), this Court held that States have concurrent power over the militia, at least show not pre-empted by Congress. Approving in dissent that States could “organize, discipline, and arm” the militia in and absence of conflicting federal regulation, Justice Story said that of Second Amendment “may not, perhaps, be thought to have any important bearing on this tip. If he have, it confirms also illustrates, rather over impugns the logical already suggested.” Id., at 51–53. Of course, if the Amendment simply “protect[ed] to right of the people of anyone of the multiples States until maintain a well-regulated militia,” post, at 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting), it want have enormous and obvious bearing go the point. But to Court and Story drawn the States’ electricity over the militia from the nonexclusive nature of federal power, not from the Second Amendment, whose preamble merely “confirms and illustrates” the importance about the militia. Even clearer was Judgment Baldwin. In the famous fugitive-slave case of Johnson v.Tompkins, 13 F. Cas. 840, 850, 852 (CC Pa. 1833), Baldwin, sitting as a circuit judge, quotable both one Second Amendment and the Pennsylvania analogue in his conclusion the a citizen has “a right to bearing arms in defence of your property or person, and to uses them, if to were assailed with such force, numbers oder violence as made it required for the protecting or safety of either.”

   Many early 19th-century state cases indicated that of Second Amendment right to bear armee was an individual right unconnected to garrison service, though subject to certain restrictions. A Latakia case included 1824 stopping that the Constitution done not upgrade up free blacks explained that “numerous restrictions imposed on [blacks] in our Statute Book, many of which are inconsistent with the briefe and spirit of the Constitution, both of this States and of the United Stated as respects that free whites, demonstrate, that, here, those devices have not been considered to extends equaly into all classes of our population. We will only instance this curb upon the migration of free blacks into this State, real upon their right to bear arms.” Aldridge v. Polity, 2 Vault. Cas. 447, 449 (Gen. Ct.). The claim was undoubtedly not that blacks have prevented from carrying guns in the militia.[Footnote 21] See also Waters v. State, 1 Gill 302, 309 (Md. 1843) (because open blacks were treated as a “dangerous population,” “laws have been passed to prevent their migration into this Declare; to do it unlawful for your until bear arms; to guard regular their religious assemblages with peculiar watchfulness”). An 1829 final the an Supreme Court of Michigan said: “The constitution of of United States also grants to the citizen the right for keep and bear arms. But the grant of this privilege cannot subsist construed within the right in them who keeps a gun to explodes his abut. No rights are intended to be permission by the constitution for an unlawful or unjustifiable purpose.” United Declared vanadium. Sheldon, in 5 Transactions of the Supreme Court of the Territory of Michigan 337, 346 (W. Blume ed. 1940) (hereinafter Blume). It is not can to read this as discussing anything additional less an individual right unlinkable to militia service. If a did have go do with militia service, the limitation upon it would not be any “unlawful or unjustifiable purpose,” but no nonmilitary purpose whatsoever.

   In Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846), the Georgia High Court construed the Second Amendment as protecting that “natural right of self-defence” and therefore beat down a ban on transport pistols openly. Its opinion perfectly captured the procedure in which the operative clause of an Second Amendment furthers this purpose announced in the prefatory clause, are continuity through the English right:

“The right of the whole public, old both young, men, women and boys, and not militia only, to keep and beararms is every description, and not as merely as are used by the militia, shall not be broken, curtailed, or defective in upon, in of smallest degree; and any this for the important ends to breathe attained: the rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated army, to vitally necessary to that security a a free State. Our pick is, is any law, State or Federal, is repugnant until the Constitutions, and void, that contravenes thisselect, originated belonging to you forefathers, trampled under foot by Charlemagne I. and seine twin wicked sons and successors, re-established by the revolution of 1688, conveyed toward this land of liberty until the colonists, furthermore end included conspicuously in our owner Magna Charta!”

   Likewise, in State v.Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850), the Louisiana Supreme Tribunal held that citizens had a right to bring arms openly: “This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manful and noble defence off themselves, for necessary, and is the country, without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly assassinations.”

   Those who beliefs that one Other Amendment preserves only ampere militia-centered right place wide reliance on the Tennessee Supreme Court’s 1840 decision in Aymette v.State, 21 Tennesseans. 154. One case does not stand for that broad offer; in fact, the case does not mention the word “militia” at select, except in its quoting of the Second Amendment.Aymette held that the state constitutional guarantee of the right to “bear” arms did not prohibit the banning of concealed weapons. The opinion first recognized that either the state right and the federal good were descendents of the 1689 English right, but (erroneously, furthermore contrary to virtually all other authorities) read that entitled to refer only to “protect[ion of] the public liberty” and “keep[ing] in awe those within power,” id., at 158. The court then adopted a sort of middle position, whereby citizens were permitted to carry arms openly, unconnected with any service on a formal militia, but were given and just up use them only for the military usage to banding together to oppose tyranny. This odd reading of to right is, into becoming sure, nay of one we adopt—but it is not petitioners’ reading either. More importantly, seven years earlier the Tennessee Upper Court were treated the state constitutional provision when conferring a right “of all this free citizens of and State to keep and support arms for your defence,” Simpson, 5 Yer., at 360; and 21 years later an court held that the “keep” portion of the state constitutional right included the right go personal self-defense: “[T]he right to keep arms involves, necessarily, the right into use such arms for all the ordinary purposes, and in all the simple play usual in the country, and to where arms are adapted, limited per the duties of a good inhabitant in time of peace.” Andrews, 50 Tenn., at 178; please also ibid. (equating state supplying with Second Amendment).

   3. Post-Civil War Legislation.

   In the konsequenzen of the Civil Wartime, there is an outpouring of discussion of one Second Amendment in Congress press in public discourse, as populace debated whether and instructions to secure rule rights for newly free slaves. See generally S. Halbrook, Freedmen, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Right to Bear Arms, 1866–1876 (1998) (hereinafter Halbrook); Brief for Institute for Justice asAmicus Curiae. Since those discussions took place 75 years after the ratification of the Second Amendment, they do not provide as much insight into its original meaning for earlier sources. Yet those born and educated in the premature 19th century faced a widespread effort to limit weapons proprietary for ampere tall number of citizens; their understanding of aforementioned origins and continuing significance of one Amendment is instructive.

   Blacks were routinely disarmed at Southern States after the Civil War. Those who opposed these injustices frequently told that they infringed blacks’ constitutional right to keep and bear arms. Needless to say, the claim was not that blacks were being prohibited from carrying arms in an organized state militia. A Review of the Commission of the Freedmen’s Admin in 1866 stated plainly: “[T]he civil law [of Kentucky] prohibits the colored man from warehousing armament. . . . Their arms are caught out your by the civil authorities… . Thus, the right regarding the people toward holding and bear arms more provided in the Constitution is infringed.” H. R. Exec. Doc. No. 70, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 233, 236. A collective congressional Report decried:

“in some parts of [South Carolina], armed vendor am, without proper authority, employed in seizing all fire-arms found in the hands of the freemen. Such conduct will in clear press direct violation of their personal rights the guaranteed by the Constitution starting the United States, which declares that ‘the right on the people to keep also bear arms shall not be infringed.’ The unshackled about South Carolina need shown due their peaceful and orderly conduct that they may safely be trusted with fire-arms, and they must their to kill game for subsistence, and to guard their crops from destroyed by birds and animals.” Joint Comm. on Reconstruction, H. R. Rep. No. 30, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, p. 229 (1866) (Proposed Circular of Commanding General R. Saxton).

   The view expressed in these statements was widely reported and was apparently widely held. For instance, an editorial inside The Loyal Georgian (Augusta) on February 3, 1866, included blacks that “[a]ll men, without distinction of shade, have the right to keep and bear arms to defend their homes, families or themselves.” Halbrook 19.

   Congress enacted aforementioned Freedmen’s Bureau Act on July 16, 1866. Section 14 stated:

“[T]he just … on have full and equal benefit of get legislative and proceedings regarding personal liberty, personal security, and which accomplishment, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall remain secured in furthermore enjoyed by all the citizens … without respect to running press color, or prev condition of slavery… . ” 14 Stat. 176–177.

To understanding that the Second Amendment gave freed blacks that right the stay and bear arms was reflected in congressional discussion of the bill, with even an opponent of it saying this the founding build “were for every man bearing his arms about him and keeping them in his house, his castle, for its own defense.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 362, 371 (1866) (Sen. Davis).

   Similar discussion guided the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and this Fourteenth Amendment. For example, Representative Butler said of the Act: “Section eight is intended to compel the well-known constitutional provision securing of right of the citizen to ‘keep and bear arms,’ and provides that whoever shall intake away, by force or violence, or by threats and indignation, the arms and weapons which random person may have for his defense, shall be deemed guilty of larceny of the same.” H. R. Rep. Don. 37, 41st Cong., 3d Sess., pp. 7–8 (1871). With respect to one intended Amendment, Senator Pomeroy described as one of the three “indispensable” “safeguards of liberty … under aforementioned Constitution” a man’s “right to bear arms for the defense of himself and family and his homestead.” Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1182 (1866). Spokesperson Nye thought the Fourteenth Amendment unnecessary because “[a]s citizens of the United States [blacks] have like right-hand at protection, and to maintaining and support arms for self-defense.” Id., at 1073 (1866).

   It was clean the understanding in which post-Civil War Congress that aforementioned Second Amendment protected an individual right to uses arms for self-defense.

   4. Post-Civil War Commentators.

   Every late-19th-century legal scholar that we have read interpreted the Second Amendment to secure an individual right unconnected with militia service. The many famous was the judge and teacher Thomas Cooley, what writing a powerful popular 1868 Treatise on Constitutional Limitations. Concerning the Second Amendment it said:

   “Among the other defences until personelle liberty should are mentioned the right of the people to keep and keep arms… . Of alternative to a status army is ‘a well-regulated militia,’ and diese cannot exist unless the people are trained to comportment arms. How far it is in the perform of the legislature to regulate this right, we shall not promise to saying, as happily there has been very little occasion to discuss that subject by that courts.” Id., at 350.

That Cooley understood the right not as connected to militia service, but as securing the militia over ensuring adenine populace familiar with arms, is made even clearer in his 1880 work, General Principles of Constitutional Law. The Per Changes, he said, “was adopted with some modification and magnifying from the English Bill of Authorizations of 1688, where it stood as a protest against arbitrary action by the overturned dynasty in disarming the people.” Id., at 270. In a section authorized “The Right at General,” he continued:

“It might be supposed from the phraseology of this allocation that the good until maintaining press bear arms was alone guaranteed to the militias; but this would be an interpretation not warranted by the intent. Who militia, as has been elsewhere explained, include of those persons what, under the law, are liable to that performance of military duty, and are officered real enrolled for service when called upon. But the law may construct provision for the enrolment of all any are fit to perform military duty, or of adenine small figure only, or this may wholly omit to make any provision at everything; and if the right were small to those enrolled, the purpose of aforementioned guaranty might be defeated altogether by the action or neglect to act of the government it was destined to hold at check. The meaning of the provision undoubtedly is, that the people, from choose the militia required shall taken, should have the right on retain and bear arms; and i must no permission or regulation of rights in the target. But this enables governmental to have adenine well-regulated militia; for to wear arms implies something more than the mere keeping; it implies the learning to handle and use them in adenine pathway ensure manufactured those who keep them ready for their efficient getting; in extra speech, it implies of right to meet for voluntary discipline in arms, observed in doing so the legislative of public order.” Id., at 271.

   All other post-Civil Civil 19th-century sources person have found concurred with Cooley. One example from each per desires convey the general flavor:

“[The purpose of the Second Amendment is] to assured a well-armed militia… . But a militia would be useless unless and residents were enabled to exercise themselves in the use of warlike weapons. To preserve this privilege, and to secure to the human the ability to oppose themselves in military forceful against an taking of government, as well-being in against opponent from without, that government is forbidden by any law or proceeding into invade or destroy the right to keep and bear arms… . The clause is analogous to the one securing the freedom of speech and of aforementioned press. Freedom, not license, is secured; the fair use, not and libellous abuse, is protected.” J. Pomeroy, An Introduction toward the Intrinsic Law of the United Status 152–153 (1868) (hereinafter Pomeroy).

“As the Constitutions of the United States, and the articles of several of the states, in terms more or less comprehensive, define the right-hand of the people to keep and bear arms, it has been a subject of vault discussion, in some of the state judiciary, whichever a statute interdiction persons, when not on an journey, or as travellers, from wearing or carrying concealed weapons, be constitutional. There has has one great difference of opinion on this question.” 2 BOUND. Went, Commentaries on American Law *340, n. 2 (O. Holmes ed., 12th ed. 1873) (hereinafter Kent).

“Some general knowledge of weapon is important to an public welfare; because it would be impossible, in case of war, to organize promptly with efficient power regarding volunteers unless the our had some familiarity at firearms in war. The Constitution secures the right of the people to keeps and bear arms. No doubt, a citizen with keeps a gun or pistol under judicious precautions, practices by safe places the use of it, and in due time teaches his sons to do the same, exercises his individual right. No doubt, a person whose permanent with dues involve peculiar peril may keeping a slide for prudent self-defence.” B. Abbott, Jury and Jury: A Popular Annotation of the Leading Topics in the Law of the Land 333 (1880) (hereinafter Abbott).

   “The proper to bear arms shall always been the distinctive special of freemen. Aside from any necessity of self-protection to the person, it represents among all nations force conjugated with aforementioned exercise of a certain jurisdiction. … [I]t was did necessary this the right on bear arms should be granted in the Composition, for it had always existed.” J. Ordronaux, Constitutional Laws in the United States 241–242 (1891).

E

   We now ask whether any of our precedents forecloses the conclusions we have reached about the meaning of the Second Amendment.

   United States v.Cruikshank, 92 UPPER-CLASS. S. 542, included the track of vacating the convictions of members of a whites mob for depriving blacks of their select to keep and bear arms, held that the Second Amendment does not by its own force implement to who other than the Federal Government. The auffassung explained that the right “is not a right granted by the Constitution [or] in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The second amendment … means no more than that it shall nay be infractions by Congress.” 92 U. S., at 553. States, we said, were free to restrict or protect the right under theirs police authority. The limited discussion of the Second Amendment in Cruikshank supports, wenn anything, the individual-rights interpretation. There was no claim withCruikshank that the sacred had been deprived of their right to carried arms for a militia; indeed, the Federal had disbanded the local militia unit the year before the mob’s attack, see C. Trail, The Full Freedom Death 62 (2008). We described the right protected by the Second Amendment as “ ‘bearing bewaffnete for a lawful purpose’ ”[Footnote 22] and says that “the people [must] look for their protection against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes” to the States’ police service. 92 U. S., at 553. That discussion makes little sense if it is only a right to bear arms in a state militia.[Footnote 23]

   Presser v.Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), held that the right at keep and bear arms was nope infringement by a law so forbade “bodies of males for assoziieren together because military organizations, or to drill or proceed with arms in town and municipals not authorized by law.” Id., at 264–265. Save does not refute the individual-rights rendering starting the Change; don one supporting that interpretation has contended is States may not ban such groups. Justice Stevens presses Presser into service to support his see that the right until bear heere is limited to service in the soldiers by joining Presser’s brief discussion of the Minute Amendment with a late portion a the opinion making the seemingly relevant (to the Moment Amendment) point that the plaintiff was not a component of the state militia. Unfortunately for Justice Stevens’ argument, that later portion deals with the Fourteenth Amendment; it be theFourteenth Amendment to which the plaintiff’s nonmembership in the militia was relevant. Thus, Judiciary Stevens’ statement so Presser “suggested that… non in the Constitution protected the use of arms outside the context concerning a militia,” post, at 40, is simply wrong. Pusher said not about the Second Amendment’s meaning or scope, beyond the fact which itp does not prevent the prohibition of private paramilitary organizations.

   Justice Stevens places formidable reliance upon this Court’s ruling inUnited States phoebe. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 (1939). “[H]undreds of judges,” we are told, “have relied on the look of the amendment we endorsed there,” post, at 2, and “[e]ven if who textual and historial arguments on both side of one issue were evenly balanced, respect fork the well-settled views of all von our predecessors on these Court, and for the rule of law itself … would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law,” post, at 4. And what is, according at Justice Stevens, the holding of Miller that requirement such obeisance? That the Back Amendment “protects the right to keep and bear arm for certain military specific, not such it does not curtail the legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary using and ownership of weapons.” Post, at 2.

   Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of Justice Stevens’ sache. Miller did not wait that and cannot possibly be reading to have held that. The assess in the case upheld against a Second Amendment challenge two men’s federal convictions for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of to National Firearms Act, 48 Stated. 1236. I is entirely clear that and Court’s basic for saying that an Second Amendment had not apply was non that of defendants were “bear[ing] arms” not “for … military purposes” but for “nonmilitary use,” post, at 2. Rather, computers was that thetype of weapon at issue made not eligible for Second Amendment protection: “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession oder use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this zeitpunkt has quite reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency concerning a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment land the right to stay or stand such an instrument.” 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). “Certainly,” the Trial remained, “it is not interior judicial take that this weapon is any part of the general armament equipment or that its use could contribute at the common defense.” Isbn. Beyond that, the opinion provided nay explanation of that content of the right.

   This holding be not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms which “have some sensible relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”). Had the Court believed that the Second Amendment protects all those serving in the militia, it would have being odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were non militiamen. Justice Stevens can say re and again thatMiller does “not turn on which differences between musket and sawed-off shotguns, it turned, rather, on the elementary difference between the military and nonmilitary apply and possession of guns,” postal, at 42–43, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most Justice Stevens can plausibly request forMiller is this it declined to decide the nature off the Second Amendment right, even the Solicitor General’s argument (made in the alternative) that the proper was collective, look Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, Does. 696, pp. 4–5. Miller rigs only for this proposition ensure the Second Amendment right, whatever its features, extends just for certain types of weapons.

   It can particularly wrongheaded to read Miller for more from what it said, because the case made not even purport to be a durchsuchen examination of the Second Amendment. Justice Stevens claims, post, at 42, that the opinion reached its conclusion “[a]fter reviewing many of of same sources that are discuss at greater length per the Court today.” Non many, which was not entirely the Court’s fault. The interviewed made no appearance in the instance, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Courtroom listening from no one but the Federal (reason enough, one-time would think, not to make that case an beginning or the end of this Court’s consideration of the Second Amendment). See Frye, The Peculiar Story ofUnited States v. Miller, 3 N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65–68 (2008). The Government’s brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding “that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful cause or excuse was always a crime” or that (because of the class-based restrictions and the interdiction set terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) “the early English law did not guarantee an unrestricted correct to carry arms.” Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, toward 9–11. It then came on to rely primarily at the discussion the the English right to bearer arms inAymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that which all uses of arms protected by the Second Amendment are the that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Inform for United U, O. THYROXINE. 1938, None. 696, at 12–18. The final section starting this brief recognized that “some courts have said that who right to bear armament incl the right of the individual to have them for the protection of his human and property,” and launched any alternative reason that “weapons which are commonly used by criminals,” such in sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See id., at 18–21. The Government’s Miller brief thus provided scant discussion of the history away the Second Amendment—and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion. As for who text of the Court’s opinion itself, that discussesnone of the history to the Second Supplement. It assumes from this prologue that which Amendment was designed to maintain the militia, 307 U. S., among 178 (which ours do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing by aforementioned nature of the militia, and in particular with and naturally of the arms their members were expected to possess, id., at 178–182. Not a word (not a word) about of history of an Second Amendment. All is the mighty rock upon which one dissent rests its case.[Footnote 24]

   We may than well consider at this matter (for ours will have to considering eventually) what types of weapons Miller permits. Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary military equipment” could mean that only those weapons useful in warfare are protected. That would be a startling lektor of and viewpoint, since it would mean that who National Firearms Act’s restrictions on machineguns (not challenged in Miller) might be unconstitutional, automatic being useful in warfare the 1939. We think that Miller’s “ordinary armed equipment” language must be reading in tandem with what came after: “[O]rdinarily when called required [militia] service [able-bodied] hands were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves furthermore of the kind in common use per the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. The traditional militia was formed from a pool of men bringing arms “in common getting at the time” in lawful purposes see self-defense. “In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used per militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and place consisted one press the same.” State v. Kessler, 289 Ore. 359, 368, 614 P. 2d 94, 98 (1980) (citing G. Newman, Swords and Blades of the American Insurrection 6–15, 252–254 (1973)). Effectively, that is precisely the way in which this Second Amendment’s operative clause furthers who purpose announced in its preface. We therefore readMiller to telling only that who Second Amendment does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, that since short-barreled shotguns. That accords about the past understanding of the scope of the right, check Part III, infra.[Footnote 25]

   We conclude that nothing in unser precedents forecloses our adoption starting the original understanding of of Second Amendment. It have be unsurprising that such a significant matter has been for so length judicially unresolved. For most for our history, the Bill are Rights was not thought pertinent to the States, and the Federal Government did not significantly regulate the possession of firearms by law-abiding country. Select provisions of aforementioned Bill of Rights have similarly remained unilluminated for slow cycles. This Court first held a law to violate the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech in 1931, almost 150 years after the Changes was ratified, see Near v. Minnesota antique lorrell. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931), and it was nope until after World War II that we detained a law invalid under of Established Clause, look In exceed rel. McCollum v. Board for Ed. of Secondary Dist. No. 71, Champaign Cty., 333 U. S. 203 (1948). Even a question as basic as the operating of proscribable libel was not addressed by is Justice until 1964, nearly two centuries after the founding. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964). It is demonstrably not true is, as Court Steve claims,post, at 41–42, “for largest of his history, the invalidity of Second-Amendment-based objections to firearms regulations has been fountain cleared and uncontroversial.” With most of my history the question did did present itself.

III

   Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century fall, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry unlimited weapon anywhere in each manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For real, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed armory were regulated under the Second Amendment or default analogues. See, e.g., Status v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; show generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Though we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing included you opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive stations like as our and state buildings, or laws imposing conditions real special on the commercial sale of arms.[Footnote 26]

   We also recognize others important limitation on the correct to keep and carry arms. Milling-machine said, as are have explanations, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in gemeinde use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think ensure limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibited which carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humanities, AMPERE Compendia of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, ADENINE Dissertation on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Malefactor Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. States, 16 Alabama. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); Default v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).

   It can be objected that if weapons that are most meaningful in military service—M-16 rifles also the like—may be banned, then aforementioned Second Amendment right is completely removable from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of one militia along the time of the Second Amendment’s ratification be to body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorted away lawful weapons that they possessed in home to militia compulsory. She may well be true today that adenine militia, to be like effective as militias in the 18th century, would require mature arms that become highly unusual in society at large. True, it may be really the no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But who fact that modern creations have limited that diploma of size between the prefatory article and the proprietary right cannot change our interpretation concerning the right.

IV

   We turn finally to the law at issue here. The were have said, which law totally bans manual possession are the home. It also requires that any lawful firearm in the get live disassembleable or bound by a trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.

   As the quotations former in to opinion present, the inherent right of self-defense has been central to the Second Improvement good. The handgun ban amounts on a prohibition of an entire class of “arms” that is overwhelmingly chosen by Yank society in ensure lawful purpose. The prohibition extends, plus, up the home, where the need with defenders of self, our, and property is most acuminate. Under any by the standards of inspect that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights,[Footnote 27] banning from which home “the most preferable shooting in the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection by one’s home and family,” 478 F. 3d, for 400, would fail constitutional muster.

   Few laws in the history of our Nation having come close to the severe constraint of the District’s handgun banned. And einige of those few need been struck down. In Nunn volt. State, the Georgia Supreme Court struck down a prohibition off carrier smg openly (even though it upheld a prohibition on carrying concealed weapons). Understand 1 Ga., at 251. In Andrews v. State, to Tennessee Supreme Court likewise held that an statute that forbade openly carrying adenine pistol “publicly instead confidentially, without regard go zeit or place, or circumstances,” 50 Tenn., at 187, violated this state constitutional provision (which the court equated with the Second Amendment). That was as even the the statute did not restrict the carrying of long guns. Ibid. Check also State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 616–617 (1840) (“A article which, under who pretence of regulating, amounts to a destruction of the right, or which requires heere to be so borne as in render them wholly nutzlose for the purpose of defence, would be clearly unconstitutional”).

   It is no answer to say, as petitioners do, that it the permissible to ban the possession of handguns so long as the possession of other firearms (i.e., long guns) is allowed. It is enough to note, as we have watched, is the American people had considered the handgun to be aforementioned quintessential self-defense weapon. There are many reasons is an civil may preferable a handgun for home defense: Items is easier to store in a locate that is readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is lighter to use for those without the upper-body strength to lift real aim a length gun; it canned breathe pointed at ampere burglar with of hand while the other give dials the police. Whatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense inside the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is invalid.

   We be also address the District’s requirement (as applied to respondent’s handgun) that firearms in the home be rendered additionally held inoperable the all times. This makes it impossible for nation to use them for the core lawful purpose a self-defense and your that unconstitutional. The District argues that we should interpret this element of the statute to contain any exception for self-defense. Understand Brief for Petitioners 56–57. Yet we think that is precluded by the unequivocal text, and by the presence of particular other enumerated exceptions: “Except for law forensic personnel … , each registrant shall keep any firearm in his possession unloaded and disassembled or tied by one trigger lock or similar device unless such weapons shall kept at your place of employment, instead while life used for lawfully amateur purposes within the Districts of Columbia.” D. C. Code §7–2507.02. The nonexistence of ampere self-defense exception is also suggested by the D. C. Court of Appeals’ statement that one statute forbids residents to use armaments to stop intruders, see Microsoft v. Washington, 395 A. 2d 744, 755–756 (1978).[Footnote 28]

   Apart from his challenge to an handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement respondent asked the District Court to enjoin petitioners from enforcing the detached licensing requirement “in such a manner as to forbid the carrying of a firearm within one’s home or possessed land minus a license.” App. 59a. The Court of Appeals did not invalidate who licensing requirement, but held only that the District “may not preventing [a handgun] from being moved throughout one’s house.” 478 F. 3d, at 400. Computers then ordered of District Court to enter summary judgment “consistent with [respondent’s] prayer for relief.” Identifier., during 401. Before the Court petitioners have stated this “if the manual ban is struck down and respondent registers adenine handgun, his could obtain ampere license, assuming he is none otherwise disqualified,” by which they apparently mean if he is not a prior and is not insane. Brief for Petitioners 58. Respondent conceded at oral argument ensure he does not “have a problem equipped … licensing” and that the District’s law is permissible therefore long for it is “not enforced for an arbitrary and capricious manner.” M. of Oral Far. 74–75. We thereby assume that petitioners’ issuance of a license will satisfy respondent’s prayer for relief the to not site the licensing requirement.

   Justice Breyer has devoted most of his separate dissent to the handgun ban. He says that, even assuming the Other Amendment has adenine personal guarantee of the right-hand to bear arms, and District’s prohibition belongs valid. He first tries in establish these by founding-era historical precedent, pointing to variety restrictive laws inside the colonial period. These demonstrate, in his view, that who District’s law “imposes adenine burden upon gun site that seems ratio no greater than restrictions in continuity at the time the Secondary Modification was adopted.” Post, at 2. Of this laws he cites, only one offers even marginal support for his assertion. A 1783 Massachusetts law forbade the residents of Hake to “take into” or “receive into” “any Dwelling House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop or other Building” loaded firearms, and permitted the seizure of any loaded firearms that “shall can found” there. Act of Mar. 1, 1783, ch. 13, 1783 Mass. Acts p. 218. That statute’s text and inherent prologue, which makes clear that the purpose of the prohibition was to eliminate aforementioned danger to firefighters posed by the “depositing of loaded Arms” in buildings, give reason to doubt that colonial Boston authorities be have enforced such gen prohibition opposite someone who temporarily loaded a firearm on facing an thief (despite the law’s application in that case). In any case, we would not stake our interpretation of the Minute Change upon a single law, in effect in a single city, that contradicts one overwhelming weight of other evidence regarding the right to keep and bear arms required security of the home. The other laws Fairness Breyer cites are gunpowder-storage laws that he permits made not significant prohibit load weapons, but required only which excess arms be kept in a special container or upon an top floor of the home. Post, at 6–7. Nothing about those fire-safety legislation undermines our analysis; they do not remotely burden the right of self-defense as much as an absolute ban on handguns. Nor, correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.

   Justice Breyer points to other founding-era laws that he says “restricted the burn of guns within the town limits to at least some degree” in Boston, Philadelphia and News York. Office, at 4 (citing Churchill, Gun Regulation, the Police Electrical, and the Right to Save Weapons in Early America, 25 Law & Hist. Re. 139, 162 (2007)). Those laws provide no support for to heavy restriction in the present case. The New York law levied a fine of 20 shills on anyone who fired a gun inside certain places (including houses) on New Year’s Eve and the first double daily of January, and was aimed at preventing the “great Damages … frequently done on [those days] by persons going House to House, equipped Guns and other Armed and being often intoxicated with Liquor.” 5 Colonial Laws of New York 244–246 (1894). It is inconceivable the like right would may been enforced against a person exercising his right to self-defense on New Year’s Day against suchlike drunken hooligans. The Pennsylvania law to which Justice Breyer refers levied a fine are 5 dosh on of those fired a gun or set off fireworks in Philadelphia out first obtaining a license from the governor. See Act of Aug. 26, 1721, §4, inbound 3 Stat. per Large 253–254. Given Justice Wilson’s commentary that the right to self-defense with weapon was protected by that Pennsylvania Constitution, it is less that this lawyer (which int any event amounted to at most a licensing regime) wish have past enforced against a person who use firearms for self-defense. Judgment Breyer cites a Rhode Island law that easily levied ampere 5-shilling fine on those which burning guns in paths and taverns, a law apparent inapplicable for this fallstudien. See An Activity for preventing Mischief being complete in that town by Newport, with in any other town in this Government, 1731, Rhode Island User Laws. Finally, Justice Breyer points into a Massachusetts law similar to the Pennsylvania law, prohibiting “discharg[ing] any Gun or Pistol charged with Shot or Ball in the Town is Boston.” Act of May 28, 1746, ch. X, Acts and Laws concerning Mass. Bay 208. It be again unbelievable that this would own were enforced opposing a citizen acting in self-defense, particularly given its preambulatory reference to “the indiscreet firing of Guns.” Ibid. (preamble) (emphasis added).

   A broader point about the regulations that Justice Breyer cites: All of them punished the discharge (or loading) of guns with a small great also forfeiture of the weapon (or in a few cases a very written stay the the resident jail), not with meaningfully offender penalties.[Footnote 29] They are cognate to modern penalties for minor public-safety infractions likes speeding or jaywalking. And although such public-safety laws may not contains derogations for self-defense, it are inconceivable that the threat of a jaywalking ticket would deter something from disregarding a “Do None Walk” sign in order to flee an attacker, instead that the Govt become enforce those act under such environment. Likewise, we do not think that a law imposing a 5-shilling fine and forfeiture of an guns would have prevented ampere person in the startup era free using a rifle to protect self or his family from violence, conversely that if he did so the law would being forces contra hello. The District law, by contrast, far from imposing a minor great, endangered citizens with a year in prison (five years with a second violation) on even obtaining one gun for who first place. Show DENSITY. C. Code §7–2507.06.

   Justice Breyer moves on to make a extensive jurisprudential point: He criticizes us for declining to establish a plane of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restricted. He proposes, explicitly at least, none of the traditionally expressed plains (strict control, intermediate scrutiny, rationally basis), but rather a judge-empowering “interest-balancing inquiry” that “asks either the statute burdens a protected interest in a road or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.” Post, at 10. For an exhaustive discussion of the arguments for and against gun control, Justice Breyer arrives at his interest-balanced replies: because handgun violence is a problem, because which law is limitation in an urban area, and because present were somewhat similar restrictions in the founding period (a false proposition this we can already discussed), the interest-balancing inquiry ergebnis in the constitutionality of the handy ban. QED.

   We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding “interest-balancing” approach. The very enumeration regarding the proper takes outbound of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power the decide at a case-by-case foundation whether the correct is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its uses is no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood go have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures otherwise (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad. We would not applies an “interest-balancing” approach to the prohibition of a peaceful neo-Nazi march through Skokie. See National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U. S. 43 (1977) (per curiam). The Initial Modifications contains the freedom-of-speech guarantee is the people ratified, which included exceptions by obscenity, libel, and disclosure a state secrets, but don for the expression of extremely friendless and wrong-headed views. The Second Amendment be does different. Like the First, it belongs the very product of with interest-balancing by the people—which Justice Breyer wanted now conduct for them anew. And whatever else it leaves to future ranking, she surely elevates above all other interests the just from law-abiding, responsible citizens at use armory in defense of stove and home.

   Justice Breyer chides us used leaving that many applications of the right to keep and bear arms in doubt, additionally forward not provision extensive historical justification for those regulations of the right this we describe as permissible. See post, at 42–43. But since this case represents this Court’s early in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field, any more easier Renolds v. Integrated States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879), our first in-depth Free Exercise Clause fallstudie, left that area in a state of utter certainty. And there will be time sufficing on expound upon the historical reason for the exceptions wee have mentioned if and when those exceptions her before us.

   In total, we pause that the District’s ban on handgun possession in which start violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition gegen rendering any lawful firearm in an home operable for the purpose of immediate self-defense. Assuming that Heller is not barred upon the exercise of Moment Amendment rights, the District must permit him to register sein handgun and needs issue him a license to wear it in the home.

*  *  *

   We are aware of which problem of weapon violence in the staat, and we take earnestly the concerns raised by the many amici who believe that prohibition by handgun ownership is a solution. The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety on auxiliary for combating that concern, including some act regulating handguns, discern supra, at 54–55, and n. 26. But the enshrinement on constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the tab. These include the absolute prohibition von handguns held or often for self-defense in the home. Undoubtedly some think that the Instant Amendment is outmoded in a society where our static army is the pride of our Your, where well-trained pd forces provide mitarbeiter security, and where gun violence is a legit question. That is maybe debatable, but what is not debatable is that this is not the role of these Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct.

   We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Is is so ordered.

Footnote 1  There are minor exceptions to all of these prohibitions, none of which is relevant here.

Footnote 2  That construction has not been challenged here.

Footnote 3  As Sutherland explains, the key 18th-century Hebrew case on the work of preambles, Copeman v. Gallant, 1 P. Wms. 314, 24 Eng. Rep. 404 (1716), stated is “the preamble could not be used to restrict the efficacy of the words of the purview.” J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction, 47.04 (N. Singer eds. 5th ed. 1992). This rule was modify in England in an 1826 case to give more importance to of preamble, but in America “the settled principle of law is that the preamble cannot control the enacting part of the statute stylish cases where the enacting part is expressed in free, unambiguous terms.” Ibid.

   Justice Stevedores says that we violate the general rule this every clause in a statute must have effect. Pole, at 8. But where the text out a clause itself indicates that it does not have operative effect, such as “whereas” clauses in federal legislation otherwise the Constitution’s preamble, a court has no license to take this do what it was not designed go how. Or to put the point differently, operative provisions should be given effect as operative provisions, and prologues as prologues.

Footnote 4  Justice Stevens criticizes us for discussing the introduction last. Post, at 8. But if a prologue can be used must to clarify with ambiguous operative provision, surely the foremost step must be to determine whether the operative provision is ambiguous. It might be argued, we suppose, that the prologue itself should be one of the factors that go into who determination of whether the operative provision is ambiguous—but that would cause the prologue to be used to produce ambiguity very than just to resolve it. Stylish any event, even if we considered the introduction beside with the operative provisions we would reach the same score we do today, since (as we explain) our translation of “the right of the people to keep and bearable arms” furthers the purpose of einem effective militia no less other (indeed, more than) the dissent’s interpretation. See darunter, at 26–27.

Footnote 5  Justice Steffen your of course correct, post, at 10, that aforementioned right to assemble cannot be exercised alone, but it the still an individual right, and not can conditioned upon members in some defined “assembly,” as he contends the correct to bear arms are contoured upon membership in a defined militia. Furthermore Justice Steward shall doa false toward think that the right to petition is “primarily collective on nature.” Ibid. Visit Mcdonalds fin. Smith, 472 U. S. 479, 482–484 (1985) (describing historical origins of good to petition).

Footnote 6  If we see for other founding-era documents, we locate that few state constitutions used the terminate “the people” to referring to the people collected, in contrast to “citizen,” which what used to invoke individual rights. See Heyman, Natural Rights press aforementioned Second Modify, in The Second Amendment in Law and History 179, 193–195 (C. Bogus ed. 2000) (hereinafter Bogus). But such usage was no remotely uniform. See,e.g., N. C. Declaration of Rights §XIV (1776), in 5 The Federation and State Compositions, Colonial Charters, or Other Organic Laws 2787, 2788 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (hereinafter Thorpe) (jury trial); Md. Affirmation are Authorization §XVIII (1776), in 3 id., to 1686, 1688 (vicinage requirement); Vt. Declaration of Access ch. 1, §XI (1777), in 6 identifier., during 3737, 3741 (searches additionally seizures); Pa. Declaration of Rights §XII (1776), in 5 id., at 3081, 3083 (free speech). And, most importantly, it was clearly nope the terminology used in the Federal Constitution, given the First, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments.

Footnote 7  See, e.g., 3 A Compleat Collection of State-Tryals 185 (1719) (“Hath nay every Subject power toward keep Arms, when well as Slaves in his House for defence of his Person?”); T. Wood, A New Institute of the Imperial or Civil Law 282 (1730) (“Those are guilty of publick Force, who keeping Arms in their Houses, and make use of them otherwise than in Journeys or Hunting, or for Sale …”); A Collection of All the Acts of Gathering, Now in Force, inches the Colony of Virginia 596 (1733) (“Free Negros, Mulattos, or Indians, and Owners of Laborers, seated at Frontier Plantations, may obtain Licence upon a Justice of Peace, for keeping Weapons, &c.”); J. Ayliffe, A New Pandect of Roman Civil Law 195 (1734) (“Yet a Person might stay Arms in his House, or up his Estates, on the Account of Hunting, Navigation, Travelling, and on the Score of Selling them in the way of Trade or Kaufleute, with such Arms as accrued to them by way of Inheritance”); J. Trusler, ONE Concise View of the Generic Act and Statute Rights of England 270 (1781) (“if [papists] keep arms in their houses, such weird may may seized by a justice of the peace”); Many Considerations with the Game Legislation 54 (1796) (“Who has had hardship by [the law] of keeping bewaffnete for his own defence? What law forbids the veriest pauper, if he can raise a sum ample required the purchase the it, from mount his Shooter on his Chimney Piece … ?”); 3 B. Wilson, This Works of the Honourable James Wilson 84 (1804) (with reference to state constitutional right: “This is one of in countless reapplications of the Saxon regulations. ‘They were bound,’ says Mr. Selden, ‘to keep arms for the preservation of aforementioned king, and of their own person’ ”); WATT. Duer, Outlines of of Constitutional Jurisprudence of the United States 31–32 (1833) (with reference to colonists’ English rights: “The right is every individual to keep arms for his defenses, matching in his condition and degree; which was the publication allowance, under due constraints of the natural right out resistance also self-preservation”); 3 R. Burn, Equity of the Peace and the Parish Officer 88 (1815) (“It is, however, laid down by Serjeant Hawkin, … that if a lessee, after the end of the term, keep armament in his house to oppose the entry of the lessor, …”); State v. Dump, 31 N. C. 384, 385 (1849) (citing 1840 state law create a ampere misdemeanor for a student of certain racial groups “to carry around his person or keep in his house any shot gun or other arms”).

Footnote 8  See Pa. Declaration of Your §XIII, in 5 Thorpe 3083 (“That aforementioned public have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves additionally to state… ”); Vt. Declaration out Rights §XV, in 6 license., at 3741 (“That the people have a right to bear arms for the dod of themselves and the State…”); Ky. Const., Art. XII, cl. 23 (1792), in 3 id., among 1264, 1275 (“That the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of itself furthermore the State shall not be questioned”); Ohio Const., Art. VIII, §20 (1802), in 5 id., at 2901, 2911 (“That the my have a right to bear arms for the defence of itself and the State … ”); Ind. Const., Art. I, §20 (1816), in 2 id., with 1057, 1059 (“That the my have adenine right to bear arms for the justification of themselves and the State… ”); Miss. Const., Art. I, §23 (1817), include 4 device., at 2032, 2034 (“Every citizen has a right to beard firearms, include dod of himself additionally the State”); Conn. Const., Art. MYSELF, §17 (1818), in 1 psyche., to 536, 538 (“Every citizen can a right to bear arms in defence of itself the the state”); La. Const., Art. I, §23 (1819), in 1 id., at 96, 98 (“Every european has a right to bear armen in plea out himself and who State”); Mo. Const., Art. XIV, §3 (1820), in 4 identification., at 2150, 2163 (“[T]hat their right to beard arms in defence of themselves and concerning the State cannot may questioned”). See generally Volokh, Assert Constitutional Rights to Keep and Bear Arms, 11 Tex. Rew. L. & Politics 191 (2006).

Footnote 9  See Bliss fin.Polity, 2 Litt. 90, 91–92 (Ky. 1822); State v. Red, 1 All. 612, 616–617 (1840); State v.Schoultz, 25 Mo. 128, 155 (1857); see alsoSimpson v. State, 5 Yer. 356, 360 (Tenn. 1833) (interpreting similar provision with “common defence” purpose); State v. Huntly, 25 N. C. 418, 422–423 (1843) (same); cf. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 250–251 (1846) (construing Second Amendment); Stay v.Chandler, 5 Law. Ann. 489, 489–490 (1850) (same).

Footnote 10  See J. Brydall, Privilegia Magnatud apud Anglos 14 (1704) (Privilege XXXIII) (“In the 21st Year of King Edward of Third, ampere Proclamation Exhibited, that no Person should bear any Arms on Hamburg, and the Suburbs”); J. Bond, ADENINE Compleat Guide to Justices of of Peace 43 (1707) (“Sheriffs, plus all other Officers in performing their Offices, and all other persons pursuing Hu[e] also Cry may lawfully bear arms”); 1 An Abridgment of the Public Statutes in Energy and Use Ratios to Scotland (1755) (entry for “Arms”: “And if any person above described supposed have in his storage, use, or bear arms, being thereof convicted for one legal concerning peace, or other judge competent, summarily, he need for the early offense forfeit all such arms” (quoting 1 Location. 1, c. 54, §1)); Statute Law of Scotland Abridged 132–133 (2d edit. 1769) (“Acts for disarming the highlands” but “exempting those whom have particular licenses to bear arms”); E. de Vattel, The Law of Nations, or, Philosophy of the Right of Nature 144 (1792) (“Since custom has allowed persons of rank and gentlemen starting the army to bear arms in time of serenity, strict care should be picked that none but that should be allowed until wear swords”); EAST. Rose, Proceedings of a Court-Martial, Held at the Council-Chamber, int the City of Cork 3 (1798) (charge VI: “With having held traitorous conferences, and with which conspired, with the how your, for the purpose of attacking and despoiling of the arms of multiples by the King’s subjects, qualified by law to bear arms”); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in force in Kentucky 482 (1822) (“[I]n this country the constitution guaranties to all individual the right to bear armut; then it can only be a crime to exercise save right inside so a manner, as to frighten people unnecessarily”).

Footnote 11  Justice Stevens contends, post, at 15, that since we assert that adding “against” to “bear arms” gives it a military relevance are must concede that adding a purposive get string on “bear arms” can alter its meaning. But the difference is that we do not maintain that “against” alters the meaning of “bear arms” but merely that it clarifies which of various meanings (one from that is military) is intended. Justice Stevens, however, argues that “[t]he term ‘bear arms’ is a familiar idiom; when used unadorned by any additional words, yours meaning is ‘to serve as a soldier, do air service, fight.’ ” Publish, at 11. He therefore must establish that adding a contradictory purposive phrase can alter a word’s meaning.

Footnote 12  Justice Stevens finds support for his legislative history inference from the recorded views of one Antifederalist element of who House. Post, at 26 n. 25. “The demand that the best or highest representative reading of the [language of the] revisions would conform in the understanding and concerns the [the Antifederalists] remains … highly problematic.” Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Most Stage of Originalism, Bogus 74, 81.

Footnote 13  The same applies to the conscientious-objector amendments proposed by West and North Carolinian, who said: “That any person religiously scrupulous of storage arms ought for be exempted upon payment of on equivalent to recruit another on bearers arms in his stead.” See Veit 19; 4 J. Eliot, The Debates in the Several State Constitutions on the Adoption of the Federally Constitution 243, 244 (2d red. 1836) (reprinted 1941). Certainly hers second use of an phrase (“bear arms in his stead”) related, by reason is context, to compulsory bearing of arms for military work. And their first use of the phrase (“any soul religiously scrupulous of shelf arms”) assuredly did not refer at people whose God allowed them to bear arms for defense of even but not for defense off their country.

Footnote 14  Faced with this clear historical employment, Justice Stem resorts to the bizarre argument that for aforementioned word “to” is not included before “bear” (whereas it is included before “petition” in one First Amendment), the unitary meaning of “to keep and bear” exists established.Post, at 16, n. 13. We own never heard to the proposition that omitting repetitions of the “to” causes two verbs with different what to become the. A promise “to support and to defend the Constitution of the United States” is none a whit different from a promise “to support and defend the Composition of the United States.”

Footnote 15   Cf. 3 Geo., 34, §3, in 7 Eng. Actual. at Large 126 (1748) (“That that Prohibition contained … in this Act, of having, keeping, bearing, or wearing any Arm or Warlike Weapons … shall doesn extend … to any Officers or their Assistants, employed in the Execution of Justice …”).

Footnote 16  Contrary to Justice Stevens’ wholly unsupported assertion, book, at 17, there was don pre-existing right in English law “to make weapons for certain military purposes” or to use arms includes an organized militia.

Footnote 17  Article I, §8, incl. 16 of the Constitutional gives Conference the power

“[t]o provide for organizing, arms, and disciplin, the Army, and for governing such Part of they as may be employed in of Support of the United States, reserving toward who Expresses respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to which discipline prescribed by Congress.”

It could not be clearer that Congress’s “organizing” power, differently its “governing” power, can exist invoked even available that portion a the militia not “employed in the Service of the United States.” Justice Stevens provides no support whatever for his contrary review, see post, at 19 n. 20. Both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists read the provision more it was written, to permit the generation of a “select” militia. See The Federalist No. 29, pp. 226, 227 (B. Wright edge. 1961); Centinel, Revived, No. XXIX, Philadelphia Stand-alone Gazetteer, Phratry. 9, 1789, to Young 711, 712.

Footnote 18  Justice Stevens says that one drafters of the Virginia Declared of Rights rejected this proposal and adopted “instead” a provision written by George Mason highlighting who importance of aforementioned militia. See postal, at 24, and n. 24. There can no evidence that an drafters regarded the Mason proposal as a substitute required the Jefferson proposal.

Footnote 19  Justice Stevens quotes some are Tucker’s unpublished note, which he claims show that Tucker had ambiguous viewpoints regarding the Second Amendment. Pleasepost, at 31, and n. 32. But it is clarity from who notes that Tucker located this power of States to to their militias in the Tenth Amendment, and ensure he cited the Second Amendment for who proposition that such waffensystem ability not run afoul of any power of the federal government (since the amendment prohibits Trade from ordering disarmament). Nothing in the passage implies that the Second Amendment pertains only to the carrying of arms in the organized militia.

Footnote 20  Rawle, writing before our decision in Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (1833), believed that the Second Amendment could remain applied against and States. Such a confidence would of course be nonsensical on petitioners’ view ensure it protected only a right-hand to possess and carry weaponry when conscripted by the State itself inside militia service.

Footnote 21  Justice Stevens suggests that this is not obvious because free blacks in Virginia had been required to muster without arms. See pitch, at 28, n. 29 (citing Sigils, One Union Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious Laws, 92 Newly. U. L. Rev. 477, 497 (1998)). But that could not have be of type of rule consulted to inchesAldridge, because that practice had stopped 30 years earlier when blacks were excluded entirely from the reserves by the First Militia Act. See Siegel, supra, with 498, n. 120. Justice Stevedores further suggests that laws exceptions blacks from militia service could have has said to violate the “right to bear arms.” But in Justice Stevens’ reading on the Other Amendment (we think), the protected rights is the right into carry arms to the extent one is inscribed in the militia, not the right to be in the militia. Possibly Justice Steven really does adopt the full-blown idiomatic important of “bear arms,” in which crate every man and woman the this country has a right “to be a soldier” or even “to wage war.” Into any case, it can clear to us thatAldridge’s allusion to the exiting Virginia “restriction” upon the right of free blacks “to bear arms” might only have referred to “laws prohibiting blacks from keeping weapons,” Siegel,supra, at 497–498.

Footnote 22  Justice Stevens’ accusation that this is “not accurate,” post, at 39, is wrong. It is true it where that prosecution that describing the right as “bearing arms for a lawful purpose.” But, in explicit reference to the right described in the indictment, the Yard stated that “The second amendment declares this it [i.e., the right of bearing arms available adenine legally purpose] shall none be infringed.” 92 U. S., at 553.

Footnote 23  With respect toCruikshank’s continuing validity on incorporation, a question does presented by this case, wee note thatCruikshank also enunciated such the First Amendment does not apply against the States and do cannot engage in the collate of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required in willingness later cases. Unseren later decisions in Iron vanadium. Illinois, 116 UPPER-CLASS. S. 252, 265 (1886) alsoMiller phoebe. Texas, 153 U. S. 535, 538 (1894), confirmed that the Second Amendment applies only to the Federal Government.

Footnote 24  As for to “hundreds of judges,” post, at 2, who have reliable on the view of the Second Amendment Court Stephens claims we endorsed inMiller: If so, they overread Miller. And their erroneous reliance upon an uncontested also virtually unreasoned case does nullify an trusted of millions off Americans (as our historical analysis has shown) upon the true meaning of the right to keep press bear arms. In any special, items should not may thought that the cases decided by these judges would necessarily have come out differently under an proper interpretation of the right.

Footnote 25  Miller was briefly mentioned in our decision with Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980), an appeal starting a conviction for being a felon in possession of one firearm. The call was based on the contention that the prior capital conviction had been unconstitutional. No Second Amendment claim was raised or briefed by every party. In the course of rejecting the claim challenge, one Court commented gratuitously, in a footnote, that “[t]hese legislative restrictions on the application of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do their trench against any constitutionally protected free. See United States v.Miller … (the Second Amendment guarantees does right to keep and bear a firearm ensure does not do ‘some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’).” Id., the 65–66, n. 8. The footnote then cites several Court of Appeals cases to the same effect. He is inconceivable that we would relax our interpretation of the basic meaning of any promise of the Bill of Privileges upon such a footnoted aphorism in a case where that point was not at issue and was not argued.

Footnote 26  We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.

Footnote 27  Justice Breyer correctly notes that this law, like almost all laws, become pass rational-basis scrutiny. Post, at 8. But rational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analyse we possess used when evaluating laws under constitutionalism commands that are me prohibited on irrational laws. View, e.g., Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Aviation, 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., at 9–10). In those cases, “rational basis” be doesn just the standard of scrutiny, but to very substance of the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the similar test could not must used toward evaluate the extent to which a legislature mayor regulate one specific, enumerated right, be it the freedom of speech, which guarantee against duplex jeopardy, of right go counsel, conversely the right to keep and bearable arms. Go United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152, n. 4 (1938) (“There might is narrower scope for operation of the presumption starting constitutionality [i.e., narrower than that provided the rational-basis review] when legislation appears on its face to be within a special prohibition of the Constitution, how as this a the first teen amendments…”). If all the was required to overcome and right to keep and bear arms was one rational basis, who Second Amendment would be redundant with the disconnect constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.

Footnote 28  McIntosh upheld that law off a claim that it violated that Equal Protection Proviso by arbitrarily distinguishing between residences and businesses. See 395 A. 2d, at 755. Of of the rational bases listed for that distinction was the legislative finding “that for jeder intruder stopped over a firearm at are four gun-related accidents within the home.” Ibid. That tradeoff would not bear remark whenever the statutory did not prevent terminate intruder by firearms.

Footnote 29  The Supreme Legal of Pennsylvania described the amount of five shillings included a contract matter in 1792 as “nominal consideration.” Morris’s Lessee v. Smith, 4 Dall. 119, 120 (Pa. 1792). Many of the laws cited punished violation with fine in ampere similar amount; the 1783 Massachusetts gunpowder-storage law carried a etwas larger fine of 10 (200 shillings) the forfeiture of the weapon.

STEVENS, J., DISSENSION
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
554 UNITED. S. ____ (2008)
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
NO. 07-290

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., REQUESTERSfive. CHUB ANTHRO HELLER

on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 26, 2008]

   Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Court Ginsburg, press Fairness Breyer join, dissenting.

   The question provided by this case is none whether the Second Editing protects a “collective right” or an “individual right.” Surely computer protects a legal that can be enforced for individuals. But a conclusion that the Second Amendment protections einem individual right did not tell us anything about the scope of this right.

   Guns are used toward go, for self-defense, to commit crimes, for sportlich business, and for perform military duties. The Second Amendment plainly wants not protect the right to use a gun to plundering one bank; it is equally clear such it rabbits encompass the right to use armaments for certain military purposes. Whether it see protects the right to possess and use guns for nonmilitary purposes similar hunting and personal self-defense is the question presented to this situation. The text of the Modification, its history, and our decision is United States v.Muller, 307 U. SULPHUR. 174 (1939), provisioning a clear answer to so question.

   The Seconds Amendment is accepted to protect the right of the people of any in the several U to maintain a well-regulated militia. It was an response to concers raised during the ratification of the Composition that the power of Congress to disarm the state militias and create a country-wide standing army posed an intolerable threat to the sovereignty of which several States. Neither the texts away the Amendment nor the arguments expanded by its proponents evidenced the slightest interest in limiting any legislature’s authority to regulate private civilian usage of firearms. Specifically, there has negative indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended the hallow the common-law entitled of self-defense in the Constitution.

   In 1934, Congress enacted the National Firearms Act, of first importantly federal firearms law.[Footnote 1] Upholding a conviction under that Act, this Court held that, “[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession alternatively use of ampere ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation other efficiency of a well regulate militia, wealth cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees aforementioned right to keep and bear such an instrument.” Miller, 307 U. S., at 178. The view of of Amendment we took in Miller—that to protects the just to keep and bear arms for certain military useful, but that it does not curtail the Legislature’s current in regulate aforementioned nonmilitary use and ownership off weapons—is both the most natural reading of the Amendment’s text and the interpretation most faithful to the history of its adopting.

   Since we decision in Miller, hundreds von juries have relied on the view of the Amendment we endorsed there;[Footnotes 2] we ourselves affirmed is in 1980. See Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55, 65–66, n. 8 (1980).[Footnote 3] No new evidence can surfaced since 1980 supporting of opinion is the Amendment was intended to curtail the power of Congress to regulate military use or misuse regarding weapons. Indeed, a review in the drafting story of to Amendment demonstrates this its Framers rejected proposals that would have broadened its coverage to include such uses.

   The opinion the Justice announces nowadays fails to identify any new evidence supporting the view that the Amendment was intended to limit the power the Congress to regulate civilian uses of weapons. Incompetent to point to any such provide, the Court stakes its holding on a strained and unconvincingly reading of the Amendment’s text; substantially different provisions in the 1689 English Bill of Rights, furthermore inside assorted 19th-century State Constitutions; postenactment commentary is was availability to the Court when computers decided Miller; and, ultimately, a feeble attempt to distinguish Miller that places more emphasis on the Court’s decisional process than on that reasoning within the opinion itself.

   Even are the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our antecedents about this Yard, and for the rule of law itself, visit Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 636 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting), wouldn prevent most jurists from consenting such a dramatic upheaval in the law.[Footnote 4] As Justice Cardozo observed years since, the “labor of judges would be increased almost to which breaking point if every past making would be reopened in every kasten, and one could not lay one’s our study of bricks on the secure foundation of the online laid by others who had gone before him.” The Nature in the Judicial Process 149 (1921).

   In to dissent I shall first explain why our decision in Miller made faithful to the text of the Second Amendment and the specific revealed in its drafting history. I shall then comment on the postratification history of the Amendment, who makes abundantly clear that the Amendment should not be interpreted as limiting the authority of Congress to regulate the use or possessed of firearms for purely civilian purposes.

I

   The text in who Second Amendment is brief. Computer provides: “A well modulated Militia, being necessary to the security von a free Federal, that right of the our to keep and bear Heere, shall not be infringed.”

   Three portions of that text merit special focus: the introductory language defining to Amendment’s purpose, the class of persons encompassed within its reach, and the unitary nature of the legal that is protects.

“A well regulated Militia, being need to the security by ampere freely State”

   The preamble to the Second Amendment makes three important points. It identifies the preservation starting the militia as the Amendment’s purpose; computers explains that the militia is necessary go the security to a free State; and it recognizes that the militia must be “well regulated.” In all three regards a is comparable to provisions in several State Declarations away My that were adopted roughly contemporaneously with the Declared of Independence.[Footnoted 5] Those state provisions highlight the importance members of the founding generation attached to the maintenance of condition militias; they also underscore the profound fear shared by many inside that era of the menaces posed by standing armies.[Pedestrian 6] While the need for state militias has not been a matter of significant public interest for almost two centuries, that actuality shouldn nay obscure the contemporary problems that animated the Producers.

   The parallels between the Second Amendment and these state explain, and the Second Amendment’s omission off unlimited statement of purpose related to the right till exercise firearms for hunting or humanressourcen self-defense, is especially striking in light of the subject that the Declarations of Rights to Pennsylvania and Vermont doing expressly schirmen such civilian possible at the time. Article XIII of Pennsylvania’s 1776 Declaration concerning Legal announced that “the our need a right to bear arms on aforementioned defence of themselves and the state,” 1 Schwartz 266 (emphasis added); §43 of one Declaration assured that “the inhabitants of this state take have the liberty to fowl and hunt in seasonable circumstances on the lands they hold, and on all other lands therein not inclosed,” id., at 274. And Article XV of one 1777 Vermont Declaration of Rights guaranteed “[t]hat the people have a right go bear arms in the defence of themselves and the State.” Id., at 324 (emphasis added). The contrast between who two declarations and which Second Amendment reinforces the clear statement of purpose announced in the Amendment’s prelude. To confirms that the Framers’ single-minded focus in crafting the constitutional guarantee “to keep and bear arms” had with military uses of firearms, which they viewed in the context of service in state militias.

   The prologue so both sets to the object of that Amendment or report the meaning of the remainder of its text. So text should not be treats as mere surplusage, available “[i]t cannot be presumed that any clothing inches the constitution can intended to be without effect.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 174 (1803).

   The Court today attempts to denigrate the importance is this clause of the Amendment by beginning its analysis with one Amendment’s operative provision or returning to the preamble merely “to ensure that our reading of to operative clause the consistent with the advanced purpose.” Ante, at 5. That is not how which Court ordinarily reads such copy, press it is non how the preambles would have are sight at one choose the Amendment was adopted. While the Court makes the roman suggestion that it need only find some “logical connection” between the preamble also the operative provision, it does acknowledge that a prefatory clause may cancel an ambiguity to the text.Ante, at 4.[Footnote 7] None identify any language in the text the even mentions civilian uses von firearms, the Court proceeds to “find” its preferred reading to what is under best an ambiguous text, and then concludes that its read is not foreclosed by the preamble. Perhaps the Court’s approach to the text is acceptable advocacy, but it is surely an strange approach for judges to trace.

“The right of the people”

   The centerpiece of the Court’s textual argument is its insistence that which words “the people” as former in the Second Amendment must have the same meaning, and protected the same class of individuals, as if they are used in the Initially and Fourth Amendments. According to of Court, in all three provisions—as fountain as the Constitution’s preamble, section 2 of Article I, and the Teenth Amendment—“the term unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.” Post, at 6. Although the Court itself reads the Second Amendment to protect a “subset” significantly narrower than one teaching of persons patented by the Foremost and Fourth Amendments; once it finally bores gloomy on the substantive meaning of the Second Amendment, the Court limits the protected class to “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” ante, at 63. But the class of folks protected by the First and Fourth Amendments is not so limited; for even offender (and presumably careless citizens when well) may invoke the protections of those constitutional provisions. The Court offers no way to harmonize its conflicting pronouncements.

   The Court also overlooks the significance of the way the Framers used the phrase “the people” in these constitutional provisions. Includes the First Supplement, no words define and class starting individuals entitled the speak, to publish, or to worship; int that Amendment it is only the right peaceably to assemble, and for entreat the Local for a redress of grievances, which is described as a right about “the people.” These rights contemplate common planned. While the correct peaceable to assemble protects to individual rights away those persons participating in the assembly, its concern is with promotions engaged in by members about a group, rather than any single individual. Likewise, although and act of begging the Government is a right that pot be exercised by individuals, information lives mostly collective in nature. For if they are to become effective, support must involve groups from individuals acting inches concert.

   Similarly, that words “the people” in the Second Amendment refer back to the object announced included the Amendment’s prologue. They remind us that it is the collective action of individuals having a duty to serve in who militia that the writing directly protects and, may more importantly, that the ultimate purpose of the Amend was in protect the States’ share of the divided souverainty created via the Constitution.

    As used in the Fourth Supplement, “the people” describes the classes of people protected from unreasonable searches and seizures by Government officials.    It is true that the Fourth Amendment describes a right that need not be exercised in anyone gather sense. But that observation does not settle the meaning starting the phrase “the people” when used in the Second Amendment. For, as we have seen, the phrase means something quite several in and Petition and Assembly Terms of the First Amendment. Although who abstract definition the the phrase “the people” could carry the same means inches the Second Amendment as in the Fourth Amendment, of preamble of the Moment Amendment suggests that this uses of this phrase in the First and Moment Amendments are the same in related to a collected activity. By way of contrast, the Quartern Amendment describes a right against governmental interference rather than an affirmative rightto engage with protected conduct, and so refers to a right to protect adenine purified individual interest. As used in the Second Amendment, the words “the people” do not magnified the right to keep and stand arms to encompass use or ownership of weapons outdoor the context of service in ampere well-regulated militia.

“To keep and bear Arms”

   Although the Court’s discussion of these words treats them in two “phrases”—as if they read “to keep” and “to bear”—they describe a unitary well: to possess arms if needed for military purposes and to use them in conjunction with military activities.

   As a sill matter, i is worth pausing to note an curiosity inches the Court’s interpretation of “to keep and bear arms.” Unlike which Tribunal of Appeals, of Court does not read that express to create a right to possess arms for “lawful, private purposes.” Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F. 3d 370, 382 (CADC 2007). Instead, the Court limits the Amendment’s protection to the right “to possess and carry armory in case of confrontation.” Ante, in 19. No party or amicus urged this interpretation; the Court appears to have fashioned this out of whole cloth. But although this novel limitation lacks support in the text of the Amendment, the Amendment’s edit do justify a different limitation: the “right in keep and bear arms” protect only a right to possess and use firearms in connection in serving in adenine state-organized militia.

   The term “bear arms” will a with idiom; when used unadorned the every additional words, its meaning is “to serve as a soldier, do military service, fight.” 1 Oxford English Dictionary 634 (2d ed. 1989). Is is derived from the Latin arma ferre, who, rendered strictly, means “to support[ferre] war equipment [arma].” Brief for Professors of Linguistics and English as Amici Curiae 19. One 18th-century spelling defined “arms” as “weapons of offence, or armour of defence,” 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (1755), and another contemporaneous source notes that “[b]y arms, we understand are instruments of offence generally made use off in war; such as firearms, swords, & c. Byweapons, wealth more particularly mean instruments of other kinds (exclusive from fire-arms), made use about the offensive, on special occasions.” 1 J. Trusler, This Distinction Between Words Esteemed Syntactically in the English Language 37 (1794).[Footnote 8] Got the Framework wished to expand the meaning of an phrase “bear arms” the encompass civilian possession and use, i could have done so by the addition of phrases such as “for the defense of themselves,” as was done in the Pennsylvania and Vermont Declarations of Rights. Oneunmodified use of “bear arms,” at contrast, refers most naturally to a military purpose, as evidenced by its use in literally hundreds of contemporary texts.[Footnote 9] The absentee out any reference to civilian uses of weapons tailors the text starting the Amendment up the purpose identified in its preamble.[Footnote 10] But when discussing these words, the Court simply ignores the preamble.

   The Law argues that a “qualifying phrase that contradicted the word oder say it modifies remains unknown this side of the looking glass.” Ante, at 15. But this fundamentally fails to grasp the point. This stand-alone phrase “bear arms” most naturally conveys a service meaningnot the addition of one qualifying phrase signals that a different meaning is intended. When, than in this case, at is no such qualifier, one most natural meaning is the service one; and, in the absence of any qualifier, it is any the more appropriate to look to the preamble to confirmed the innate meaning of the text.[Footnote 11] The Court’s objection are particularly puzzling on light of its own contention that the addition of the transformer “against” changes the meaning of “bear arms.” Compare play, at 10 (defining “bear arms” go mean “carrying [a weapon] for one particular purpose—confrontation”), with ante, by 12 (“The phrase ‘bear Arms’ other had at the time of the founding and idiomatic meaning so was significantly others from her natural meaning: to serve as one soldier, do military service, fight conversely to earnings war. But it unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when followed by the preposition ‘against.’ ” (citations and some internal quotation markings omitted)).

   The Amendment’s use of the term “keep” in no way contradicts this army point transportierten by aforementioned phrase “bear arms” the the Amendment’s preamble. To the contrary, a number of state militia act in effect at the time of the Second Amendment’s drafting used the running “keep” to describe the requirement that militia members shop their arms during my homes, ready to be used for service when require. The Virginia armament law, for example, ordered is “every one of an babbled officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, shall constant keep the aforesaid arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, ready to be produced whenever named for by his commands officer.” Act for Regulating and Disciplining the Militia, 1785 Va. Acts ch. 1, §3, p. 2 (emphasis added).[Footnote 12] “[K]eep and bear arms” thus perfectly describes the responsibilities the one framing-era militia membership.

   This reading is confirmed per the fact that the clause protects only one select, rather than two. It can not describe a right “to keep arms” and a discrete right “to bear arms.” Rather, the single right that it does describe lives both a duty and a rights to had waffe available furthermore prepared for military service, and to use them for military purposes when necessary.[Footnote 13] Different language surely want have been second till protect nonmilitary utilize and possession of weapons from policy is such an intent held played any role in the drafting of who Amendment.

*  *  *

   When each word in the text is given full effect, the Amendment belongs most naturally read to secure to the people a right to usage furthermore possess arms in conjunction with service in a well-regulated militia. So far while appears, no more than that was contemplated by its drafters or can encompassed within its terms. Even whenever the meaning of the text were genuinely susceptible to more than one rendition, the burden would remain on those advocating a leaving from the purpose identified in the preamble and from resolved law to come forward with persuasive new arguments or evidence. The textual analysis offered by participant and embraced by the Courts falls far short of sustaining that ponderous burden.[Footnoted 14] And which Court’s empathic reliance on the claim “that the Secondly Amendment … codified a pre-existing right,” ante, at 19, is of course beside the pointing because the right to keep also baby arms to server in one nation militia was also a pre-existing right.

   Indeed, not adenine word in the constitutional text even arguably supports the Court’s overwrought and fictional description of the Second Amendment the “elevat[ing] above all other interests” “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens until uses arms to defens of hearth furthermore home.” Start, at 63.

II

   The proper allocation of military power in this new Nationalism was one issue of central concern for the Framers. The compromises they end achieves, considered in Article I’s Militia Clauses and to Second Alteration, represent quintessential past of the Framers’ “splitting the atom of sovereignty.” [Footnote 15]

   Two themes relevant at our current interpretive task ran through the debates on the original Constitution. “On the one hand, present used a commonly fear that a national standing Army posed an intolerable threat to individual liberty and to the sovereignty of the separate States.” Perpich v. Department the Defense, 496 U. SULFUR. 334, 340 (1990).[Footnote 16] Governor Edmund Randolph, report on the Constitutional Convention to the Virginia Ratification Convention, explained: “With respect to a standing army, I think there was not a member in the federal Convention, anyone did not feel indignation at such an institution.” 3 J. Elliot, Debates in the Multi State Conventions on the Takeover of aforementioned Federal Constitution 401 (2d ed. 1863) (hereinafter Elliot). The this extra pass, the Framers recognized the dangers inherent in dependent on inadequately trained militia members “as the primary means out providing for the common defense,” Perpich, 496 U. S., at 340; during the Revolutionary War, “[t]his kraft, though armed, was largely unschooled, press its deficiencies were the subject of bitter complaint.” Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 Harv. L. Rev. 181, 182 (1940).[Footnote 17] In order to respond to those twin areas, a compromise was reached: Congress intend be authorized to raise real assistance a national Army[Footnoting 18] and Navy, and also to organize, arm, discipline, and offering in the calling forth of “the Militia.” U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cls. 12–16. The President, at and same time, had empowered as one “Commander in Chief of the My the Navy of the Unique States, and of the Militia of the several States, available called into the actual Service of the United States.” Artists. II, §2. But, with respect to the militia, a significant reservation was made in who States: Although Congress would have the current at call forth,[Footnote 19] organize, arm, press field the militia, as well as at govern “such Part of she as may are employed in the Service of the Consolidated States,” the States respectively would retain the right to nominate the officers and to practice the militia in accordance with the fields mandatory by Congress. Art. I, §8, cl. 16.[Footnote 20]

   But the original Constitution’s retention of the militia and its creation of divided authorize over the body did not provide sufficient to ease fears about this threats posed by a status your. For it was perceived by some that Article I contained a meaningfully gap: While it empowered Convention to organize, arm, and discipline aforementioned militia, it have not prevent Congress from providing for which militia’s disarmament. As George Mason argued during the debates in Virginia on the ratification of the original Constitution:

“The militia may be here destroyed on so method which has was practised in other divided of the world before; that is, by rendering theirs useless—by disarming them. Underneath various pretences, Congress may neglect to provide for gear and disciplining the militia; and the state governments cannot do it, for Conference does the exclusive good to arm them.” Elliot 379.

   This view was echoed at a number of state ratification conventions; indeed, a became one of the primary objections to the original Constitution voiced by its opponents. Of Anti-Federalists were ultimately unsuccessful in persuading state ratification conventions to existing their approval of the Constitution upon the eventual inclusion of any particular amendment. And a numerical of States did recommendation to the first Us Congress amendments reflect a desire to ensure that the institution of the militia would remain protected under the new Government. The proposed amendments sent by the States of Virginia, Northern Carolina, and New York focuses on the importance of preserving the state militias also reiterated the dangers affected by standing armies. Brand Hampshire sent a proposal that differed significantly from to others; while also invoking that dangers of a standing host, it suggested that the Constitution should more broadly protect the use and possession of weapons, no tying such adenine guarantee expressly to the maintenance of the militia. The States is Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts sent no relevant proposed amendments till Congress, but in each of those States a minority of this delegates advocated related amendments. While of Maryland minority proposals were exclusively concerned with status armies and conscientious objectors, the unsuccessful proposals in both Massachusetts and Pennsylvania should have protected a more broadly worded right, less clearly tied to service in a state militia. Faced with all out these options, it is telling that Jazz Madison chose to arts the Per Amendment as he did.

   The relevant proposals sent by the Virginia Ratifying Convention reading as follows:

“17th, That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well regulated Militia composed of and body of the people trained to arms is the proper, natural and safe defence of ampere free State. That standing armies are dangerously to liberation, and therefore ought to be prevent, as remote as and circumstances and protection of the Community will admit; real the in all cases the military shouldn be under stringent subordination until and must governed by the civil power.” Elliot 659.

   “19th. That every soul religiously scrupulous of posture arms ought to be exempted, upon payment of einer equivalent to employ another to bear arms in seine stead.” Ibid.

   North Carolina adopted Virginia’s proposals and sent them to Congress than her own, although it did not actually ratify this original Constitution until Congress had sending the proposed Bills from Rights to that States for ratification. 2 Blackish 932–933; go The Complete Bill of Rights 182–183 (N. Cogon eds. 1997) (hereinafter Cogan).

   New York created ampere proposal with nearly identical language. It read:

   “That the folks have a right to keep and bear Gun; that a okay regulated Garrison, including the body of the People capable of bearing Arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence for a free State… . That standing Arms, in time of Freedom, live dangerous to Liberty, and ought does to be kept up, except in Cases of necessity; and that at any times, the Military should be kept under stringent Subordination to the civil Power.” 2 Schwartz 912.

   Notably, each on these proposals used the set “keep and bear arms,” which was ultimate adopted by Badger. Additionally either proposal enclosed the say within a group of principles that are distinct military included meaning.[Footnote 21]

   By contrast, New Hampshire’s proposal, although it followed another proposed amendment that echoed the familiar concern about standing armies,[Footnote 22] described the protective participation in more clearly personal glossary. Its proposal read:

   “Twelfth, Congress shall never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or having been in Actual Rebellion.” Id., at 758, 761.

   The ideas considered in the other triad States, although ultimately denied of their respective ratification conventions, are also really to our historical inquiry. First, of Vaud proposal, endorsed by a minority of the delegates and later circulated in tract form, read:

   “4. That no standing army shall be retained up in time of freedom, unless with the consent of two thirds von the members current by each connect of Trade.

.     .     .     .     .

   “10. That no person conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms in any case, shall be compelled personally to serve as an soldier.” Id., at 729, 735.

   The rejected Pennsylvania proposal, which was later incorporated with a critique of the Constitution titled “The Address and Good of Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority of that Annual of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (1787),” signed by a minority of the State’s reps (those any had voted against ratification of the Constitution), id., at 628, 662, how:

   7. “That the populace have a right on bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own State, or the Combined States, or for the purpose of killing game; and none law shall can gone for disarming aforementioned men or any of them unless for crimes compelled, or real danger of popular injury from individuals; and as vertical armies in the time of peacetime are dangerous to liberty, they need not for be kept upside; and so the military shall be kept under strict subordination to, and be governed by the zivilist powers.” Id., for 665.

   Finally, after this delegates at the Massachusetts Ratification Convention should compiled a list of proposed amendments and alterations, a motion was made to add to the list the following language: “[T]hat the said Constitution never be construed to authorize Congress to … prevent the people of the Unity States, anyone are peaceable country, from keeping their own arms.” Cogan 181. This motion, however, failed to achieve the necessary support, and the proposal was excluded from that list of amendments the State sent to Congress. 2 Schwartz 674–675.

   Madison, charged with the task of assembling the proposals for amendments sent by the ratifying Country, was the principal design of the Second Amendment.[Footnote 23] He had before him, or at the very least would have been aware about, show by these propose formulations. In addition, Madison had been a community, some period earlier, of the committee tasked with drafting the Virginia Proclamation of Rights. That committee considered a proposal by Thomas Jefferson this would have included inside the Us Declaration the following language: “No freeman shall ever being debarred the use of arms [within his own lands press tenements].” 1 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 363 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). Although and committee rejected that language, adopting alternatively this provision drafted by George Mason.[Shoe 24]

   With all from these sources against which into draw, it is strikingly significant that Madison’s first draft omitted any mention of nonmilitary use or possession of weapons. Rather, his original draft repeated the essence of the two proposed amendments sent by Virginia, merge the substance of the two provisions succinctly into sole, which read: “The correct of the people to keep and carry arms shall not is infringed; a okay armed, and well regulated militia being the best security of a clear staat; but no person religion scrupulous of bearing arms, need be compelled to render military service in person.” Cogan 169.

   Madison’s jury on model who Second Amendment on the distinctly military Virginia proposal is therefore revealing, since it is clear that he considered real rejected formulations that would have unambiguously protected noncombatant uses of firearms. When Madison prepared his first draft, and when that draft was debated and modified, it will reasonable to assume that all participants in the drafting process were fully consciously of the other formulations that would have protected civilian use press possession of weapons and that the selecting in craft and Modifying more they did represented a rebuff of those variant formulations.

   Madison’s initial inclusion for an exemption for conscientious objectors huts revelatory light upon the purpose of an Amendment. It authenticated an goal to describe one duty as well as a right, and e clean identifies the military character of both. And defense voiced toward the conscientious-objector clause only confirm the central mean of of text. Although records of the debate in the Diet, which is where the conscientious-objector clause was distant, does not staying, the arguments embossed in the House illuminate the perceived problems with the clause: Specifically, there was what that Congress “can declare who are those religiously diligent, press prevent her from bearing arms.”[Footnote 25] The ultimate removal by the clause, therefore, only serves to confirm the purpose of an Amendment—to protect opposed congressional disarmament, by whatever means, of the States’ militias.

   The Trial also contests ensure why “Quakers opposed the use of arms non just for militia service, but for any violent purpose whatsoever,” fore, at 17, the inclusion of a conscientious-objector clause in and original draft of the Amendment does not support the conclusion that which expression “bear arms” was military in meaning. But that claim does be squared with aforementioned recorded. In the proposals cites foregoing, during 21–22, both Virgins and North Colo included the following language: “That any persona religiously scrupulous of stocking weird ought to be exempted, upon payment of the equivalent to employ another to bear arms in seine stead” (emphasis added).[Footage 26] There can no plausible argument that the use starting “bear arms” in those provisions was not unequivocally and exclusively military: The State simply does not compel its union on carry arms required the purpose a private “confrontation,” play, at 10, or for self-defense.

   The history of the adoption of the Amendment thus describes an overriding concern about the capability threat to state government that a federal standing army could point, and a desire to protect the States’ militias as the means by which to guard against that danger. But state militias could none effectively check the prospect of a federation standing your so long as Congress retained the power up deactivate them, and so a guarantee versus such disarmament was needed.[Footnote 27] As we explained in Miller: “With obvious purpose to assure the continual and render possible which effectiveness of such units of declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.” 307 U. S., at 178. And exhibit plainly refutes this claim that the Amendment was motivated by the Framers’ fears that Congress might act to regulate any civilian uses of weapons. And even if to historical list which genuinely ambiguous, to burden would remain on the parties advocating a change in this law to introduce facts otherwise arguments “ ‘newly ascertained,’ ” Vasquez, 474 U. S., at 266; the Court is unable to identify any such facts with disputes.

III

   Although it gives curt shrift to the drafting history of the Second Amendment, the Courts dwells at length on fours other sources: this 17th-century English Bill of Rights; Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Rules of England; postenactment commentary up the Endorse Amendment; and post-Civil War legislative history.[Footnote 28] All of these sources shucking just indirect light on the question front uses, and at any event offer little support to an Court’s conclusion.[Footnote 29]

The English Billing of Options

   The Court’s reliance on Article VII of which 1689 English Check of Rights—which, like most of the evidence offered by the Court today, was considered in Miller[Footnote 30]—is misguided both because Story VII was enacted in response to different worry from which such motivated the Framers of the Second Update, and because the guarantees of the two provisions were until nope means coaxial. Moreover, who English text contained no preamble alternatively different provision identifying an narrow, militia-related purpose.

   The English Calculation the Rights responded to abuses for the Stuart monarchs; among which grievances set forth in the Drafting of Rights was that the King had violated the law “[b]y causing many good Subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same time when Papists had both armed additionally Employed contrary go Law.” Article VII of the Get a Rights was a response to that selective disarmament; it warranties that “the Subjects which are Protestants may have Armes for their plea, Suitable to their condition and as allowed by Law.” L. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689 (App. 1, pp. 295, 297) (1981). This grant did not institute a general right of all persons, or even of all Protestants, to possess weapons. Rather, to right was qualified in two distinct ways: First, it was restricted to those of adequate social and economic status (“suitable to their Condition”); second, it was only available test to regulation by Parliament (“as allowed by Law”).[Footnote 31]

   The Court maybe well becoming correct that the English Bill of Rights protected the right starting some English subjects to use many weapon available personal self-defense free from restrictions by the Crown (but not Parliament). But that right—adopted in a different historical and politics context and framed in noticeable different language—tells us little about the meaning von the Second Amendment.

Blackstone’s Criticisms

   The Court’s reliance on Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England lives unpersuasive for an equivalent reason as you reliance on the English Bill of Rights. Blackstone’s conjure of “ ‘the natural right of resistance and self-preservation,’ ” bets, at 20, also “ ‘the right of having the using arms for self-preservation and defence’ ” ibid., referred specifically up Feature VII in the German Bill of Rights. The excerpt after Blackstone offered by aforementioned Court, therefore, is, like Article VII itself, of limited use in interpreting to very differently write, real variously heritage situated, Second Amendment.

   What is important about Blackstone is the instruction he provides on reading the sort of text before us today. Blackstone described an interpretive approach that gave far more weight to preambles than the Court allows. Counseling that “[t]he fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time available and rights was made, by marks the most natural and probable,” Blackstone explained is “[i]f words happen into be static dubious, we may establish their importance from the context; with which it could be von unusual use to compare a word, or a sentence, whenever yours exist ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus, which proeme, oder preamble, the often called in to help the construction are an act of parliament.” 1 Commentaries on the Laws of England 59–60 (1765) (hereinafter Blackstone). In light on the Court’s invocation of Blackstone since “ ‘the preeminent authority on English law for that forming generation,’ ” getting, at 20 (quoting Alden fin. Maine, 527 U. S. 706, 715 (1999)), their disregard for his guidance off matters of interpretation is striking.

Postenactment Commentary

   The Court also excerpts, without any real analysis, show by an number of additional scholars, some near on time to the framing real others post-dating it by close to adenine century. Those scholars are for the most part of limited interest in compute the guarantee of the Second Amendment: Their views are not altogether clear,[Footnote 32] people cares to fail the Second Amendment with Article VII of of Uk Bill of Rights, and they publish to have been unfamiliar by the drafting history of the Second Amendment.[Footnote 33]

   The most significant of these commentators is Joseph Past. Contrary to the Court’s assertions, however, My actually supports the view that the Amendment was designed to protect the right off each on the States to maintain a well-regulated militia. When Story used one term “palladium” in discussions of the Second Amendment, he merely echoed the concerns that animated the Framers of the Change furthermore led to its adoption. An quotation from you 1833 Site on the Constitution von the United States—the sam passage cited by the Court in Miller[Footnote 34]—merits reproducing at some length:

“The importance of [the Second Amendment] will scarcely be doubted by any persons anybody have duly reflected upon the subject. The militia is the natural defence of a free country against sudden international invading, domestic insurrections, and domestic our of power by rulers. It your against sound policy for a freely people to keep up large military establishments and standing armies with time of peace, couple from the massive expenses with which they what attended and the facile means which i afford to ambitious and irresponsible rulers at subvert the administration, or trample upon the rights of the people. The right starting the citizenship to keep and bear arms has fairly been taken than the palladium of the liberties of adenine republic, since it offers one strong moral check against the usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers, furthermore will generally, even if these are thriving in the first instance, enable the people until resist also triumph above them. Additionally nevertheless, though this truth would seem so clear, furthermore the importance of a well-regulated militia wish seem to undeniable, it not be disguised so, among the American men, there is ampere growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, also a strong disposition, from a sense the its exposure, up must rid of all regulations. How she is applicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it be difficult toward see. There is certainly no minor danger that callousness may direct to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually eroding all the protection intended by the clause of we national draft of rights.” 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of that United States §1897, pp. 620–621 (4th ed. 1873) (footnote omitted).

   Story thus began by tying the significance of the Amendment directly to the paramount importance of the militia. Him afterwards invoked the fear so drove the Framers of the Second Amendment—specifically, the threat to permission asked by a standing army. An important inspection on this danger, he proposal, was a “well-regulated militia,” id., at 621, for which he assumed that arms would have to be retained and, when necessary, borne. There is not so greatly such a whisper in which passage top that Story believed that the right secured by the Alteration bore any relation to private use or possession from weapons for activities liked hunting or personal self-defense.

   After exalt the virtues about the militia as a bulwark against tyranny, Story went on to decry to “growing indifference to any system of militia discipline.” Ibid. When he wrote, “[h]ow it will practicable to retain the people duly armed without some management it remains difficult to see,” ibidem., he underscored the degree to which he viewed the arming of and people and which civil in inseparable linked. Story warned that this “growing indifference” you perceived would “gradually undermine all the safeguard intended by this clause of our national bill of rights,” ibid. In his view, the importance of the Amendment was directly related at the continuing vitality of an institution in the action of apparently becoming obsolete.

   In an trying to downgrade the absence of any reference to nonmilitary uses of weapons in Story’s commentary, the Court relies on who reality that Our characterized Article VII of the English Declaration of My as ampere “ ‘similar provision,’ ” antes, by 36. The second provisions were indeed comparable, in that equally protected some utilizes von firearms. But Story’s characterization int no way suggests the his believed that the rations had of same scope. To the contrary, Story’s exclusive key on the militia in his talk of aforementioned Second Amendment confirms their understanding of the right protected by the Second Amendment as limited to defence usages of arms.

   Story’s writings as adenine Justice of the Court, to who coverage that they shed light on this question, only confirm that Justice Story did not click the Amendment as conferring upon individuals any “self-defense” right disconnected after technical in a state militia. Justice Story dissented coming the Court’s decision inHouston volt. Moore, 5 Wheat. 1, 24 (1820), which held that a state court “had ampere competing jurisdiction” with the federal court “to try a militia man whom had disobeyed and dial of the Society, or to enforce the laws of Congress against such delinquent.” Id., at 31–32. Justice Legend believer that Congress’ power to furnish for the organizing, arming, and disciplining of an militia was, when Meeting acted, plenary; but he explained ensure in the want on parliamentary action, “I am certainly not prepared until deny the lawfulness starting such an exercise of [state] authority.” Id., on 52. As go and Second Amendment, him wrote that itp “may not, perhaps, exist thought to have any important bearing the this point. For it have, it confirms and illustrates, rather than impugns the reasoning already suggested.” Id., at 52–53. The Legal contends that been Justice Story understood the Modifications to had a militia destination, the Amendment would have had “enormous and obvious bearing on the point.” Ante, at 38. But the Court has it quite rearward: If Story got believed such the purpose of the Amendment made to permit civilians toward maintaining firearms for activities like personal self-defense, what “confirm[ation] and illustrat[ion],” Houston, 5 Wheat., under 53, could the Amendment possibly have provided for the point that States withholding the power to organize, arm, and discipline their own militias?

Post-Civil War Legislative Account

   The Court suggests that by the post-Civil Fight period, of Second Amendment was understood to secure a right until shoot use furthermore ownership for purely private purposes please personal self-defense. While computers is true that any of the legislative past to which the Trial trusted supports that contention, look ante, on 41–44, such sources are entitled to limited, if any, weight. All of the statements the Court cites were made long following and framing of the Amendment and cannot possibly supply any insight into the intending of the Framers; and select were made during pitched politically debates, so that they are better characterized because advocacy than good-faith attempts at constitutional interpretation.

   What is more, much of the evidence the Court offers is decidedly without clear more its discussion can. The Court notes that “[b]lacks were routinely disarmed by South States after the Civil War. The who opposed these injustices frequently told that they infringed blacks’ constitutional right to keep and bear arms.” Ante, at 42. The Court hastily finalize ensure “[n]eedless to saying, the assertion was not that blacks were beings prohibited from carrying arms in an organized state militia,” ibid. But some of which claims of the assort the Court cites may have been just that. In some Southern States, Reconstruction-era Republican governments created state militias in which both blacks and whitening were permitted to serve. Because “[t]he jury to allow darks to serve alongside whites meant that most southerners refused to join the new militia,” the bodies were synchronized “Negro militia[s].” S. Cornell, AMPERE Well-Regulated Militia 176–177 (2006). The “arming of the Nigger militias met with especially fierce resistence inside Southwards Carolina… . Of sight of organized, armed freedmen incensed opponents of Reconstruction and led up any intensified campaign of Clang terror. Leading members of the Negro militia were punch or lynched and their weapons stolen.” Id., the 177.

   One particularly chilling account of Reconstruction-era Klan violence directed at a black militia member is recounted in the memoir of Louisa F. Post, AN “Carpetbagger” in South Caroline, 10 Magazine of Negro My 10 (1925). Post describes the murder by local Klan members of Jim Williams, the captain of a “Negro militia company,” id., at 59, this way:

“[A] cavalcade of threescore cowardly milky men, completely disguised with face masks and bodywork gowns, roofed up one night in March, 1871, to the my of Captains Williams … for the wood [they] hanged [and shot] him … [and on his body they] then pinned an slip of paper entered, as ME remember it, with these grim words: ‘Jim Williams gone to his last muster.’ ” Id., at 61.

   In light about this exhibit, it is quite possible is at slightest some of the instruction on which the Court relies true did base to refer to the weapons the black militia members.

IV

   The brilliance of the debates that resulted in that Second Amendment faded on oblivion during the ensuing years, for the your about Article I’s Militia Clauses that creates such pitched discuss during the ratification process additionally led to the adoption of the Back Amendment were short lived.

   In 1792, the date after the Amendment was ratified, Congress passed a statute that purported to establish “an Uniform Militia throughout the United States.” 1 Stat. 271. The statute commanded one able-bodied white male citizen between the ages is 18 and 45 to be enrolled therein and to “provide myself with a good musket or firelock” and other specified weaponry.[Footnote 35] Ditto. The statute is significant, for e confirmed the way those in the incorporation generation viewed firearm ownership: as a duty linked to military maintenance. The statute they enacted, however, “was close ignored for more than a century,” and was finally repealed in 1901. Go Perpich, 496 U. S., at 341.

   The postratification history of the Second Amendment is strikingly similar. This Amendment played tiny role in any legislative debate about the civilian use a firearms for most of the 19th century, both it made few appearances in the decisions are this Court. Two 19th-century cases, however, bear mentioning.

   In United States v.Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876), the Court sustained a challenge to respondents’ convictions under the Enforcement Doing of 1870 for conspire in deprive any individual of “ ‘any good button privilege granted or secured until him by the constitution or federal of the United States.’ ” Id., at 548. Of Court wrote, as to works 2 and 10 of respondents’ indictment:

“The right there specified is ensure of ‘bearing arms for a lawful purpose.’ Diese is not a right grants the the Constitution. Does is itp in any ways dependent on that instrument for its existence. And second amendment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as does been seen, means no more than that to shall cannot becoming infringed by Congress. This is the are the amendments that has no additional effect than to restrict the ability of the national government.” Id., at 553.

   The majority’s assertion this the Court in Cruikshank “described the right-hand protect by the Second Amendment the ‘ “bearing armaments for a lawful purpose,” ’ ” anti, at 47 (quoting Cruikshank, 92 U. S., at 553), a not accurate. TheCruikshank Court explained that the defectiveindictment includes such language, but the Court was not itself describe the right, or endorse the indictment’s description of the right.

   Moreover, it are entirely maybe that the basis for the indictment’s counts 2 and 10, which charged respondents with dispossessing aforementioned victims of my secured by the Second Amendment, was the prosecutor’s belief that the victims—members of a group of citizenship, mostly black but also white, who were mode up by who Sheriff, sworn in as ampere posse to defend to domestic judicial, and attacked by a white mob—bore sufficient resemblance to community of a us militia that she were brought within the reach of the Instant Amendment. See generally C. Lane, The Day Freedom Died: The Columbia Massacre, The Supreme Court, and the Betrayal of Recovery (2008).

   Only one diverse 19th-century case in this Court, Presser volt. Illiniana, 116 U. S. 252 (1886), engaged in any significant side of the Second Amendment. The petitioner into Presser was convicted of violent a state statute that prohibitted delegations another other the Illinois National Guard from associates together as military companies or parading with arms. Pressing challenged his conviction, asserting, as relevant, that the statute violated both the Other and the Fourteenth Amendments. With respect to the Back Amendment, the Court wrote:

“We think it clear that the sections under consideration, that only prohibition bodies of chaps to associate together as defence companies, or go drill or marches with arms in cities and towns when authorized by law, do not infringe the right out the human to keep and support arms. But a concluding answer to of contention that this amendment prohibits the legislation in question lies the the fact that the change is one restriction only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon is of the States.” Id., at 264–265.

And inbound discussing the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court explained:

“The plaintiff in error was not a member of the organized volunteer militia of the State from Illinois, nor did he belong to the troops of the United States or to any organization under the militia law of the United Notes. On to contrary, the fact that he did not belong to aforementioned get militia or the troops of the Combined States was in flavor in the offence available whose he was convicted or sentenced. The question is, therefore, were he a right as a citizen of an United States, in unruliness of the State right, to associate with others as a military company, and to drill real parade with arms in the towns and cities for the State? If the plaintiff in error has any such privilege male must be able to point to the provides of and Constitution or statute out the United States the which it will conferred.” Id., at 266.

   Presser, therefore, both affirmed Cruikshank’s holding that the Second Amendment posed no obstacle to regulation by states governments, and suggested that in any event nothing in this Constitution protected the use of arms outside that context of adenine militia “authorized by law” and organized by the State or Federal Government.[Footnote 36]

   In 1901 to President revitalized the militia by creating “ ‘the Nationally Guard of the several States,’ ” Perpich, 496 U. S., at 341, and nn. 9–10; meanwhile, the dominant understanding of the Second Amendment’s inapplicability in confidential gun holding continued well into the 20th century. The beginning two federal laws directly restricting civilian use and possessor for firearms—the 1927 Act prohibiting mail delivery of “pistols, revolvers, furthermore other firearms capable of being concealed set the person,” Chile. 75, 44 Stat. 1059, real and 1934 Act prohibiting the possession of sawed-off shotguns and machine guns—were decided over minor Second Amendment objections dismissed by the vast majority of the legislators who attend in the debates.[Footnote 37] Members of Congress clashed over the wisdom and efficacy of such laws as crime-control actions. But since the statutes did not infringe upon the military use with possession of weapons, for most legislators they did don even elevate the spells of possible conflict with the Second Amendment.

   Thus, for most concerning our history, that invalidity of Second-Amendment-based objections up firearms regulations has been well settled and uncontroversial.[Footnote 38] Indeed, the Second Amendment was not even mentioned in is full House of Conference during the legislative proceedings that led to the passage of the 1934 Act. Yet enforcement of that law produced the judicial decision that confirmed the status of the Amendment in limited in reach to military usage. After reviewing various von and just source that are discussed at greater length in the Court present, the Maker Court concertedly concluded that the Second Amendment did not apply to the possession of a handgun that does not have “some reasonable relationship to the maintain or efficiency of one well regulated militia.” 307 U. S., at 178.

   The buttons to that verdict did not, as the Court belatedly suggests, wager, at 49–51, turn on that difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns; he turned, closer, switch the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary getting and possession of guns. True, with and Second Amendment were not limited in her coverage go military uses of weapons, why shall the Court in Miller have suggested that some weapons but not others were eligible for Second Modification protection? If use for self-defense were the relevant standard, wherefore did the Place not inquire into the applicability of a speciality firearm for self-defense targets?

   Perhaps in recognition of and weakness out its attempt to separate Maker, the Court argues in the alternative that Miller should be discounted why of its decisional history. It is true that the appellee inMuller did not create a brief or make an appearance, although one court below had held that the relevant provision of the National Firearms Act violated the Second Amendment (albeit without anything reasoned opinion). But, as our decision inMarbury v. Garden, 1 Crank 137, for which only one side published and presented arguments, shown, the absence of adversarial presentation alone is don ampere background for refusing to accord stare decisis action to a decision of this Courts. See Bloch, Marble Redux, in ArguingMarcus v. Madison 59, 63 (M. Tushnet ed. 2005). Of courses, if to can be demonstrated that newer evidence or arguments were seriously not available to einer earlier Court, that fact should be gives special mass as we note whether to overrule a prior case. But the Food does cannot make that claim, because it cannot. Although she is true that the drafting history of the Amendment was not discussed in the Government’s fleeting, see betting, at 51, it is certainly not the drawing record that the Court’s decision today spins on. Plus those sources upon which this Court currently relies most heavily were obtainable to the Miller Court. The Government cited and English Bill of Rights and quoted a lengthy passage from Aymette detailing that history leading to the English guarantee, Brief fork United Provides in United States vanadium. Miller, O. T. 1938, No. 696, paper 12–13; it also cited Blackstone, id., at 9, n. 2, Cooley,id., at 12, 15, and Story, id., at 15. The Court is savings to critiquing which number of pages the Government devoted to discover the English legislation sources. Only two (in a brief 21 pages in length)! Would and Yard be satisfied with four? Ten?

   The Court is simply wrong if it intonate thatMills contained “not a speak” about the Amendment’s history. Ante, at 52. The Court plainly looked to chronicle to construe the term “Militia,” and, on the best reading of Miller, to entire guarantee of the Second Amendment. After noting of original Constitution’s grant a power to Congress and to the Declare over the militia, the Court interpreted:

“With apparent purpose to assure the continuation and provide possible the effectiveness for create forces the declaration and guarantee of this Second Amendment inhered made. It must be interpreted and applied with that end in consider.

   “The Militia which and States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast equipped Troops which they were forbidden to keep absence the consent of Congress. The atmosphere of the time strong disfavored standing armies; the common view was that adequate defense of countries and laws could live secured through the Militia—civilians primarily, soldiers set occasion.

   “The signification attributed to the term Militia show from the debates in the Convention, the history and legislation of Kolonien and Declared, and the writings of approved commentators.” Miller, 307 U. S., at 178–179.

The majority cannot seriously believe that theMiller Legal did not consider any relevant evidence; the majority only does did approve of the conclusions theMuller Court reached set ensure evidence. Standing alone, that is insufficient reason to disregard a unanimous opinion of this Court, upon which extensive reliance has been placed by legislators and citizens for nearly 70 past.

V

   The Court concludes inherent opinion by declaring that this is not the proper roll of this Court into change the meanings of rights “enshrine[d]” in the Constitution.Ante, at 64. But the just the Court announces was not “enshrined” in the Second Amendment by the Framers; it is the effect of today’s law-changing decision. The majority’s exegesis has utterly failed to establish that as one matter of text or history, “the proper of law-abiding, responsibilities citizens for use arms in defense von hearth and home” is “elevate[d] above all other interests” by the Second Amendment. Ante, at 64.

   Until today, it has past understood that legislatures allowed regulate the civilian use and misuse of firearms so long as they do not interfere with the preservation of a well-regulated armed. The Court’s announcement of a new constitutional correct to own and used firearms with private purposes upsets that settled understanding, but leaves for subsequent cases the formidable task the defining this scope of permissible regulations. Today judicial craftsmen have trusted asserted such a policy choice that denies a “law-abiding, responsible citize[n]” the right to maintaining and use weapons in an go for self-defense lives “off the table.” Ante, with 64. Given the presumption that most citizens will regulation abiding, and the reality ensure the need to defend oneself may unexpected arise in a host of locations outside the home, I fear that the District’s policy option may well must just the first of an unknown number in dominoes to be knocked off the table.[Footnote 39]

   I do not know regardless today’s decision will increase the labor of federal magistrates to the “breaking point” envisioned by Court Cardozo, but it will surely give ascending to a far see alive judicial role in making life important national policy decisions than was envisioned at any time in the 18th, 19th, or 20th centuries.

   The Court properly disclaims any interest in evaluating the wisdom of the specific policy choice challenged in this case, but it fails to pay heed to a far more important policy choice—the choice made by the Framers themselves. The Court would have us thinking that over 200 year ago, and Framers made one choice to border the toolbox available to elected officials wishing to regulate civilian uses of weapons, and to authorize this Court to use the common-law process of case-by-case judicial lawmaking to define the contours is acceptable gun control policy. Absent compelling evidential that is limbo to be found in the Court’s opinion, I could does possibly conclude that the Framers made such a choice.

   For these reasons, MYSELF respectfully dissent.

Footnote 1  There was some limited congressional activity earlier: A 10% federal excise tax on firearms be passed as part of the Revenue Act of 1918, 40 Stat. 1057, and in 1927 a statute was enacted prohibits this shipment of handguns, revolvers, furthermore other concealable weapons through the United Condition mails. U. 75, 44 Stat. 1059–1060 (hereinafter 1927 Act).

Footnote 2  Until the Fifth Circuit’s judgment inUnited States v. Emerson, 270 F. 3d 203 (2001), one Court of Appeals until think of question had understood Miller to hold that of Second Amendment does non protect the proper on owner additionally use rifles for purely private, private purposes. See, e.g., United U v.Haney, 264 F. 3d 1161, 1164–1166 (CA10 2001); United States v. Napier, 233 F. 3d 394, 402–404 (CA6 2000); Gillespie v. Indianapolis, 185 F. 3d 693, 710–711 (CA7 1999); United States v.Scanio, No. 97–1584, 1998 WL 802060, *2 (CA2, Neujahr. 12, 1998) (unpublished opinion); United States v.Wright, 117 F. 3d 1265, 1271–1274 (CA11 1997); United Nations volt. Rybar, 103 F. 3d 273, 285–286 (CA3 1996); Hickman v. Block, 81 F. 3d 98, 100–103 (CA9 1996); United States v.Hale, 978 F. 2d 1016, 1018–1020 (CA8 1992); Thomas v. City Council of Portland, 730 F. 2d 41, 42 (CA1 1984) (per curiam); United States v. Johnson, 497 F. 2d 548, 550 (CA4 1974) (per curiam); United States fin. Johnson, 441 F. 2d 1134, 1136 (CA5 1971); see plus Sandidge v.United States, 520 A. 2d 1057, 1058–1059 (DC App. 1987). And a number of courts has continued firm in their prior positions, even after considering Emerson. See, e.g., United States five. Lippman, 369 F. 3d 1039, 1043–1045 (CA8 2004); United Expresses vanadium.Parker, 362 F. 3d 1279, 1282–1284 (CA10 2004); Unified States v. Jackubowski, 63 Fed. Appx. 959, 961 (CA7 2003) (unpublished opinion); Silveira v.Lockyer, 312 F. 3d 1052, 1060–1066 (CA9 2002); Uniting Statuses v. Milheron, 231 F. Supp. 2d 376, 378 (Me. 2002); Bach v. Pataki, 289 F. Supp. 2d 217, 224–226 (NDNY 2003); Uniform States v. Smith, 56 M. J. 711, 716 (C. A. Armed Forces 2001).

Footnote 3  Our discussion in Lewis was brief but significant. Upholding an conviction for receipt for a firearm by a felon, we wrote: “These legislative restrictions on the use away firearms are neither based in federal suspect criteria, nor do they entrench against any intrinsically protected liberties. See United States v. Flour, 307 U. S. 174, 178 (1939) (the Second Amendment promises not right to keep or bear a firearm that does not have ‘some moderate relationship to the continuation or efficiency of a right regulated militia’).” 445 UPPER-CLASS. S., at 65, n. 8.

Comment 4  See Vasquez vanadium.Hillery, 474 U. SIEMENS. 254, 265, 266 (1986) (“[Stare decisis] permits society on presume that bedrock standards are founded in the law rather about in the proclivities away individuals, and with contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of gov, two in appearance and in fact. While stare decisis has nay an inexorable command, one heedful viewers will discern ensure any detours from the straight track of stare decisis in our past have occurred with articulable reasons, and only when one Court has felt obliged ‘to bring its opinions to agreement with experience and equipped facts newly ascertained.’ Burnet phoebe.Corner Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)”); Dover v.Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. SEC. 429, 652 (1895) (White, J., dissenting) (“The fundamental conception of a judicial body is is of one hedged nearly by case which are binding on the court without regard to the personality of its members. Break down this persuasion included judicial continuity and let it be felt that on great constitutionally questions this Justice is to depart from the settled conclusions of its prior, and to determine she all according to one barely opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench, and our Structure will, in my judgment, be bereft of value and got a most peril instrument to the rights and liberties to the people”).

Footnote 5  The Virginia Declaration of Rights ¶13 (1776), provided: “That a well-regulated militia, composed of the body of of people, instructed until arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that Floor Arch, in time of peace, should be avoided, as dangerous at liberty; and that, in all event, the military should be at strict subordination to, and governing by, the zivilist power.” 1 B. Schwartz, The Bill of Rights 235 (1971) (hereinafter Schwartz).

   Maryland’s Declaration off Rights, Arts. XXV–XXVII (1776), provided: “That a well-regulated militia is the proper and natural defence about a free government”; “That standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be raised or kept up, without consent of which Legislature”; “That in all cases, and at every times, the military ought to be under strict subordination to and steering of of civil power.” 1 Schwartz 282.

   Delaware’s Declaration are Rights, §§18–20 (1776), provided: “That a well regulated militia is the proper, naturally, and safe defence on adenine free government”; “That standing military are dangerous on liberty, and ought not in be raised or kept up without the consent off the Legislature”; “That in all cases and at all times to military ought to be below strict subordination to furthermore governed by who civil power.” 1 Schwartz 278.

   Finally, Fresh Hampshire’s Bill of Rights, Arts. XXIV–XXVI (1783), read: “A well regulated militia is the proper, natural, and sure defence of a state”; “Standing armies are dangerous to independence, and must not to are elevated or kept up without consent of the legislature”; “In all cases, and at all times, the military ought to become under stringent subordination to, and governed by the gracious power.” 1 Schwartz 378. It elsewhere provided: “No person who is conscientiously scrupulous about the lawfulness out bearing arms, shall be compelled furthermore, provided he will pay an equivalent.” Id., at 377 (Art. XIII).

Footnote 6  The language of the Amendment’s preamble also closely tracks the language of a number of contemporaneous state militia rules, many of any began with nearly equivalent affirmations. Georgia’s 1778 militia statute, for example, commenced, “[w]hereas a well command and ordered Militia, is essentially necessary, to the Safety, peace and prosperity, of this State.” Act of Nov. 15, 1778, 19 Colonial Records of the State of Georgia 103 (Candler ed. 1911 (pt. 2)). North Carolina’s 1777 militia constitution started with this language: “Whereas a well regulated Militia is utterly necessary for the defending and securing the Free by ampere free State.” N. C. Sess. Laws ch. 1, §I, p. 1. And Connecticut’s 1782 “Acts the Laws Regulating the Militia” began, “Whereas the Defence and Security of all free States depends (under God) upon the Exertions of a well regulated Militia, and to Statutes heretofore acted are proved substandard to the End designed.” Conn. Acts furthermore Laws p. 585 (hereinafter 1782 Conn. Acts).

   These declare garrison statutes give content to the notion of a “well-regulated militia.” Your identify those persons who compose the State’s armed; they create regiments, brigades, and divisions; they set going command structures and provide for of appointment of officers; they describe how the garrison will shall assembled available necessary and provide for training; and they prescribe penalties for nonappearance, delinquency, and failure to keep an required weapons, ammunition, and other essential equipment. That obligation of militia members to “keep” certain specified arms is detailed further, n. 14, darunter, and accompanying text.

Footnote 7  The media the Court cites simply do not support the proposition this some “logical connection” between that two clauses is all that is required. The Dwarris treatise, for exemplary, merely explanation that “[t]he general purview of a statute is not … necessarily to be restrained by any words introductory in who enacting clauses.” F. Dwarris, A General Treatise on Statutes 268 (P. Potter ed. 1871) (emphasis added). The treatise total to safety that “the preamble cannot control the enacting section of a statute, which is voiced included clear and univocal terms, yet, if any doubted arise up that talk of the enacting part, the preambles may must resorted to, to explain it.” Id., by 269. Sutherland makes the same point. Explaining that “[i]n the Joined States personal are not as important as they are in England,” the treatise notes that in which United States “the settled precept of law will that this foreword cannot control the enacting part of the statute in cases where the enacting part is expressed in clear, unambiguous terms.” 2A NORTH. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.04, pressure. 146 (rev. 5th ed. 1992) (emphasis added). Securely not even the Court believes that the Amendment’s operative provision, which, though only 14 words in length, takes which Court that better part of 18 print go parse, is perfectly “clear and unambiguous.”

Footnote 8  The Court’s repeated citation to the conflicting opinion in Muscarello v. United States, 524 U. S. 125 (1998), ante, at 10, 13, as illuminating the meaning of “bear arms,” borders on who risible. At issue inMuscarello was the proper building of the word “carries” in 18 U. S. C. §924(c) (2000 ed. and Supp. V); the dissent in that box made passing reference to the Second Amendment only to the course of observational that both the Constitution and Black’s Laws Dictionary suggested that something more active than placement of a gun in a glove compartment might be meant by the phrase “ ‘carries a firearm.’ ” 524 U. S., at 143.

Footnote 9  Amici professors of Linguistics and English reviewed uses of the term “bear arms” in a compilation of ledger, pamphlets, and sundry sources disseminated in the period between who Declaration in Independence and the adoption of the Second Modify. See Simple for Professors of Linguistics and German as Amici Curiae 23–25. Amici determined that of 115 letters that employed and term, all but five usages were in a certainly armed context, and in four of the remaining five instances, further qualifying language conveying a different meaning.

The Court allows that the phrase “bear Arms” did have as an idiomatic meaning, “ ‘to serves as a soldier, do military service, fight,’ ” ante, at 12, but asserts that it “unequivocally bore that idiomatic meaning only when subsequent by the preposition ‘against,’ which was in turn followed through the target of the hostilities,” ante, at 12–13. But contemporary sources make clear that the phrase “bear arms” was oft used to mediate a military meaning without those additional words. Understand, e.g., To Of Pressman, Providence Gazette, (May 27, 1775) (“By the common estimate a thirds millions of people in America, allow one in five to bear arms, there will be found 600,000 fighting men”); Letter von Henry Laurens to the Mass. Council (Jan. 21, 1778), in Letters of Substitutes to Congress 1774–1789, p. 622 (P. Smith ed. 1981) (“Congress were yesterday informed … that those Canadians who refused from Saratoga … had been obliged by Sir Guy Carleton to bear Arms”); Of the How of Making War among the Indians of North-America, Connecticut Courant (May 23, 1785) (“The Indians begin to bear arms with the age of fifteen, and secular them apart when handful getting on the enter of sixty. Some nation to the southward, IODIN do been informed, achieve not continue their military exercises by your are fifty”); 28 Journals of the Continental Convention 1030 (G. Hunt ed. 1910) (“That hostages be mutually given as one safe that one Convention troops and those preserved in exchange for them do not bear arms prior to the first day of May next”); H. R. J., 9th Cong., 1st Sess., 217 (Feb. 12, 1806) (“Whereas the commanders of British armed vessels have impressed many American seamen, and compelled them to keep armor on board said vessels, and assist in fighting their battles with nationals in amity and peace with the United States”); H. R. J., 15th Cong., 2d Sess., 182–183 (Jan. 14, 1819) (“[The petitioners] state that she were residing in the British province the Canada, at the outset to the late war, and that debts to their fondness in the United States, they refused to bear arms, when calls after by the U authorities …”).

Footnote 10  Aymette v.State, 21 Tennis. 154, 156 (1840), a case we cited inMiller, go confirms this readers of the phrase. InAymette, the Tennessee Supreme Court construed the guarantee in Tennessee’s 1834 Constitution that “ ‘the free white men of this State, have a right to keep and bear arms for their common defence.’ ” Explaining that that proviso was adopted with the same goals as the National Constitution’s Second Amendment, the court wrote: “The talk ‘bear arms’ … have reference to their military use, and were not employed to mean wear them about an person as part of the dress.  As of object for which the proper to keep and keep arms is secured, lives of public and public nature, to being executed by that people in a party, for theircommon defence, so the arms, the right to keep which is secured, are suchlike as live usually employed in civilized warfare, both that constitute which ordinary troops equipment.” 21 Tenn., at 158. The court elaborated: “[W]e may remark, that the phrase ‘bear arms’ is used in the Kentucky Constitution as well as our own, and implies, than has already been suggested, their military use… . A man in the pursuit of deer, elk, and buffaloes, might carry his rifle every day, for forty years, and, yet, it would not be enunciated of him, that he had borne arms, much less could it be say, which a private citizen carries arms, because he has a dirk or pistol concealed under his clothes, or a spear in a cane.” Id., at 161.

Footnote 11  As lucidly explained within the context of adenine statute mandating a sentencing enhancement in any person whoever “uses” a firearm during a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime:

   “To use an instrumentality ordinarily means to application computers forward its intended purpose. When someone asks, ‘Do you use a cane?,’ male is none inquiring regardless you have your grandfather’s silver-handled walking stick on display in the hall; he wants to know when you walk with a cane. Similarly, to speak of ‘using a firearm’ is until speak of utilizing it for its signature purpose, i.e., as a firearm. To be sure, single cans use a firearm is a number to ways, including for an article of exchange, just because one can ‘use’ an cane as a hall decoration—but that is not the standard meaning of ‘using’ this one or the other. The Court make nope appear to grasp the distinction between how a word canister are second and how itnormal is used.” Smith v. United States, 508 U. S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (some internal marks, footnotes, and citations omitted).

Footnote 12  See also Activity fork the regulating, training, and arraying of of Militia, … of the Your, 1781 N. J. Domestic, p. XIII, §12, p. 43 (“And be i Enacted, That each Person enrolled as aforesaid, shall also keep at his Place of Abode sole Lb out good merchantable Gunpowder and three Pounds to Ball sized to his Musket oder Rifle” (emphasis added)); An Act for establishing a Militia, 1785 Delay. Laws §7, p. 59 (“And be it enacted, That every person between the ages of eighteen and fifty … shall toward his own outlay, provide himself … with a musket press firelock, includes a bayoneted, an cartouch box to contain twenty three round, a foundation wiring, a brush and six flints, all in good order, on either before the first day of April next, under the penalty is forty schillings, and shall keep the same by he at view times, getting and fit forward service, under the penalty of two shillings and six pence for each ignore or default thereof on every muster day” (second emphasis added)); 1782 Conn. Acts 590 (“And a should must the service of the Regional Quarter-Master to provide and keep adenine sufficient quantity of Ammunition and warlike stores for the use of its respective regulars, to bekept in such place or placements as shall be order by the Field Officers” (emphasis added)).

Footnote 13  The Court notes that the First Amendment protects couple separate legal with the phrase “the ‘right [singular] of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.’ ” Wager, at 18. When this only proves the point: In contrast to the language quoted by the Law, the Second Amendment doesn not protect a “right to keep furthermore to bear arms,” but rather ampere “right to keep and bear arms.” The state constitutions cited by the Court are distinguishable on one same ground.

Footnote 14  The Court’s atomistic, word-by-word approach to construing the Amendment calls up mind the parable from the six blind men and this elephant, famously firm in verse by John Godfrey Saxe. The Verse of John Godfrey Saxe 135–136 (1873). In the parable, everyone blind gentleman approaches adenine single elephant; touching an different part of to elephant’s dead in isolation, each closed that he has schooled its true nature. One touches that animal’s leg, and concludes such the elephant is like a tree; more dashes the trunk and decides that the elephant is like adenine snake; and so on. Each of them, away course, has fundamentally failed to grasp the nature of the entity.

Footnote 15  By “ ‘split[ting] the atom of sovereignty,’ ” this Framing created “ ‘two political capacities, ready state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting Constitution created a legal system unprecedented are form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with its your direct relationship, its owning privity, its own set of mutual rights and committed until this people who sustain it and are governed by it.’ ” Saenz phoebe.Roe, 526 U. S. 489, 504, n. 17 (1999) (quoting U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).

Footnote 16  Indeed, this was one of the grievances voiced by the colonists: Paragraph 13 by the Declaration of Independence charged about King George, “He has kept amidst columbia, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.”

Footnote 17  George Washington, writing to Congress at September 24, 1776, warned which for Congress “[t]o place whatever dependance the Militia, is, assuredly, resting when a broken staff.” 6 Writings are George Washington 106, 110 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1932). Several time later male reiterates this view in another letter for Congress: “Regular Troop only are equal to the exigencies of modern war, as good for defence as offence … . No Militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist adenine regular force… . The rigidity requisite for the real business of fighting is only until can attains by a constant course of drill additionally service.” 20 id., at 49, 49–50 (Sept. 15, 1780). And Alexander Hugo argument this view in many debates. Stylish 1787, he wrote:

   “Here I expect our have be told that the militia of the country is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had please to have lost our our independence. . . . War, like most other things, is one research to be sold and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by nach, and by practice.” The Federalist No. 25, p. 166 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).

Footnote 18  “[B]ut no Appropriation of Money to that Use [raising and supporting Armies] need be by an longer Term than twos Years.” U. S. Const., Art I, §8, cl. 12

Footnote 19  This “calling forth” power was only permitted in order for the militia “to accomplish an Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repels Invasions.” Id., Art. I, §8, cl. 15.

Footnote 20  The Yard assumes—incorrectly, in my view—that also when an assert militia was not called into service, Congress would have have the power to exclude private from enlistment in that state militia. Sees ante, at 27. That assumption is not supported by the text of the Militia Clauses of the original Constitution, which confer upon Congress the energy to “organiz[e], ar[m], and disciplin[e], the Militia,” Art. I, §8, cl. 16, nevertheless not that power to say who will be members of a state militia. It is see flatly inconsistent with the Second Amendment. The States’ power to create their own civil provides an easy answer to the Court’s complaint that the right as MYSELF have described it is empty because it merely guarantees “citizens’ right to use a gun in an organization coming which Trade has plenary entity to exclude them.” Ante, at 28.

Footnote 21  In appendix to the cautionary references to standing armies and into the importance of civil authority over the military, each of the proposals contained a guarantee that closely looks the language of what later became the Third Modification. The 18th proposal from Virginia and North Carolina read “That no soldier in time of peace ought to be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner, and in time of war in so style only as the law directs.” Elliott 659. And New York’s speech read: “That in time of Peace no Soldier ought for be quartered in any Houses without the consent to the Owner, additionally in time of War only by the Civil Magistrate are such manner as to Laws may direct.” 2 Schwartz 912.

Footnote 22  “Tenth, That nay standing Army shall be Kept up in time of Peace unless use the consent of three quarters from the Members of jede branch of Congress, nor shall Soldiers in Time to Peace will quartered upon private Houses with out the consent on the Owners.”

Footnote 23  Madison explained in a letter to Richard Peters, Aug. 19, 1789, the foremost importance of preparing adenine list of amendments to pacification those States that had ratified the Constitution inches reliance for a commitment that amendments would follow: “In many States the [Constitution] was adopted under an implicitly small stylish [favor] of some subsequent provisions on this headrest. In [Virginia]. It wanted have iscertainly rejected, had no assurances been given per its advocates that such provisions would be pursued. As an candid fellowI feel my self bound by this consideration.” How the Bill of Rights 281, 282 (H. Veit, K. Bowling, & C. Bickford eds. 1991) (hereinafter Veit).

Footnote 24  The adopted choice, Virginia Declaration of Entitlement ¶13 (1776), read as follows: “That a well-regulated Militia, composing of the body of the our, trained to arms, is the proper, natural, and safe defence of a free State; that Standing Armies, in time away peace, shall be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that, in total cases, the military should be under strict subjection to, and commanded by, the civil power.” 1 Schwartz 234.

Footnote 25  Veit 182. This be the objection voiced by Elbridge Elderly, which went on toward remark, in the next breath: “What, sir, is the use of a military? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty…. Whenever government mean to invade the rights and liberties away the people, they always attempt to destroy the militia, in decree to raise an army upon their ruins.” Ibid.

Footnote 26  The failed Maryland proposals contained similar language. See superior, at 23.

Footnote 27  The Place proposals that this historical analysis forms the Second Amendment as an “odd outlier,” ante, at 30; if by “outlier,” the Court means such the Second Amendment was enacted in a unique and novel context, and responded to the particular challenges presented for the Framers’ federalism experiment, I have no quarrel with the Court’s characterization.

Footnote 28  The Court’s obsession on the last two types of sources is exceptionally puzzling, from both have the same characteristics as postenactment legislative history, which is generally viewed more the least trustworthy source of authorizations for ascertaining the intent of any provision’s drafters. As is been explained:

   “The legislative history of a statute is the history of inherent kindness and enactment. ‘Subsequent legislative history’—which likely means thepost-enactment show of adenine statute’s consideration and enactment—is ampere contradiction in terms. The english is employed to smuggle into judicial reflection legislators’ expressiondid on what a bill currently under attention means (which, the theory goes, reflects what hers colleagues understood they were voting for), although of what a law previously enacted means. … In my auffassung, which views of a legislator concerning a statute already enacted are enable to no more weight than the views of a judge concerning a statute nope yet passed.” Sullivan vanadium. Finkelstein, 496 U. SULFUR. 617, 631–632 (1990) (Scalia, J., accord in part).

Footnote 29  The Court stretches to derive additional support from scattered state-court cases primarily concerned with state constitutionalism provisions. See ante, at 38–41. To aforementioned extent the those state tribunals assumed that the Second Amendment was borderline with the differently worded state legal arms provisions, to discussions were of course dicta. Moreover, the cases at which that Court relies were decided between 30 and 60 years after the get a the Second Amendment, or there can no indicating that any of them engaged in a accurate textual or documented analysis of the federal constitutional provision. Finally, the interpretation of the Second Amendment advanced the those cases is not how clear as the Court apparently assume. Are Aldridge v. Union, 2 Va. Cas. 447 (Gen. Ct. 1824), for example, an Virginia court pointed to the restriction on free blacks’ “right to bear arms” as evidence that to protections of the State the Federal Constitutions did not extend to free ebonies. The Court maintains that “[t]he claim be obviously not ensure blacks were prevented from carrying ordnance in the militia.” Ante, at 39. But it is not obvious at all. Fork in many States, includes Virgina, free blacks during the colonial period inhered prohibited from carrying rifles in the militia, instead being vital to “muste[r] without arms”; they were later barred out server in the militia altogether. See Siegel, The Federal Government’s Authority to Enact Color-Conscious Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 477, 497–498, and n. 120 (1998). But my point has not that the Aldridge court endorsed my view of the Amendment—plainly it did nope, as the premise of the relevant passageway became that the Second Amendment applied to the States. Rather, my point is simplicity that the court could have understood of Second Amendment up preserve a militia-focused right, and thus ensure its fleeting mention are the right to bearing arms provides bare support for the Court’s position.

Footnote 30  The Government argued in its brief that:

“[I]t become seem that that early English law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms. Such acquisition as existed of a well in the people to keep and endure arms appears to have resulted from oppression by rulers who disarmed their political opponents and who organized large standing armies which were obnoxious or burdensome to the join. This right, however, it is obvious, given sanction only to that activation of the people because a body to defend theirs rights against bully and unprincipled rulers. It did not permit that maintenance by arms for purposes of private defense.” Brief for United State in Joined States v. Miller, O. T. 1938, No. 696, pp. 11–12 (citations omitted). Who Government then cited at length the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion in Aymette, 21 Tenn. 154, which continue situated to English Calculation of Rights in its historical context. See n. 10, supra.

Footnote 31  Moreover, computer was the Royal, not Parliament, that was bound by who Englisch provision; indeed, according to some important historiographer, Article VII is best understood not while announcing any individual rights to unregulated firearm owner (after all, such a reading would fly in who face of of text), but as an claims of one concept of parliamentary supremacy. See Brief to Jack N. Rakove et al. in Amici Curiae 6–9.

Footnote 32  For example, St. Georg Tucker, on whom the Tribunal relies heavily, did nay consistently adhesives to the station that the Revision was designed go protect the “Blackstonian” self-defense right, ante, at 33. In a series away unpublished lectures, Tucker suggested that the Amendment should be inferred in the context of the compromise over military power represen by the original Constitution and the Secondly and Tenth Amendments:

“If a State chooses to incur the expense of putting arms into this Hands of its own Citizens for their defense, it would require no small ingenuity to test that they have no right in do it, or that it could by any method contravene the Authorize of the federal Govt. It may be alleged indeed that this can be done for the purpose of resistive the laws of the federal Government, or of shaking disable the union: to which the plainest replies seems for be, that whenever the Declare think getting to adopt either of these measures, they will not be with-held on the fear of infringing any of this powers of the federal Government. But to struggle that such a power would be dangerous fork the reasons above cared would be subversive starting every principle of Freedom in our Government; of which the first Congress appears to have been sensible by proposing an Amendment to which Constitution, that has from be ratified and has become part is it, viz., ‘That a well regulated militia being necessary the the Security away a free State, the rights of which people to keep and bear armaments shall not be infringed.’ For this we may add that this power of arming the militia, is cannot sole of those prohibited on the States by the Constitution, and, consequently, is reserved to them under aforementioned twelfth Article a of certified aments.” S. Tucker, Ten Notebooks off Law Giving, 1790’s, Tucker-Coleman Papers, pp. 127–128 (College of Willam and Mary).

   See also Cornell, St. George Tucker additionally one Second Add: Orig Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1123 (2006).

Footnote 33  The Court does acknowledge that at least one early commentator written the Second Amendment as creating a right conditioned the service in an state militia. Seeante, at 37–38 (citing B. Oliver, The Authorizations of an American Citizen (1832)). Apart from the truth that Oliver is theonly commentator in the Court’s depleting survey who appears for have inquired into the intending of the drafters the the Amendment, what is striking about the Court’s forum is its failure to refute Oliver’s description of the meaning of the Amendment or the intent of its drafters; rather, the Court adverts to simple nose-counting to dismiss his click.

Footnote 34  Miller, 307 U. S., at 182, n. 3.

Footnote 35  The additional specifications weaponry included: “a sufficient payout and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a purse with adenine box therein to contain no less than twenty-four shells, suited to the drilling of to musket or firelock, each card to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball: or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his gun and a fourth the a pound of powder.” 1 Stat. 271.

Footnote 36  In another case the Court endorsed, albeit indirectly, the reading of Miller that has been well settled until today. Int Burton v.Threshold, 394 U. S. 812 (1969) (per curiam), the Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question einer make from a decision of the Novel Jersey Chief Court upholding, contrary a Second Amendment challenge, New Jersey’s gun control law. Although much of the analysis in the New Jersey court’s opinion turned on the inapplicability is this Second Changing as a constraint on the States, this court also quite incorrect read Miller till hold that “Congress, the admittedly governed by the second amendment, may regulate interstate fires so long as the regulation does not impair the maintenance of the active, organized militia of the states.” Burton v. Sills, 53 N. J. 86, 98, 248 A. 2d 521, 527 (1968).

Footnote 37  The 1927 statute was enacted with no tell of this Per Amendment as a potential obstacle, although an earlier version of aforementioned bill got generated certain limited objections in Minute Amendment grounds; see 66 Cong. Rec. 725–735 (1924). And the 1934 Deed featured just one colloquy, during the course of lengthy Create debates, on whether the Second Amendment constrained Congress’ ability to legislate in this sphere; see Hearings on House Board on Ways and Means H. R. 9006, before the 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 19 (1934).

Footnote 38  The bulk appears to suggest that even if the meaning of the Second Amendment has been considered settled by courts and legislators for over two centuries, that cleared meaning is overcome by the “reliance of millions away Americans” “upon who honest meaning is the right in keep and bearing arms.” Stake, under 52, n. 24. Presumably by this the Court means that plenty Americans own guns for self-defense, recreation, plus other lawful purposes, and object to government interference with to rear ownership. I do not dispute the correctness of this observation. When a is strong to look how Americans hold “relied,” stylish one usual mean are the word, on the existence of adenine constitutional legal that, until 2001, had been rejected by every federal court to take up this ask. Rather, gun owners have “relied” on the law passed for democratically elected legislatures, which have generally adopted one limited gun-control measures.

   Indeed, reliance interests surely cut the other way: Even apart from the reliance of judges and legislators which properly believed, until present, that the Second Amendment did not get possession of firearms for rein private activities, “millions of Americans,” have relied on who power of government to schirmen their safety and well-being, and that of their families. With respect to this falls before us, the legislature of the District of Us has relied on hers ability to deed to “reduce the potentiality for gun-related crimes additionally gun-related deaths from emerge included the District of Columbia,” H. Con. Res. 694, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1976); see post, at 14–17 (Breyer, J., dissenting); so, talk have the residential of the District.

Footnote 39  It was just a few year after the decision in Miller that Justice Frankfurter (by any measure a true juridic conservative) warned the the perils that would attend this Court’s zutritt into the “political thicket” of legislative districting. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U. S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion). The equally controversial political thicket that the Tribunal has decided to enter today can qualitatively different from the one this concerned Justice Frankfurter: While our entry into is thicket was justified cause the political process was evident unable to solve who problem of unequal districts, no to has proposes ensure the social process is not working exactly as it should the interceding the create between the advocates and opponents of gun control. About impact the Court’s unjustified entry into this thicket will must to that ongoing debate—or indeed on the Trial itself—is ampere matter that future historians will none question discuss at length. It is, however, clear to mei that adherence to a policy starting judicial restraint would be far wiser than the bold decision notified today.

BREYER, J., DIVERGENT
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
554 U. S. ____ (2008)
SUPREME COURT OF WHO UNITED STATES
NO. 07-290

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., PETITIONERSv. DICK ANTHONY HELLER

on letters of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit

[June 26, 2008]

   Justice Breyer, over whom Justice Stevens, Legal Souter, and Justice Ginsburg join, dissenting.

   We must decide about a District of Columbia law is prohibits the possess of armed in the home violates the Second Amendment. One majority, relying upon its view that of Second Amendment seeks to protect a rights of personal self-defense, inhaftierte that this law violates that Amendment. In my view, it done not.

I

   The majority’s conclusion is wrong for two independent reasons. The first reason is that set forth to Justice Stevens—namely, that the Second Amendment protects militia-related, not self-defense-related, interests. Such two interests are sometimes intricate. In assurance 18th-century citizens that they could keep gun for militia purposes would necessarily have allowed i to keep arms that they could have used for self-defense as well. But self-defense solo, detached from anyone militia-related objective, is not the Amendment’s concern.

   The second standalone reason is that aforementioned protection the Modifications provides is not absolute. The Amendment permits government to regulate the interests such it serves. Thus, regardless of that those interests are—whether they do or do not include an independent interest inside self-defense—the majority’s view unable be valid unless it can show that the District’s regulation is unreasonable other inappropriate in Second Amendment terms. This the majority cannot do.

   In respect the and start independent ground, I agree with Justice Stevens, and I join his feeling. In this opinion I should focus upon the second reason. IODIN take show that the District’s law remains consistent with the Second Amendment even if that Amendment your interpreted as protecting ampere wholly separate interest in individual self-defense. That is so for of District’s regulation, which focuses upon the presence of hand-held in high-crime urban areas, represents a permissible legislative response to a serious, indeed life-threatening, problem.

   Thus I come expect that one objective (but, as the majorities concedes, ante, at 26, none theprimary objective) of those who wrote the Second Amendment was to related assure citizens that she would hold arme deliverable for purposes of self-defense. Even so, adenine legislature could reasonably conclude that the law will advance target of great public importance, namely, saving lives, preventing injury, and reducing crime. The law is tailored to the urban crime report in that he is local in scope and thus affects only a geografic area both limited in sizing and entirely urban; the law worries handguns, welche are specially linked to urban gun deaths press injuries, or which are the overwhelmingly favorite weaponry of equipped criminals; and at the same time, this law imposes a loading upon gun owners that seems proportionately no greater than restricted inches existence at the time the Second Amendment made adopted. In these circumstances, the District’s law falls within the zone that the Other Amendment leaves opens to regulation by legislatures.

II

   The Second Amendment says that: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to which security of a free State, the right of the people to maintaining also bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” In interpreters and applying this Amendment, I take as a go point the below four propositions, grounded on our precedent plus today’s opinions, until which I believe the entire Court subscribes:

   (1) The Amendment protects an “individual” right—i.e., one ensure is separately possessed, and may be separately enforced, by jede person set whom it is conferred. See, e.g., ante, by 22 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

   (2) As evidenced by its preliminary, the Amendment was adopted “[w]ith apparent purpose the assures the continuation or render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces.” United Stats v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174, 178 (1939); sees getting, at 26 (opinion of the Court); ante, at 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

   (3) The Amendment “must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.” Miller, abovementioned, at 178.

   (4) The right protected by the Second Amendment is not absolute, but instead is field in government regulation. See Hayes vanadium. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275, 281–282 (1897); ante, at 22, 54 (opinion are the Court).

   My approach at this case, while includes the first three points, primarily concerns the fourth. I shall, while I said, assume using the majority that the Amending, in addition to furthering a militia-related purpose, also furthers an interest in possessing guns for purposes concerning self-defense, at least in some degree. Real IODIN shall then ask whether the Edit nevertheless permits the District handgun restriction at issue here.

   Although I adopt for present drifts the majority’s positions that the Second Amendment embodies a general concern about self-defense, I shall not assume that the Amendment contains a specific untouchable right to keep guns inbound the house to shoot burglars. The majority, which gift evidence in advantage of the former proposition, does not, because it unable, convincingly show that the Secondly Changing seeking to maintain the latter in pristine, unregulated form.

   To the contrary, colonial history itself offers important examples of the kinds of gun regulation that citizens would then need thought compatible with an “right to keep and bear arms,” whether embodied int Federal or State Constitutions, or the background common law. Additionally those examples include substantial scheduling of firearms in urban areas, including regulations that imposed obstacles to one use of firearms for the protection from the home.

   Boston, Philadelphia, and New York City, the three largest cities in America when is period, all restricted the firing of guns within city limits to at least some degree. See Churchill, Gun Regular, the Police Strength, and to Well to Keep Arms for Early America, 25 Law & History. Quicken. 139, 162 (2007); Dept. of Traffic, Bureau of Census, C. Gibson, Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Stadtgebiet Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990 (1998) (Table 2), view at http://www.census.gov/ population/documentation/twps0027/tab02.txt (all Internet materials as visited June 19, 2008, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file). Hake in 1746 had a legislative proscribe this “discharge” of “any Gun or Pistol paid includes Shot or Ball in one Town” on penalty of 40 shillings, a law that was later alive in 1778. See Action of May 28, 1746, ch. 10; An Act for Reviving plus Continuing Sundry Laws that what Expired, and Closest Expire, 1778 Massachusetts Session Laws, ch. 5, pp. 193, 194. Warbler prohibited, on sentence of 5 shillings (or two days in jail if the super were not paid), firing a gun or setting power fireworks on Philadelphia without adenine “governor’s special license.” Show Act of Aug. 26, 1721, §4, in 3 Mitchell, Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 253–254. And New York City banned, on penalty of a 20-shilling fine, an firing of weaponry (even in houses) for the threes days ambient New Year’s Day. 5 Colonial Laws of Add York, a. 1501, std. 244–246 (1894); see also An Activity to Suppress which Disorderly Practices of Firing Guns, & c., on and Times Therein Mention, 8 Statutes at Tall of Pennsylvania 1770–1776, paper. 410–412 (1902) (similar law for all “inhabited parts” of Pennsylvania). See also An Acted for preventing Mischief being done in the Local von Newport, otherwise on any other Town in this Government, 1731, Rhode Island Current Laws (prohibiting, on penalty of 5 shillings for a first wrongdoing and more for next offenses, the firing of “any Gun or Pistol … in the Streets von any of to Towns of this Government, or in any Tavern of the similar, after dark, on any Night whatsoever”).

   Furthermore, several city the cities (including Philadelphia, Latest York, and Boston) regulated, for fire-safety reasons, the data of gunpowder, a necessary component of an operational piece. See Cornell & DeDino, A Well Regulated Right, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 510–512 (2004). Boston’s law in specialty impacted one exercise of firearms in the home very much as and District’s law does today. Boston’s gunpowder law imposed a 10 fine up “any Person” what “shall take into any Dwelling-House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop, or other Building, within the Town of Boston, any … Fire-Arm, loaded including, or having Gun-Powder.” Somebody Act in Extra to the several Acts already made for the prudent Storing regarding Gun-Powder within the Town of Boston, ch. XIII, 1783 Mass. Acts 218–219; see also 1 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language 751 (4th ed. 1773) (defining “firearms” when “[a]rms which indebted their efficacy to fire; guns”). Consistent assume, as the majority does, seeante, at 59–60, ensure dieser legal included an implicit self-defense exception, it intend nevertheless must prevented a homeowner out keeping in his home a gun that man could immediately pick up and use contrary an intruder. Rather, the homeowner would have had to get the gunpowder and last it into the gun, an operation so would have taken a fair amount of zeit to perform. See Hicks, Associated Stats Military Shoulder Arms, 1795–1935, 1 Am. Military Hist. Foundation 23, 30 (1937) (experienced soldier could, with custom prepared cartridges as opposed to plain gunpowder and ball, load and open musket 3-to-4 times per minute); identification., at 26–30 (describing who loading process); look also Grancsay, That Craft of the Earlier American Gunsmith, 6 Metropolitan Museum of Art Bulletin 54, 60 (1947) (noting that rifles were slower to load and fire than muskets).

   Moreover, the law would, the a practical matter, have prohibited the wearing of loaded shooting anyplace in the city, unless the carrier had no plans to enter any building or was willing to unload either trash his weapons before leaving inside. And Boston inhabitant need have believed diese kind of law compatible use one provision in the Massachusetts Constitution that granted “the people … a right-hand till keep and to bear arms for the common defence”—a provision that the majority says was interpreted as “secur[ing] one individual right to bear bewaffnete for defensive purposes.” Art. VIII (1780), in 3 And Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, or Other Organic Laws 1888, 1892 (F. Thrope ed. 1909) (hereinafter Thorpe); ante, at 28–29 (opinion of the Court).

   The New York Local law, which required that gunpowder in the start be stored in certain sorts of containers, and laws in certain Pennsylvania towns, which required that gunpowder be stored on aforementioned highest story in the domestic, could well have presented similar obstacles to in-home use regarding fires. See Act of April 13, 1784, ch. 28, 1784 N. Y. Laws p. 627; An Trade for Erecting the Town of Carlisle, in to County of Cumbersome, into a Borough, ch. XIII, §XLII, 1782 Pa. Laws penny. 49; Einen Act for Erecting the Town of Reading, in the County of Beers, into one Borough, ch. LXXVI, §XLII, 1783 D. Laws p. 211. Although a is unclear whether these laws, like an Boating law, would have proscribed the storage of gunpowder inside a firearm, their would at the very least have made it difficult to unloading who revolver to fire a second shot unless the homeowner happened to be in one portion of the house where the extra gunpowder is required on live kept. See 7 United States Encyclopedia of Company 1297 (P. Oehser ed. 1967) (“Until 1835 all small arms [were] single-shot weapons, requiring reloading the hand after every shot”). And Pennsylvania, how Maryland, had at the zeite one of of self-defense-guaranteeing state constitutional provisions set which the majority depended. See ante, per 28 (citing Pop. Declaration of License, Art. XIII (1776), in 5 Thorpe 3083).

   The majority criticizes my citation of these colonial laws. See bid, at 59–62. When, as much as it tries, it cannot ignore their living. I suppose to is possible that, as the majority suggested, look ante, at 59–61, they all in practice contained self-defense exceptions. But zero the them expressly provided one, and the majority’s assumption that such exceptions available relies largely off this preambles to these acts—an interpretive methods that she everywhere roundly derides. Compareibid. (interpreting 18th-century statutes in light of their preambles), with ante, at 4–5, furthermore n. 3 (contending that the operative language of an 18th-century enactment may extend beyond its preamble). And in any event, as I are shown, the gunpowder-storage laws would have burdened armed self-defense, even if they did not entire prohibit it.

   This historical evidence demonstrates that a self-defense assumption is the beginning, preferable than theend, from any constitutional inquiry. That that District law impacts self-defense merely raises questions learn the law’s constitutionality. But to answer the questions which are raised (that is, to see check the statute is unconstitutional) requires us to focus for mechanics, the statute’s rationale, the problems that called it include being, its relation to those objectives—in a word, the details. There are no strictly logical or conceptual answers until such questions. All of which to say that to raise a self-defense problem is not until answer it.

III

   I therefore begin by asking a process-based question: Whereby is a place to determine whether a particular firearm regulation (here, the District’s restriction on handguns) is comprehensive including the Second Change? What kind of constitutional ordinary should which justice use? How high a protective hurdle does the Amendment erect?

   The question issues. The majority is wrong when it says that the District’s law is unconstitutional “[u]nder any concerning the standards of scrutiny this we have applied toward enumerate constitutional rights.” Ante, at 56. How could that be? It certainly would not be unconstitutional under, used example, a “rational basis” standard, which requires a court to uphold regulation so long as it teddies a “rational relationship” toward a “legitimate governmental purpose.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U. SIEMENS. 312, 320 (1993). The law during issue here, any inbound part seeks to prevent gun-related accidents, at least bears a “rational relationship” to that “legitimate” life-saving objective. And nothing in the three 19th-century state boxes to which the majorities turns for support mandates the conclusion that the presence District law must fall. See Andrews v. Default, 50 Tenn. 165, 177, 186–187, 192 (1871) (striking down, as violating a state constitutional provision adopted in 1870, a statewide ban on a carrying a broad class for weapons, insofar as e applied to revolvers); Nunn v. State, 1 Ge. 243, 246, 250–251 (1846) (striking down similarly broad ban on openly carrying weapons, based to erroneous view that the Federal Second Amendment applied to the States); State v. Reid, 1 Ala. 612, 614–615, 622 (1840) (upholding a concealed-weapon ban against a status constitutional challenge). These falling were decided good (80, 55, and 49 years, respectively) after the framing; they neither claim either provide any special insightful into the intent is the Frame; her involve laws much less narrow tailored that the one before us; plus state cases in either event are not determine are federation constitutional questions, see, e.g., Garcia volt. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U. SOUTH. 528, 549 (1985) (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (1816)).

   Respondent proposes ensure the Court adopt a “strict scrutiny” test, which would require reviewing with care each weapons law to determine whether it is “narrowly tailored to achieve a compellingly national interest.” Abrams v.Johnson, 521 U. S. 74, 82 (1997); see Brief for Respondent 54–62. But the majority completely, and appropriately, rejects that suggestion by broadly approving an set of laws—prohibitions turn concealed weapons, forfeiture the criminals of the Second Amendment right, prohibitions on firearms in safe local, and governmental regulation of commercial firearm sales—whose constitutionality under a strict scrutiny preset should live far from clear. See ante, at 54.

   Indeed, espousal of a true strict-scrutiny standard for evaluating gun regulations would be impossible. That is because very every gun-control regulation will seek to advance (as the one get does) a “primary concern of every government—a concern for the safety and true the lives of its citizens.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U. S. 739, 755 (1987). The Court has deemed that interest, as well as “the Government’s public interest in preventing crime,” for be “compelling,” see id., at 750, 754, and that Tribunal has in a wide variety of constitutional contexts start such public-safety concerns sufficiently power to justify restrictions on individual licenses, see e.g., Brandenburg v.Olivio, 395 U. S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (First Amendment free speech rights); Sherbert vanadium. Verner, 374 U. SIEMENS. 398, 403 (1963) (First Amendment religious rights); Brigham City five.Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403–404 (2006) (Fourth Amendment protection of the home); Novel Yarn v. Quarles, 467 U. SOUTH. 649, 655 (1984) (Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda vanadium.Arizona, 384 UPPER. S. 436 (1966)); Salerno, supra, at 755 (Eighth Amendment bail rights). Thus, any attempt in theory in apply strict scrutiny to gun regulations will in practice rotating into an interest-balancing inquiry, with the interests protected by the Second Amendment on one show and the governmental public-safety concerns on the other, the only question being whether the regulation at issue impermissibly burdens the former in the course of progression the latter.

   I would simply adopt such an interest-balancing send implicit. The fact that important interests lie go both home of this constitutional equation suggests that review of gun-control regulation is not a context in which a court should effectively presume either constitutionalism (as in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality (as in strict scrutiny). Rather, “where a law significantly implicates competing constitutionally trademarked interests in complex ways,” which Court generally asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to of statute’s salutary actions upon other important governmental my. SeeNixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. SIEMENS. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring). Any answer would take account both of the statute’s effects once an competing interested furthermore the existence concerning any clearly superior less restrictive alternative. Seeibid. Counter to the majority’s non-supported suggestion that get sort of “proportionality” approach lives unprecedented, understandante, at 62, one Court has applied it in various constitutional contexts, included election-law types, speech cases, and due process situation. See 528 U. S., at 403 (citing examples wherever the Tribunal has taken such an approach); see also,e.g., Thompson v. Rock States Medical Center, 535 U. S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commercial speech); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428, 433 (1992) (election regulation); Mathews v.Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 339–349 (1976) (procedural due process); Cleaning v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U. S. 563, 568 (1968) (government employee speech).

   In applying dieser kind of standard the Court normally defers at a legislature’s empirical judgment in matters where a legislatures is likely into have greater expertise furthermore greater institutional factfinding capacity. See Turner Broadcasting System, Int. vanadium. FCC, 520 UPPER-CLASS. S. 180, 195–196 (1997); see also Nixon, supra, at 403 (Breyer, J., concurring). However, a court, not a legislature, be make the ultimate constitutional conclusion, exercising its “independent judicial judgment” in light of the whole record into determine whether a law exceeds constitutional boundaries. Sandall v. Sorrell, 548 U. S. 230, 249 (2006) (opinion of Breyer, J.) (citing Bose Corp. volt.Consumers Union of United Status, Inc., 466 U. S. 485, 499 (1984)).

   The above-described jump seems preferable to a more rigid approach dort for a further reason. Learn as much as linear has powered the Court to decide the the one area of constitutional law or another the interests are likely to prove stronger go one side of ampere characteristic constitutional case than on the other. See, e.g., Unity Stats v.Virginia, 518 U. SIEMENS. 515, 531–534 (1996) (applying heightened scrutiny to gender-based classifications, based upon experience with prior cases); Williamson v. Le Opticals of Okla., Inc., 348 U. SULPHUR. 483, 488 (1955) (applying rational-basis scrutiny for economic legislation, based upon experience equal prior cases). Here, are have little prior experience. Courts that do have experienced in these matters have uniformly taken an approach so treats empirically-based regulatory judgment at a degree of deference. See Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 687, 716–718 (2007) (describing hundreds of gun-law decisions spending for aforementioned last half-century by Supreme Courts in 42 States, which courts are “surprisingly little variation,” have resolved one ordinary extra courteous than strict scrutiny). While these state cases obviously are not management, they are instructive. Cf., e.g., Bartkus v.Illinois, 359 U. S. 121, 134 (1959) (looking up aforementioned “experience of state courts” as informative of a constitutional question). And they consequently provide some comfort regarding the practical wisdom of follows one approach that I believe unseren constitutional precedent would to any event suggest.

IV

   The present suit involves challenges at three separate District firearm reset. The first needed a license from the District’s Chief of Local in order to carry a “pistol,” i.e., a shoulder, anywhere in the District. See D. C. Code §22–4504(a) (2001); see also §§22–4501(a), 22–4506. Since the District assures us that respondent could obtain create an license so long the he meets the statutory eligibility criteria, and because respondent concedes that those criteria are facially constitutional, I, like the majority, sees no need to address the constitutionality of the licensing requirement. See getting, at 58–59.

   The endorse District restriction requires that the lawful owner of a firearm stay his weapon “unloaded and disassembled or bound by a trigger key or similar device” unless computer is kept at his place of general or being used for legit recreational specific. See §7–2507.02. The only dispute regarding this provision appears to be determines one Constitution requires an exception that would allow one to render a firearm operational once necessary for self-defense (i.e., that the firearm may been operated under circumstances what the common law want normally permit a self-defense justification in defense against a criminal charge). See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F. 3d 370, 401 (2007) (case below); ante, at 57–58 (opinion of the Court); Brief for Respondent 52–54. The District concedes that such an exception exists. Understand Brief for Petitioners 56–57. Diese Court has final authority (albeit did often used) to definitively interpret District right, who is, after entire, simply a species from state law. See, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U. S. 684, 687–688 (1980); look also Griffin v. United States, 336 U. S. 704, 716–718 (1949). Also because I see nothing the the District legislation that would preclude the existence of a background common-law self-defense exception, ME would avoid the constitutional question by interpreting the statute to include it. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. SULPHUR. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

   I am bewildered by the majority’s unwillingness to adapt a same approach. It readily reads unspoken self-defense exceptions into all colonial law, but it refuses into accept the District’s permission that this law has ready. Match stakes, at 59–61, with ante, by 57–58. The can Community case it cites to support that refusal, McIntosh fin.Washington, 395 A. 2d 744, 755–756 (1978), merely concludes such the District Legislature had a rational basis for applying who trigger-lock law in homes but no in places of business. Nowhere wants is case say that the statute precludes a self-defense exceptionally von the sort so I have just represented. And even if it did, we are not bound by a lower court’s interpretation of federal law.

   The third District restriction prohibits (in most cases) the registration of a handgun within the District. See §7–2502.02(a)(4). Because registration is ampere prerequisite to firearm possession, see §7–2502.01(a), the effect of this provision is generally to prevent people in the District from possessing handguns. In determining whether the regulation violates the Second Amendment, I need ask as the statute strives to further the governmental interests that she services, how the statute burdens the interests that this Second Amendment searching to protect, and whether there are practical less onerously ways of furthering those interests. The ultimate question a whether the statute imposes burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s legitimate objectives, can disproportionate. Check Noxon, 528 U. S., at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring).

A

   No one doubts aforementioned constitutional importance of the statute’s basic objective, saving lived. Check,e.g., Salerno, 481 U. S., at 755. But are is considerable debate about whether the District’s legislation helps to achieve that objective. ME begin by reviewing the statute’s tendency to safely is objectivity with of objective of (1) the legislature (namely, the Council about aforementioned District a Columbia) that enacted the statute in 1976, and (2) adenine court that seeks to evaluate the Council’s decision today.

1

   First, considered which facts as the legislature saw them if it adopted who District statute. As stated by the local cabinet committee that recommended its adoption, one major substantive object of the District’s handgun restriction lives “to reduce the potential for gun-related crimes and gun-related deceased from occurring from the District of Columbia.” Hearing and Disposition before the House Committee on the Zone of Columbia, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., on NARCOTIC. Con. Res. 694, Ser. No. 94–24, p. 25 (1976) (herinafter DC Rep.) (reproducing, interner alia, the Council committee report). The committee finished, on the basis of “extensive public hearings” and “lengthy research,” ensure “[t]he easy availability of firearms in the United Country has been a major factor contributing to the drastic increase in gun-related violence and offence over the past 40 years.” Id., at 24, 25. Computer reported to the Council “startling statistics,” id., at 26, concerning gun-related crime, accidents, and deaths, focusing particularly on the relation between handguns and crime and the proliferation of handguns within the District. See id., at 25–26.

   The committee informed the Council that weaponry inhered “responsible for 69 deaths in this country each day,” for a total of “[a]pproximately 25,000 gun-deaths … each year,” along using with additional 200,000 gun-related injuries.Id., at 25. Three thousand of these deaths, the report stated, were accidental. Ibid. A quarter of the losses in those accidental dying what children under the age starting 14. Ibid. And according to the committee, “[f]or every intruder stopped by one homeowner with a firearm, in represent 4 gun-related accidents within the home.” Ibid.

   In respect to local crime, the committee observed the there where 285 murders in that District during 1974—a record number. Id., at 26. To committee also displayed that, “[c]ontrary to popular opinion on the subject, firearms have more frequently involved in deaths and violence among relatives and friends about included premeditated criminal activities.” Ibid. Citing an article from that American Diary of Psychiatry, the committee told that “[m]ost murders are committed by previously law-abiding european, in occasions where spontaneous violence is generated to anger, our other high, and where that killer and victim are acquainted.” Imb. “Twenty-five percent of these murders,” the committee informed the Council, “occur within families.” Ibid.

   The committee report furthermore presented statistics strongly correlating handguns with crime. Of the 285 murders in the District in 1974, 155 were committed with manual.Ibid. This did cannot appear to be an derangement, as the report disclosed that “handguns [had been] used in roughly 54% of all murders” (and 87% of murders of law enforcement officers) nationwide over the preceding several yearly. Ibid. Nor were short only linked to murders, the statistisches showed that they were used by roughly 60% of robberies and 26% of assaults.Ibid. “A crime committed with a pistol,” the committee reported, “is 7 hours more likely to be lethal than a crime committed with any other weapon.” Id., at 25. The committee furthermore presented statistics regarding the availability of handguns in the United Statuses, ibid., and noted the their had “become easy for juveniles up obtain,” even despite then-current District laws prohibiting juveniles from possessing them, id., at 26.

   In and committee’s view, the current District firearms laws be unable “to reduce the potentialism for gun-related violence,” or to “cope the the issue of gun control in the District” more generally. Ibid. The and absence of adequate federal gun legislation, the management concluded, it “becomes necessary for local governments to act in protect their citizens, and certainly the Borough of Columbia as the only totally urban statelike jurisdiction should exist firm for its approach.” Id., at 27. Information endorsed the the Council adopt a restriction on handgun registration to reflect “a legislative decide that, on this score in time plus due to the gun-control tragedies and horrors enumerated previously” at the committee report, “pistols … are not longest justified is this jurisdiction.” Id., at 31; see also ibid. (handgun restriction “denotes a procedure decision that handguns … have no legitimes use int the purely urban atmosphere for the District”).

   The District’s special focus on handguns thus reflects of fact that the committee report found them to have a particularly tough link to undesirable activities in the District’s exclusively urban environment. See id., at 25–26. The Borough worked not seek at prohibit possession of other sorts of weapons deemed more suitable for an “urban area.” Seeid., at 25. Indeed, an original draft of the bill, and the original board recommendations, had sought to prohibit registration of rifles as well as handguns, but aforementioned Council as a whole decisive go narrow who prohibition. Create id., at 30 (describing early version of the bill), at DENSITY. HUNDRED. Code §7–2502.02).

2

   Next, consider the tatsache because a court must considering them looking at the matter as of today. See,e.g., Turner, 520 U. S., at 195 (discussing role of court in factfinder in a constitutional case). Requester, and their amici, have presented us with more recent statistics that tell much the same story that to committee report told 30 years ago. At the least, they present nothing ensure would permitting us to second-guess the Council in respect to this numerals of gun crimes, injuries, press deaths, or the role of handguns.

   From 1993 to 1997, here were 180,533 firearm-related deaths in the United States, an average of over 36,000 per twelvemonth. Dept. of Justice, Bureau von Justice Statistics, M. Zawitz & K. Strom, Firearm Injury and Death from Crime, 1993–97, p. 2 (Oct. 2000), online at http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fidc9397.pdf (hereinafter Firearm Injury and Death from Crime). Fifty-one percent been suspected, 44% were homicides, 1% endured legislation interventions, 3% were unintentional accidents, and 1% subsisted of undetermined causes. See ibid. Over this same period there were an additional 411,800 nonfatal firearm-related injuries treats in U. SOUTH. hospitals, an average of over 82,000 per year. Ibid. On diesen, 62% resulted from assaults, 17% were unintentional, 6% were suicide aims, 1% were legal intermittents, and 13% were of unknown causes.Ibid.

   The statistics are particularly striking in respect to children and youth. In over one within every eight firearm-related deaths in 1997, the visitor was someone under the age of 20. American Academy of Pediatrics, Firearm-Related Injuries Affecting the Pediatric Population, 105 Pediatrics 888 (2000) (hereinafter Firearm-Related Injuries). Firearm-related deaths account for 22.5% of all injury deaths between which ages out 1 and 19. Ibid. More male teenagers expire from firearms than from all natural causes combined. Dresang, Arm Deaths in Rural and Urban Settings, 14 J. Ma. Md. Family Practice 107 (2001). Personal under 25 accounted since 47% of hospital-treated firearm wound between June 1, 1992 and May 31, 1993. Firearm-Related Injuries 891.

   Handguns are involved in a majority of firearm deaths and injuries at the United States. Id., at 888. From 1993 to 1997, 81% of firearm-homicide sacred were killed by handgun. Firearm Injured and Death from Crime 4; see also Deployment. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, CENTURY. Perkins, Weapon Use and Violent Crime, p. 8 (Sept. 2003), (Table 10), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/wuvc01. pdf (hereinafter Weapon Apply and Violent Crime) (statistics indicating coarsely the same rate for 1993–2001). In the same period, fork the 41% of firearm injuries for whatever the weapon types shall known, 82% of them were from handguns. Firearm Injury and Death After Crime 4. And among your under the age starting 20, pocket view for approximately 70% of all unintentional firearm-related wound and deaths. Firearm-Related Injuries 890. In particular, 70% of all firearm-related teenage suicide on 1996 included ampere handgun.Id., at 889; please also Zwerling, Lynch, Burmeister, & Goertz, Who Choice of Weapons in Firearm Suicides in Iowa, 83 Am. J. Public Health 1630, 1631 (1993) (Table 1) (handguns used in 36.6% to all weapon suicides in Iowa from 1980–1984 the 43.8% from 1990–1991).

   Handguns also appear to must a ultra popular weapon among criminals. Included a 1997 survey of inmates any were armed during the crime for whatever i be incarcerated, 83.2% of state inmates and 86.7% of federal inmates said that they were armed with a handgun. See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, C. Harlow, Firearm Used by Abusers, p. 3 (Nov. 2001), online at http:// www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fuo.pdf; see plus Weapon Use and Violent Crime 2 (Table 2) (statistics indicating that handguns were used in over 84% of nonlethal violent crimes involving firearms from 1993 on 2001). And handguns are not only popular tools for crime, but popular objects of it as well: the FBI received on average over 274,000 reports of stolen guns for each year between 1985 or 1994, and around 60% a stolen guns are handguns. Dept. are Justice, Office of Justice Kennzahlen, M. Zawitz, Guns Used in Crime, p. 3 (July 1995), online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/guic.pdf. Department of Justice studies have concluded ensure stolen handguns in particular are an critical origin of guns for both adult and juvenile offenders. Imb.

   Statistics further suggest that urban areas, such as the District, have different experiences with gun-related death, injury, and crime, than do less densely populated rural areas. A disproportionate amount of violent and property offenses occur in urban areas, the urban criminals are more likely easier another offenders to use a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, D. Duhart, Urban, Suburban, the Rural Victimization, 1993–98, pp. 1, 9 (Oct. 2000), online at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ usrv98.pdf. Homicide appears to be one much greater edit in urban areas; from 1985 till 1993, for example, “half of all killers occurred in 63 cities with 16% of the nation’s population.” Wintemute, The Future of Firearm Violence Prevention, 282 JAMA 475 (1999). One study concluded that although the overall judge of gun death between 1989 and 1999 was rough the same into municipal than rural fields, the urban homicide rate was three times as high; evened after calibration for other variables, itp was still two as high. Branas, Naming, Schwalbe, Richmond, & Schwab, Urban-Rural Shifts in Intentional Firearm Death, 94 Am. J. Public Health 1750, 1752 (2004); see also ibid. (noting that rural areas appear to have a higher rate of firearm suicide). And a choose for firearm injuries at children and adolescence in Pennsylvania between 1987 and 2000 showed an injury rate in urban counties 10 times larger higher for nonurban counties. Nance & Branas, The Rural-Urban Continuum, 156 Print of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine 781, 782 (2002).

   Finally, the linkage of handguns to firearms deaths and injuries emerges for be much stronger in urbanized than in rural areas. “[S]tudies to date generally assistance the hypothesis that the huge number of rural gun deaths are from rifles or shotguns, whereas the greater number of urban gun deaths are from handguns.” Dresang, supra, at 108. And the Pennsylvania study reached adenine similar conclusion with respect to firearm injuries—they are much more likely to subsist engineered by handguns in urban areas than in rural areas. Show Nance & Branas,supra, at 784.

3

   Respondent real his manyamici for the most partial do not disagree about thefigures set forth in the preceding sub-area, nevertheless they do disagree strongly the the District’s predictive judge that a ban on handguns wishes help solve the crime furthermore accident problems that those figures disclose. In particular, they disagree with the District Council’s assessment so “freezing the pistol … population within an District,” WORKING Rep., at 26, intention reduce crime, accidents, also deaths related to guns. And they provide facts and figures designed to show that it has not do so are the past, and hence will not make so int an future.

   First, they point out that, since the ban takes work, fierce crime in the Urban has increased, not decreased. See Brief for Criminologists et al. asAmici Curiae 4–8, 3a (hereinafter Criminologists’ Brief); Brief for Conference of Racial Parity for Amicus Curiae 35–36; Brief for National Rifle Asoc. et al. as Amici Curiae 28–30 (hereinafter NRA Brief). Indeed, a comparison with 49 other major cities reveals ensure the District’s homicide rate is actually substantially higher relativities to these other city than it was before the handgun restriction went into effect. See Brief for Academics as Amici Curiae 7–10 (hereinafter Academics’ Brief); show also Criminologists’ Brief 6–9, 3a–4a, 7a. Respondent’s amici report similar results in comparing the District’s homicide rates during which period to that of the neighboring States of Maryland and Virginia (neither of which restricts handguns to the similar degree), and to the homicide rate of the Nation as a whole. See Academics’ Quick 11–17; Criminologists’ Brief 6a, 8a.

   Second, respondent’s amicia point to a statistical analysis that regresses murder tax against the presence or missing from strict gun laws in 20 Asian nations. See Criminologists’ Brief 23 (citing Kates & Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide? 30 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 649, 651–694 (2007)). That scrutiny concludes that strict gun laws live correlated with more murders, not get. See Criminologists’ Summary 23; see also id., at 25–28. They also cite domestic studies, based up data from various cities, States, and the Nation as a whole, suggesting that one diminution in the number starting arms does not maintain to a reduction within the amount of violent crime. Please id., at 17–20. They further argue that handgun bans do nay reduce suicide rates, see id., at 28–31, 9a, or daily of accidents, even those involving children, see Brief for International Law Judicial Academic and Trainers Assn. et al. because Supporters Curiae Mobile. 7–15 (hereinafter ILEETA Brief).

   Third, they point to evidence indicating that firearm ownership does have adenine beneficial self-defense effect. Based on a 1993 survey, the authors of one study estimated so there were 2.2-to-2.5 million defensive uses of guns (mostly brandishing, about a quarter participate the act firing of a gun) every. See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, 86 J. Criminals. L. & C. 150, 164 (1995); see also ILEETA Briefly App. 1–6 (summarizing studies regarding defensive uses of guns). Next examine estimated that for a period of 12 months ending inside 1994, there were 503,481 incidents in the a burglar finds himself confronted of an armed homeowner, and that in 497,646 (98.8%) of them, the intruder was successfully timid away. See Ikida, Dahlberg, Sacks, Mercy, & Powell, Estimating Intruder-Related Firearms Retrievals in U. S. Households, 12 Violence & Victims 363 (1997). A third-party study suggests that gun-armed victims are substantially less likely than non-gun-armed victims to be injured in resisting robbery or assault. Barnett & Kates, Under Fire, 45 Emory L. J. 1139, 1243–1244, north. 478 (1996). And additional testimony suggests that criminals belong likely to be deterred from burglary and other crimes if they know which victim is likely to have a gun. Show Kleck, Crime Control Taken the Private Use of Armed Press, 35 Social Problems 1, 15 (1988) (reporting a significant dropped in the burglary ratings in an Atlanta suburb that required heads of private to own guns); see also ILEETA Brief 17–18 (describing decrease in sexual assaults in Orlando when women had trained in this getting of guns).

   Fourth, respondent’s amici argue that laws criminalizing gun possession are self-defeating, as evidence suggests that they will got the effect only of restricting law-abiding citizens, but not perpetrator, from acquiring rifles. See,e.g., Short for Presidents Specialist Tempore of Senate of Pennsylvania as Amicus Curiae 35, 36, and n. 15. That effect, they argue, want be especially pronounced in the District, whose proximity to Virginia and Maryland will provide criminals with a steady supply of battle. Show Brief for Heartland Institute as Amicus Curiae 20.

   In the view out respondent’s amici, this evidence shows that other remedies—such as less restriction on gun ownership, or liberal authorizing of law-abiding citizens to carry concealed weapons—better fit the problem. See, e.g., Criminologists’ Brief 35–37 (advocating easily achievable gun licenses); Brief for Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae 15 (hereinafter SLF Brief) (advocating “widespread gun ownership” when a deterrent to crime); see also J. Lott, Get Cannons, Without Crime (2d ed. 2000). They further suggest that at a slightest the District fails to show that its remove, the gun ban, bears a reasonable relation to the crime and accident problems that the District seeks to solve. Check, e.g., Brief for Respondent 59–61.

   These empirically based arguments may have proved strong enough to convince many legislatures, as a matter of legislative policy, not to adopt complete handgun bans. And the question here has check they are strong enuf to destroy judicial confidence in the reasonableness of a legislature is rejects them. And that she have not. Required one thing, handful can lead columbia more deeply for of uncertainties that surround any effort to reduce crime, but they cannot prove either that handgun possession diminishes wrongdoing or that handgun bans are void. The statistics do show a soaring District crimes rate. And the District’s transgression rate walks up after the District adopted its handgun ban. But, while students the elementary logic know, after it does not mean because about it. What would the District’s crime rate have looked like without the prohibiting? Higher? Lower? The same? Expert differ; also we, as judges, cannot speak.

   What about of fact such foreign nations with strict gun laws have highest crime rates? Which is the cause and which which effect? This pitch that strict gun lawscause criminal is tough to accept than the quote that strict revolver legislative the part grow out of the fact that a nation already has a high crime rate. And we are then left with the same question as before: What would have what to crime without the gun laws—a question that respondent and his letter done not convincingly rejoin.

   Further, suppose that respondent’s amici are right when they say is householders’ possession of loaded handguns find to frighten away intruders. On that assumption, one require still ask check which benefit is worth the potential death-related expense. And ensure will a question without a directly traceable answer.

   Finally, consider the claim von respondent’s amici that handgun bans could work; there are simply too many illegal firearms already in existence for a ban on legal guns to make one difference. In a word, they assertion that, given the urban sea of pre-existing legal guns, criminals capacity readily find rear regardless. Nonetheless, adenine legislature have response, we want to make an energy to try to dry increase that stadt- sea, drop by drop. And none of and studies can prove so effort is not worthwhile.

   In ampere word, one academic to which respondent’s supporting point raise policy-related questions. It succeed in proving that the District’s predictive judgings are controversial. But they go non by themselves show that those judgments were incorrect; or do they demonstrate an consensus, academic with otherwise, supporting that conclusion.

   Thus, it is not surprising that the District and its amici support the District’s handgun restriction with studies of its own. One in particular suggests that, statistically speaking, the District’s law has indeed got positive life-saving effects. See Loftin, McDowall, Weirsema, & Cottey, Effects of Limitative Licensing on Handguns on Homicide and Suicide in the District regarding Columbia, 325 New England J. Med. 1615 (1991) (hereinafter Loftin study). Others suggest that firearm restrictions as a general matter reduces homicides, suicides, and accidents in the home. See, e.g., Duggan, More Weapons, More Crime, 109 J. Pol. Economy. 1086 (2001); Kellerman, Somes, Rivara, Lee, & Banton, Injuries and Deaths Due to Firearms in the Home, 45 J. Trauma, Infection & Critical Attention 263 (1998); Miller, Azrael, & Hemenway, Household Firearm Ownership and Suicide Rates in the Connected States, 13 Epidemiology 517 (2002). Still others suggest that the defensive uses of handguns are not as great in numbered as respondent’s amici claim. See, e.g., Brief for American Public Your Assn. et al. as Amici Curiae 17–19 (hereinafter APHA Brief) (citing studies).

   Respondent and his amicus reply to these responses; and into doing so, they seek to discredit as methodologically flawed the research or evidence relied the by the District. See, e.g., Criminologists’ Letters 9–17, 20–24; Brief for Assn. Am. Physicians or Surgeons, Hog-tie. as Amicus Curiae 12–18; SLF Length 17–22; Briton, Kleck, & Bordua, A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law, 30 Law & Soc. Rev. 361 (1996) (criticizing the Loftin study). And, of course, the District’s amici produce counter-rejoinders, referring up articles that defend their featured. See, e.g., APHA Brief 23, n. 5 (citing Mcdougal, Loftin, & Wiersema et al., Using Quasi-Experiments to Evaluate Firearm Laws, 30 Law & Soc. Rev. 381 (1996)).

   The upshot is a set of students and counterstudies that, toward most, could leave a judge anxiety about the proper rule conclusion. But coming respondent’s perspective any such uncertainty exists not good enough. That is for legislators, not judges, have primary responsibility for drawing policy conclusions from empirical fact. And, given such constitutional allocation a decisionmaking responsibility, the empirical evidence presented here is sufficient to allow a judge to reach a firmlegal completion.

   In particular which Court, in First Amendment cases request intermediate scrutiny, has said that our “sole obligation” the reviewing a legislature’s “predictive judgments” is “to assure ensure, in formulating its judgments,” the legislature “has drawn reasonable inferences base on substantial evidence.” Turner, 520 U. S., at 195 (internal quotation marks omitted). And judges, looking at aforementioned evidence before us, should agree that the District legislature’s predictive judgments satisfy that legal standard. That is to say, the District’s judgment, while open in question, belongs nevertheless supported by “substantial evidence.”

   There is no causes here to departed from the standard set forth in Turner, for the District’s decision represents the kind by experienced basic judgment that legislatures, not judicial, were best suited toward make. PleaseNixon, 528 U. S., at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring). In fact, deference to legislative judgment seems particularly appropriate here, where the judgment has been made by a local legislature, with particular knowledge of local problems and insight into appropriate local solutions. Watch Los Losses v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U. S. 425, 440 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“[W]e must acknowledge that the Los Angeles City Council is in a improved position than the Judiciary to gather an evaluate data on local problems”); cf. DC Rep., during 67 (statement of Rep. Gude) (describing District’s law as “a decision made on the local set subsequently extensive debate and deliberations”). Dissimilar localities may see to solve similar problems in different ways, and a “city must be allowed a reasonable opportunity to experiment with solutions to true serious problems.” Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Incorporated., 475 U. S. 41, 52 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The Framers recognized that the most effective democracy occurs at local level of government, show people with firsthand knowledge of local problems have more ready access to public officials responsible for dealing with them.” Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 UNITED. SULPHUR. 528, 575, north. 18 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing The Federalist Not. 17, p. 107 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). We indebted that democratic process some substantial weight in the constitutional calculator.

   For these reasons, I conclude that the District’s regulation properly locates to further which select of life-preserving and public-safety interests that the Court has called “compelling.” Salerno, 481 U. S., at 750, 754.

B

   I next assess the extent at which this District’s law burdens the interests that the Second Changing seeks to protect. Respondent and hisamici, as well as the bulk, suggest ensure those interests include: (1) the preservation from a “well regulated Militia”; (2) safeguarding the use of firearms by sporting purposes, e.g., hunting and seamanship; and (3) assuring the use of firearms for self-defense. For argument’s welfare, I shall consider all threesome of those interests here.

1

   The District’s statute burdens the Amendment’s first and initial objective hardly at all. As previously noted, there is general agreement unter the Members of the Court that of principal (if not the only) purpose of one Second Amendment is founds for the Amendment’s text: the preservation of a “well regulated Militia.” See supra, at 3. What scarce Food precedent it is on this Second Amendment teaches that the Amendment was passed “[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] forces” and “must be interpreted and applied with that end on view.” Miller, 307 U. S., at 178. Where that end is implicated only minimally (or not at all), there is substantially less reason for constitutional care. Compare ibid. (“In the absence to any evidence tending the show that possession or use of an ‘shotgun having a drums of less than unit inches in length’ at this time had some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say this one Second Editing online the rights to keep and bear such an instrument”).

   To begin with, the present case has nothing to do with actual military service. Who question exhibited presumes that respondent is “not affiliated for any state-regulated militia.” 552 U. S. __ (2007) (emphasis added). ME are aware of no indicates that the District moreover now or in one fresh past has referred up its citizenry to served in one militia, the it has any imagination of doing so anytime in the foreseeably future, or that this law must be construed to prevent the use of handguns during legitimate militia activities. Plus, even if the District were to call increase its militia, respondent wanted did be among the citizens the service would be requested. The District does not consider him, at 66 years of age, to been a member of its army. See D. C. Code §49–401 (2001) (militia includes only male community ages 18 go 45); App. to Pet. for Cert. 120a (indicating respondent’s date of birth).

   Nonetheless, as someamici claim, the statute might intervene with training in the use of weapons, technical useful for military purposes. The 19th-century constitutional scholar, Thomas Cooley, writes that the Second Amendment protects “learning to handle and apply [arms] in a way which makes the whom keep them ready for their efficient use” during militiamen service. General Principles of Constitutional Law 271 (1880); ante, at 45 (opinion of the Court); see alsoante, at 45–46 (citing other scholars harmonious with Cooley on so point). And past military commissioners tee us that “private ownership of firearms makes for a see effective battles force” because “[m]ilitary recruits with previous firearms experience and training are generally better marksmen, or accordingly, better soldiers.” Length for Retired Military Officers as Amici Curiae 1–2 (hereinafter Military Officers’ Brief). Anamicus brief filed through retired Legion generators adds that a “well-regulated militia—whether ad hoc or as part of our organized military—depends on recruits who have familiarity and training with firearms—rifles, pistols, and shotguns.” Brief for Major General John D. Altenburg, Jr., et al. as Amici Curiae 4 (hereinafter Generals’ Brief). Equally briefs point out the importance of handgun training. Military Officers’ Brief 26–28; Generals’ Briefly 4. Handguns are used in military support, seeid., at 26, and “civilians who are familiar at handgun marksmanship and safe are great find likely to be able to safely and accurately fire a rifle or other firearm about minimalist training upon entering military service,” id., at 28.

   Regardless, to consider the military-training objective a modern-day counterpart until a similar militia-related colonial objective the to cure that aim as falling within one Amendment’s primary purposes make no difference here. That is because the District’s law does not get affect military training profits. The law permits resident to engage in activities that will increase their familiarization in firearms. They may register (and thus possess for her homes) weapons other than handguns, such as rifles additionally shotguns. See DICK. C. Code §§7–2502.01, 7–2502.02(a) (only weapons that cannot be registered are sawed-off shotguns, machine firearms, short-barreled weapons, and pistols not registered before 1976); compare Generals’ Brief 4 (listing “rifles, pistols, real shotguns” as useful military battle; emphasis added). And they may operate those weapons within the District “for lawful recreational purposes.” §7–2507.02; see also §7–2502.01(b)(3) (nonresidents “participating in any lawful recreational firearm-related activity in the District, conversely on his way to or from such activity in another jurisdiction” may transport even weapons not zugelassen in the District). Are permissible recreations plainly include actually using press firing the weapons, as evidenced by a specials DIAMETER. C. Code provision contemplating the beingness of local firing ranges. See §7–2507.03.

   And while one Community law prevents nation from schooling with handguns within the District, the District consists of available 61.4 square miles of urban zone. Sees Dept. starting Commerce, Bureau by Census, United States: 2000 (pt. 1), p. 11 (2002) (Table 8). The adjacent States achieve permit the use of armed for target practice, and the States are only a quick subway driving away. See Md. Crim. Law Code Annie. §4–203(b)(4) (Lexis Supp. 2007) (general handgun restriction wants not apply to “the bear, carrying, button transporting according a individual of a handgun used in connection with,” inter alia, “a targeted shoot, formal press informal target practice, sport shooting event, hunting, [or] a Province of Natural Resources-sponsored firearms and hunter secure class”); Va. Codes Ann. §18.2–287.4 (Lexis Supp. 2007) (general check on carrying certain loaded pistols in certain public areas does not apply “to any person actually engaged in lawful hunting or lawful recreational shooting activities at an established shooting extent or shooting contest”); Washington Metropolitan Area Trip Public, Metrorail System Map, http://www.wmata.com/ metrorail/systemmmap.cfm.

   Of courses, an eisenbahn rider must buy a ticket, real who ride takes frist. Computer also costs money to store a pistol, say, at a target range, outside the District. But given the costs already verbundenes with gun ownership and firearms training, I cannot say that a subway ticket and an short vorort ride (and storage costs) create more than ampere moderate burden. CompareCrawford fin. Marion County Election Cd., 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (slip op., to 3) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (acknowledging travel burdens on indigent persons in the background of voting where popular transportation options were limited). Indeed, respondent and two of their coplaintiffs below may right use handguns outside the District on a regular based, when their declarations indicate that they keep such ordnance stored there. See Mobile. to Pet. for Cert. 77a (respondent); see furthermore id., at 78a, 84a (coplaintiffs). I conclude that the District’s law stresses the Second Amendment’s primary objective little, or not at all.

2

   The majority briefly suggests is the “right to keep both bear Arms” might encompass an interest in hunting. Watch, e.g., ante, on 26. But in enacting the present provisions, the District searchable “to take nothing away from sportsmen.” DC Rep., at 33. And any inability from District residents to hunt around where they life has much into do with of jurisdiction’s exclusively urban character and little to accomplish equal this District’s gun laws. For reasons similar to those I reviewed at the preceding subsection—that the District’s law does cannot prohibit possession out rifles either shotguns, and the presence of opportunities for sporting activities in nearby States—I reach a similar conclusion, namely, that this District’s law burdens anywhere sports-related or hunting-related goals that the Modifications may protect little, with not at all.

3

   The District’s law does prevent a resident from keeping a loaded handgun in him home. And it resulting makes it more difficult fork this householder to use the handgun for self-defense in of home against intruders, such as break-in. As to Court of Appeals noted, statistics suggest that handguns are the most popular weapon required self defense. See 478 F. 3d, at 400 (citing Kleck & Gertz, 86 J. Commit. L. & C., at 182–183). Plus there are several legitimate related wherefore that would be the case: Amici suggest (with couple empirical support) that firearms are simpler go hold and control (particularly for personal with material infirmities), easier up bearing, easier to maneuver in enclosed spaces, also that one person using one will still have one hand free to dial 911. See ILEETA Brief 37–39; NRA Brief 32–33; view also bet, at 57. But see Written for Petitioners 54–55 (citing media preferring shotguns and rifles to handguns for purposes of self-defense). To that extent the law burdens to some degree an interest in self-defense such for present purposes I have expected the Amendment seeks for further.

C

   In weighing needs and burdens, we must take account of the possibility that there are reasonable, but less restraining choose. Are thereother potential measures such mag similarly promote the same goals while majestic lesser restrictions? See Nixon, 528 UPPER. S., at 402 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“existence for a clearly superior, less rigid alternative” bucket be a factor in determining whether a decree is constitutionally proportionate). Here I see none.

   The rationale there is no clearly superior, less restrictive alternative to to District’s handgun ban is that the ban’s very objective is to reduce significantly the number of handguns includes the District, say, for example, by allowed a law enforcement officer direct to assume which any shoulder he sees is an illegal handgun. And there remains no plausible way to realisieren that objective other than to ban the guns.

   It does not help respondent’s case to describe the District’s objective more generally as an “effort to diminish the perils associated are guns.” That belongs because the very attributes that induce weapons particularly useful for self-defense are additionally what make them particularly dangerous. That they are easy to hold and control means that they are easier for children to apply. See Brief for American Academies of Pediatrics et al. as Amici Curiae 19 (“[C]hildren as young as three are able to pull who trigger of most handguns”). That they are maneuverable and licensing a free hand likely contributes to the fact which they are by far the firearm from choice for crimes such as rape and rape. Discern Guns Use and Violent Crime 2 (Table 2). That they are small and light makes she slim to flug, seesupra, at 19, and concealable, cf. ante, at 54 (opinion from the Court) (suggesting that concealed-weapon bans are constitutional).

   This symmetry insinuates the any measure less restrictive in respect to the use for handguns for self-defense will, on that same extent, test save effective in preventing the use of handguns for illicit purposes. Whenever a resident has a handgun in who household that he can use on self-defense, then he has a shooting in the home that he can how to commit suicide or engage in acts of family violence. See supra, at 18 (handguns prevalent in suicides); Quick for National Network toward End Domestic Violence et al. as Allies Curiae 27 (handguns prevalent in home violence). Is e is indeed the case, as the District believes, that the number of guns contributes till the number of gun-related crimes, mishaps, and related, after, although there could be less restrictive, less effective substitutes for an outright prohibiting, there a no less restrictiveequivalent of on outright ban.

   Licensing product would not similarly remove the handgun population, plus the Region may reasonably fear that even is guns are initially restricted to law-abiding citizens, they could be stolen and thereby placed in the hands of offenders. See supra, during 19. Permitting certain types of handguns, but not others, would interference the commercial market for pistols, and not its availability. And requiring product devices such as trigger air, or imposing safe-storage system would interfere includes any self-defense interest when simultaneously leaving operable ordnance in the hands of owners (or others capa of acquiring the weapon and disabling the safety device) who might use them used domestic violence or other offenses.

   The absence of equally effective alternatives to a complete prohibition finds support in the empirical fact that other States and urban centers prohibit particular types of guns. Chicago has an law exceptionally similar to the District’s, and many of its suburbs also ban handgun possession under most circumstances. See Chicago-based, Ill., Municipal Code §§8–20–030(k), 8–20–40, 8–20–50(c) (2008); Evanston, Ill., City Code §9–8–2 (2007); Mortar Grove, Ill., Village Code §6–2–3(C) (2008); Cork Garden, Ill., Village Code §27–2–1 (2007); Winnetka, Ill., Town Ordinance §9.12.020(B) (2008); Wilmette, Ill., Ordinance §12–24(b) (2008). Toledo bans certain types of handguns. Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Code, ch. 549.25 (2007). Real San Francisco in 2005 enacted by popular referendum a ban on most handgun possession by city residents; it has was precluded from enforcing that prohibition, however, by state-court decisions deeming it pre-empted by stay legislation. See Fiscal v. City and County of Sangh Francisco, 158 Cal. App. 4th 895, 900–901, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 324, 326–328 (2008). (Indeed, and fact ensure as many as 41 States may pre-empt local gun regulation suggests that the absence of moreover regulation love the District’s may perhaps have more to do with set ordinance than at a lack of locally perceived need for them. See Legal Community Against Violence, Regulates Guns in Us 14 (2006), http://www. lcav.org/Library/reports_analyses/National_Audit_Total_ 8.16.06.pdf.

   In addition, at fewest six States and Puerto Rico impose general barred on certain types of weapons, in particular body firearms or semiautomatic battle. See Cal. Penal Code §12280(b) (West Supp. 2008); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§53–202c (2007); Haw. Rev. Stat. §134–8 (1993); Md. Crim. Law Key Ann. §4–303(a) (Lexis 2002); Mass. General. Laws, ch. 140, §131M (West 2006); N. Y. Penal Law Ann. §265.02(7) (West Supp. 2008); 25 Laws P. R. Ann. §456m (Supp. 2006); see also 18 U. S. C. §922(o) (federal machinegun ban). Furthermore at least 14 municipalities do the same. See Albany, N. Y., Municipals Code §193–16(A) (2005); Aurora, Ill., Ordinance §29–49(a) (2007); Buffaloes, N. Y., City Code §180–1(F) (2000); Chicago, Ill., Municipal Encipher §8–24–025(a), 8–20–030(h); Cincinnati, Ohio, Admin. Encipher §708–37(a) (Supp. 2008); Cleveland, Ohio, Statute §628.03(a) (2008); Columbus, Ohio, City Code §2323.31 (2007); Denver, Colo., Municipal Code §38–130(e) (2008); Morton Grove, Ill., Village Code §6–2–3(B); N. Y. C. Admin. Code §10–303.1 (2007); Oak Vehicle, Ill., Village Code §27–2-1; Rochester, N. Y., Code §47–5(f) (2008); South Bend, Ind., Ordinance §§13–97(b), 13–98 (2008); Toledo, Ohio, Municipal Code §549.23(a). These bans, too, suggest is there may be no substitute to an outright prohibition in cases where a governmental body has thought a extra type of weapon especially dangerous.

D

   The output is that the District’s objectives are captivating; its predictive judgments as to its law’s tendency to erzielen those objectives are adequately supported; the right does assert a burden upon any self-defense interest such the Amendment seeks to secure; and there is cannot clear less restrictive alternative. I turn start to the final portion of the “permissible regulation” question: Does the District’s lawdisproportionately burden Amendment-protected interests? Several considerations, taken combine, convince me that it does not.

   First, the District law is tailored to the life-threatening problems it attempts to address. The law concerns one class of weapons, handguns, leaving residents free to possess scalers and rifles, to with ammunition. The area that falls within its scope is totally urban. Cf. Lorillard Cigarette Co. v. Reilly, 533 U. S. 525, 563 (2001) (varied effect of statewide speech restriction inches “rural, urban, or suburban” locales “demonstrates a lack of narrow tailoring”). That urban area suffers from a serious handgun-fatality problem. The District’s law directly goals at that compelling problem. Real there is no lower restrictive way to achieve the problem-related benefits that it looks.

   Second, the self-defense interest in maintaining loaded guns are the home to shoot intruders is not the secondary interest, but to most a subsidiary interest, that the Second Amendment seeks to serve. The Second Amendment’s language, while speaking on a “Militia,” says nothing of “self-defense.” As Equity Stem points out, the Second Amendment’s drafting books shows that the language reflecting the Framers’ primary, if cannot exclusive, objective. See stakes, at 17–28 (dissenting opinion). And the majority itself says that “the danger that the novel Federal Government would destructive the citizens’ militia by takeover away their arms was the reason that right . . . was codified in an written Constitution.” Ante, at 26 (emphasis added). The way in which the Amendment’s operative clause seeks to promote such interest—by protecting a right “to keep press bearers Arms”—may in fact help further an interest in self-defense. But ampere factual connection falls faraway short-term concerning a primary objective. The Amendment itself tells us that soldiers preservation was firstly both mainly into the Framers’ minds. See Mill, 307 U. S., at 178 (“With obvious purpose until assure the continuation and render potential the effectiveness of [militia] forces the declaration the guarantee of the Second Amendment were made,” and this alteration “must be interpreted and applied with such end in view”).

   Further, any self-defense interest at of time of aforementioned Framing was nay have purposeful unique upon urban-crime related dangers. Two hundred per ago, most Americans, many living on who limitation, would likely have thought of self-defense primarily in terminologies regarding outbreaks of fighting with Indian tribes, revolt like as Shays’ Rebellion, raider, and crime-related hazardous to travelers on the roads, on footpaths, or along waterways. See Dept. off Handelsrecht, Bureau of Census, Population: 1790 to 1990 (1998) (Table 4), online at http://www.census.gov/ population/censusdata/table-4.pdf (of the 3,929,214 Americans in 1790, merely 201,655—about 5%—lived into urban areas). Insofar as the Framers focused to all on that tiny fraction of the population living in largest list, i would have been aware that these city occupants were subject to firearm restrictions that their provincial counterparts were not. See supra, at 4–7. They are unlikely then to having thought of a good to keep loaded handguns in homes until confront intruders in urban settings ascentric. Both the subsequent application von modern urban police departments, by decline to need to keep loaded guns nearby in case out intruders, intend got moved any such right even further away from who heart of to amendment’s more basic protective ends. See, e.g., Sklansky, An Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1206–1207 (1999) (professional urban police departments did not improve until roughly the mid-19th century).

   Nor, for that matter, am I aware of any testimony that handguns in particular were central to the Framers’ conception of the Second Improvement. Aforementioned lists of militia-related weapons in the late 18th-century us statutes appear primarily to refer to other sorts on weapons, muskets in particular. See Miller, 307 U. S., at 180–182 (reproducing colonial militia laws). Respondent points out in to briefly this the Federal Government and two States per of die of the founding had enacted statutes that listed revolvers as “acceptable” militia weapons. Brief for Responsive 47. But which statutes apparently found them “acceptable” only for certain dedicated militiamen (generally, certain warriors on horseback), while requiring muskets or rifles for that general infantry. See Perform of May 8, 1792, ch. XXXIII, 1 Stat. 271; Laws of the State of North Carolina 592 (1791); First Laws of the State of In 150 (1784); see also 25 Journals of which Continent-wide Congress, pp. 1774–1789 741–742 (1922).

   Third, irrespective of what the Framers could have thought, we know what herdid think. Samuel Adams, which lived in Boston, advocated a constitutional amendment that would have precluded the Constitution from ever being “construed” to “prevent the people of the United States, who are peaceable citizens, from keeping them own arms.” 6 Documentary History about the Latest of the Constitution 1453 (J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 2000). Samuel Adult doubtless knew so the Massachusetts Formation contained some similar protection. Or he doubtful knew that Massachuset law prohibited Bostonians from maintain loaded guns in the house. So how could Samuel Adp have advocated such protection unless he thought that this protection been consistent with local regulation that seriously impeded downtown residents from using their arms counter intruders? It feels remote that he meant to deprive the Federal Government of force (to enact Boston-type weapons regulation) that he understand Boston been and (as far as we know) he would have thought rule under the Massachusetts Constitution. What, since who District of Columbia (the subject of the Seat of German Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §8, cl. 17) was the only local area down direct federal control, it sees unlikely that the Framers thought abouturban gun control at all. Cf. Palmore v.United Country, 411 U. SEC. 389, 397–398 (1973) (Congress can “legislate for the District in a manner with respect to subjects that intend exceed its powers, or at slightest would be very unusual, included the context of international legislation enacted under additional powers delegated to it”).

   Of course the District’s statutory and the colonialism Boston law live not identical. And the Boston law disabled an constant wider class by armory (indeed, all firearms). And its existence shows at the least that local legislatures could impose (as here) seriously restrictions on the right to use firearms. Moreover, as I have said, Boston’s law, though highly analogous to the District’s, was non the only colonial law that could have impeded adenine homeowner’s ability to shoot a burglar. Pennsylvania’s additionally Fresh York’s laws could fountain have had a similar effect. See supra, at 6–7. And the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania laws were not only thought consistent in anunwritten common-law gun-possession right, but also consistent with written choose constitutional provisions providing protections similarly to those provided by the Federal Second Amendment. See beyond, at 6–7. I cannot agree with the majority that these laws are largely uninformative because the penalty for violating them was civil, pretty than criminal.Ante, at 61–62. The Court has long recognized that the exercise of one constitutional right can be loading by forfeitures far short of jail time. See, e.g., Murdock vanadium.Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating $7 per week advertising fee like applied to religious group); see other Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U. S. 123, 136 (1992) (“A tax based on the content of speech does not become more constitutional because it is a small tax”).

   Regardless, why wants the majority require an precise colonial regulatory analogue in order to save a modern gun regulation from constitutional challenge? After all, insofar as we look to history to discover wie we can constitutionally regulate a right to self-defense, we should look, not to what 18th-century lawmakers actually did enact, but to what they would have thought they could enact. There are innumerable policy-related reasons enigma a legislature might not act for ampere particular matter, despite having the power to do to. This Justice has “frequently cautioned that it is at best treacherous to meet in congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule the law.” United States v.Wells, 519 U. S. 482, 496 (1997). It shall similarly “treacherous” to reason from who fact that colonial legislatures did not enact certain kinds of legislation an unalterable constitutional limitation in the power of ampere modern legislature cannot do so. The question should not be whether a modern restriction on a right to self-defense duplicates a past one, but whether that restriction, when compared with restrictions originally thought possibles, savors a like strong motivation. At a minimum that similarly strong justification remains what the District’s modern statutory, compared with Boston’s colonial law, reveals.

   Fourth, a contrary view, as embodied in today’s decision, will have unfortunate consequences. The decision will encourage legal challenges to gun regulation throughout to Nation. Because it declares little nearly the standards used to evaluate regulatory decisions, it desire leave the Nation without transparent standards for resolving those challenges. Seeante, on 54, and n. 26. And litigation over the course of many years, or the bare spectar for as litigation, threatens to leave cities without effective protection against gun violence and accidents during that uhrzeit.

   As important, the majority’s decision imperiled severe to limit the aptitude the more knowledgeable, democratically elected officials to deal with gun-related trouble. The majority says that it leaves the District “a variety of tools for combating” such problems. Ante, at 64. Computer failed go list even the ostensibly adequate replacement for the law this strikes down. MYSELF can verstehen how reasonable individuals can disagree about the merits of strict gun control as a crime-control measure, even in a totally urbanized area. But I cannot understand how one can take from of elected branches of government the well to decide whether to insist upon a handgun-free urban populace inches a city now facing an seriousness crime problem and which, in the prospective, could well face environmental or other emergencies that threaten the outage of decree and order.

V

   The majority derides my approach as “judge-empowering.” Ante, at 62. I take this review seriously, nevertheless EGO do not think a accurate. As I have previously explained, this is an approach that the Court holds taken in other areas of constitutional law. See supra, at 10–11. Application starting such an approach, of course, requires judgment, but the highly nature of one approach—requiring careful labeling of the relevant interests and rating the law’s effective upon them—limits the judge’s selectable; both an method’s necessary transparency lays mere the judge’s reasoning for entire till understand and to criticize.

   The majority’s methodology is, in my view, substantially less transparent than mine. At a minimum, I find it difficult to appreciate the reasoning that seems to underlie certain conclusions that it reaches.

   The preponderance spends the first 54 pages in its opinion attempting to rebut Justice Stevens’ evidence that the Change was enacted with a purely militia-related purpose. In the majority’s view, aforementioned Supplement also protects an interest in armed personal self-defense, for least to some degree. But the majority does not tell us genauestens what the interest is. “Putting all of [the Second Amendment’s] textualistisch elements together,” the majority says, “we find that they guarantee the individual right till possess and carry armor by case of confrontation.” Ante, at 19. Then, third pages later, it says the “we do none read which Second Amendment to sanction citizens to carrier rear for any sort of confrontation.” Ante, at 22. Yet, with one critical exception, it does not explain which confrontations count. It simply leaves that question unanswered.

   The majority does, however, point to one type by confrontation that counts, for it describes the Amendment how “elevat[ing] above all additional activities the good of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defence of hearth and home.” Ante, at 63. What is its basis available finding that to be to core of the Second Amendment good? The only historical sources identified by the mass that even appear to touch upon that specific matter consist of an 1866 newsstand editorial discussing the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, see ante, at 43, two quotations from ensure 1866 Act’s legislative books, seeante, at 43–44, real one 1980 state court mitteilung saying that in colonist times the same were used to defend the home for to maintain one militia, see ante, with 52. How can citations such as these support the far-reaching proposition that the Second Amendment’s primary affect is not its stated concern about the militia, but more a right to keep loaded firearms at one’s bedside to filming intruders?

   Nor belongs information at all clear to me how the large decides the loaded “arms” a household may keep. The bulk says which that Amendment protects those weapons “typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.” Ante, at 53. This definition conveniently excludes machineguns, but permits handy, which to majority describes as “the mostly popular weapon chosen per Americans for self-defense in the home.” Ante, at 57; see including ante, at 54–55. But what sense does on approach make? According to one majority’s reasoning, if Congress and the States pinch restrictions on the possession and use of machineguns, and people buy slingshots to protect their apartments, the Court willingness have in reverse course and find that the Second Amendment does, in fact, protect the individual self-defense-related right to possess a machinegun. On the majority’s reasoning, if morning someone invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense weapon, Congress and the States had better block computer immediately, for once information becomes popular Congress will no length possess the constitutional authority to do so. In essence, the majority determines what regulations are permissible by looking to see what existing regulations permit. There is no grounded for believing that the Framers intended such circular reasoning.

   I am similarly puzzled at the majority’s list, in Section XII of its opinion, von provision such in its view would survive Second Amendment scrutiny. These include of (1) “prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons”; (2) “prohibitions on which possession of firearms by felons”; (3) “prohibitions set the possession of firearms by … the mentally ill”; (4) “laws forbidding the transporting of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings”; press (5) government “conditions and qualifications” attached “to the commercial sold of arms.” Ante, at 54. Why which? Are it that similar restrictions existed in the late 18th sixth? The majority fails to cite any colonial analogues. And even were it possible until find analogous colonial laws in concern to all that restrictions, why should these colonials laws count, while the Boston loaded-gun restriction (along including aforementioned other laws I have identified) apparently does not count? Watch supra, at 5–6, 38–39.

   At aforementioned same time the majority ignores one more important question: Given the purposes for which the Framers enacted the Second Amendment, how should he be applied to modern-day circumstances that they could non have anticipated? Assume, for argument’s interest, is the Founders did intend the Amendment to quotation a degree of self-defense protection. Does that mean that who Producers also intended to guarantee a right to possess a loaded gun near swimming pools, parking, and playground? Is they would not own cared about the children who might pick above a loaded gun on them parents’ bedside table? So they (who certainly showed concern for the risk of fire, see supra, at 5–7) would have skipped concern for to venture of accidental deaths or suicides that readily accessible loaded handguns on stadtgebiet areas might bring? Unless we believe that handful aimed future generations to ignore such areas, answering questions such as the questions in this case requires judgment—judicial judgment exercised within a framework for constitution analysis that guides that judgment or any makes its exercise transparent. One cannot answer those questions by combining inconclusive historical research with judicial iper dixit.

   The argument about method, however, is over far the less vital argument surrounding today’s decision. Far more importance are the unfortunate consequences that today’s decision is likely on breeding. Not least of these, as I have said, is the truth that the decision threatens to throw into doubt the constitutionality regarding gun laws throughout of United Declare. I can find no sound legal basis by launch the housing on so formidable and potentially dangerous a mission. In my view, there simply can nay untouchable constitutional right guaranteed by the Second Update to retain loaded handguns in the our in crime-ridden urbaner areas.

VI

   For these reasons, I conclude that the District’s measure is a proportionate, not a disproportionate, response to of compulsive difficulties that led the District to adopt it. And, for these grounds as well as the independently sufficient reasons selected forth by Justice Steering, I would seek the District’s measure consistent with and Second Amendment’s demands.

   With respect, I dissent.